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 On behalf of Lincoln Memorial University’s Duncan 
School of Law, the Law Review Editorial Board would like to 
extend the warmest welcome to our Volume 4 readers. For the 
2016-2017 academic year, the Law Review underwent some 
significant changes. We welcomed new faculty advisors, 
Professor Akraim Faizer2 and Professor William Gill,3 to our 
team, and said farewell to Academic Dean Matt Lyon, who had 
provided leadership and insight to the Law Review staff. We 
cannot thank him enough for his hard work and dedication. 
Professors Faizer and Gill will further develop the Law 
Review’s scholarship, focusing on academic excellence and 
advancing positive change throughout our community. 
 No discussion of change at the Duncan School of Law 
would be complete without acknowledging the contributions of 
former Tennessee Supreme Court Chief Justice Gary Wade. 
                                                 
1 Evan Wright, Juris Doctor Candidate (2017) and Editor in Chief of 
the Lincoln Memorial University Law Review. 
2 See Akraim Faizer, Exacerbating the Divide: Why the Roberts Court’s 
Recent Same-Sex Jurisprudence is an Improvident Use of the Court’s 
Judicial Review Power, 24 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395 (2014). 
3 See William Gill, A Tale of Two Ironies: In Defense of Tort, 25 PAC. 
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 343 (2012) (with David Partlett). 
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Having grown up in rural Appalachia,4 Dean Wade knows 
exactly what the mission of this law school means to this region. 
During his tenure, Dean Wade has fostered positive change that 
will reverberate for years to come. The Law Review Board 
recognizes these accomplishments, and we are excited about 
future developments, including Lincoln Memorial University’s 
partnership with East Tennessee Legal Aid. Together we can be 
an instrument of positive change in the world around us. 
 Volume 4 will mark a new era for LMU. We now publish 
online articles in a new rolling format, issuing an article or 
articles monthly to disperse quality scholarship at times more 
relevant to the subject matter. No longer will submissions set 
dormant waiting to proceed through the various stages of the 
publication and printing process. Each academic semester will 
feature several articles comprising an issue, each academic year 
corresponding to a Volume. As the Law Review develops this 
process, articles will gravitate toward fresh, relevant material 
elevating the scholarship of this journal. 
 The Editorial Board would also like to show our 
gratitude to those who came before us. Volume 4, Issue 1 will 
contain four articles that the 2015-2016 Editorial Board worked 
diligently to develop. In addition, two of these articles are 
authored by our former Editor in Chief, Jacob Baggett.5 Both 
submissions elevated the level of scholarship and dedication 
expected of future students submitting Notes to this 
publication. 
 In conclusion, we hope Volume 4’s new rolling 
publication meets and exceeds our reader’s expectations. For 
potential authors, we look forward to publishing submissions 
earlier, presenting your scholarship to others fresh and 
untainted by the passage of time. We endeavor to effectuate 
                                                 
4See DUNCAN SCHOOL OF LAW, 
http://law.lmunet.edu/2015/07/28/tenn-supreme-court-justice-
gary-r-wade-to-be-dean-of-lmu-law/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2009). 
5Jacob Baggett, Juris Doctor (2015) and former Editor-in-Chief of the 
Lincoln Memorial University Law Review. 
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positive change in our region, the legal community, and the 
entire world around us. If you would like to become part of our 
mission, please submit your article to our board for review, and 

























“I got into this because the O’Briens needed my help. I never 
wanted a baby, but now . . . I just wish I could hold him in my 
arms, and never let him go.” 
 
Major Kira to Odo, discussing her surrogacy, Star Trek: Deep 




 From legal and sociological perspectives, surrogacy 
arrangements, along with the accompanying contracts, remain 
hot topics of debate.  In addition to a colorful body of 
jurisprudence, a New York Times article from September 2014 
reported a story in which intended parents attempted to bribe 
a Connecticut surrogate to undergo an abortion procedure after 
having learned the developing fetus had heart and brain defects 
as well as a cleft palate.2 Refusing to either accept the bribe or 
                                                 
1 Jacob Baggett, Juris Doctor (2015) and former Editor-in-Chief of the 
Lincoln Memorial University Law Review.   
2 Tamar Lewin, Surrogates and Couples Face a Maze of Laws, State by 
State, N.Y. TIMES, September 17, 2014, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/us/surrogates-and-couples-
face-a-maze-of-laws-state-by-state.html?smprod=nytcore-
iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=0.  The article was 
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undergo the abortion procedure, the surrogate fled to 
Michigan, where surrogacy contracts are illegal.3  
 The birth certificate listed the surrogate as the child’s 
mother, despite the fact the surrogate had no genetic connection 
with the child.4 Eventually, a family with other special-needs 
children adopted the child.5 The New York Times article also 
provided several state-by-state diagrams which illustrated the 
complex legal landscape concerning surrogacy, aptly calling it 
a “maze.”6 Tennessee’s lack of statutory guidance regarding 
surrogacy issues creates one of the dead ends within this 
nationwide maze.  
 Since the mid-1990’s, the Tennessee General Assembly 
has remained entrenched in neutrality with regard to issues 
terms the parties’ surrogacy agreement may legally contain. Of 
these issues, the most heavily emphasized was public policy.   
 Part One of this note discusses the relevant surrogacy 
arrangement terminology and outlines key statutes and cases 
detailing the nationwide legal maze of surrogacy. Part Two 
discusses the facts giving rise to Baby, the sources of Tennessee 
law examined, and the Court’s analysis and holdings in Baby. 
Finally, Part Three examines Louisiana’s legislative efforts as a 
case study exhibiting the various difficulties legislatures may 
experience when addressing surrogacy issues. These 
difficulties may lead a state’s highest court to determine it has 
an obligation to act. The Tennessee Supreme Court did.    
PART ONE: BACKGROUND 
I. TERMINOLOGY OF SURROGACY AGREEMENTS 
                                                 
published one day before the Tennessee Supreme Court released its 
opinion in In re Baby). 
3 Id.; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 7.22.851- .863 (West 2013).  
4 Id. 
5 Id.  
6 Id. 
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 This note concerns two types of surrogacy arrangements: 
traditional7 and gestational.8 Traditional surrogacy 
arrangements involve a woman, the surrogate mother, whose 
egg is fertilized by means of artificial insemination and the 
surrogate mother carries the fetus until birth for the benefit of 
another.9 On the other hand, a gestational surrogacy 
arrangement involves the intended mother supplying her egg 
to be transferred, housed, artificially inseminated, and the fetus 
carried to term by another woman, the surrogate mother.10 
Gestational surrogate mothers have no genetic connection with 
the fetus.11 However, in traditional surrogacy arrangements, 
the surrogate mother and the fetus are genetically connected.12 
It is this genetic connection which often ignites legal flames 
because the corresponding rights, if extinguished, must occur 
by proper legal procedure.13  
 A number of legal commentators have professed that 
gestational surrogacy “has rendered traditional surrogacy 
obsolete and unnecessary.”14 So, why do people continue to 
enter into traditional surrogacy arrangements when the 
gestational counterpart completely avoids the legal issues 
regarding the unborn’s genetic connection with the surrogate 
mother?  The reasons are numerous.  
                                                 
7 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1582 (9th ed. 2009); see also In re C.K.G., 
173 S.W.3d 714, 720 (Tenn. 2005). 
8 See In re F.T.R. 833 N.W.2d 634, 643 (Wis. 2013); 7 Samuel Williston, 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 16:22 (Richard A. Lord ed., 
4th ed. 1992 & Supp. 2013); Christen Blackburn, Note, Family Law—
Who Is A Mother? Determining Legal Maternity in Surrogacy 
Arrangements in Tennessee, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 349, 352 (2009) (also 
identifies and defines donative surrogacy which involves creating an 
embryo from the genetic contribution of one intended parent with 
that of an unknown donor’s egg or sperm). 
9 See In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d at 720. 
10 See id.  
11 Id. 
12 See id. 
13 See Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *5. 
14 Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the 
Millennium: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating “Non-Traditional” 
Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 673, 690 (2000).  
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First, artificial insemination, the medical procedure 
utilized in traditional surrogacy,15 is a relatively simple 
procedure which may be performed in the home.16 The 
procedure involves using sperm, typically of the intended 
father, to impregnate the surrogate mother.17 As a result, it is 
significantly less expensive than in vitro fertilization, the 
procedure used to initiate a gestational surrogacy.18  The low 
cost and relative convenience of artificial insemination make it 
an attractive method for many surrogates and intended 
parents.19  
Second, there are high success rates among surrogates 
with proven fertility, and the time between a failed artificial 
insemination attempt and the time another attempt may be 
made is a matter of weeks.20  Conversely, in vitro fertilization, 
the time between implantation attempts often takes months.21 
Third, perhaps the most pertinent benefit of the traditional 
arrangement is the safety of both the mother and the unborn.22 
“The main risk to the [gestational] surrogate comes from the 
pregnancy itself, especially if she is required to carry multiple 
babies[.]”23  
Additionally, gestational surrogates are administered a 
cocktail of prescription medications not involved in traditional 
                                                 
15 Intrauterine (Artificial) Insemination (IUI), 
http://www.nyufertilitycenter.org/infertility_treatment/artificial_i
nsemination (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).  
16 Gestational vs. Traditional Surrogacy: A Comparative Study, 
http://www.surrogatemothers.org/ gestational-vs-traditional-
surrogacy-a-comparative-study (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
17 Id.  
18 Gestational vs. Traditional Surrogacy, supra note 16.  
19 Ashok Agarwal & Shyam S. R. Allamaneni, Chapter 36: Artificial 
Insemination, Section 6: Infertility and Recurrent Pregnancy Loss 




21 Id.  
22 The Center for Bioethics and Culture Network, Drugs Commonly 
Used for Women in Gestational Surrogacy Pregnancies, 
http://breeders.cbc-network.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Drugs-Commonly-Used-for-Women-in-
Gestational-Surrogacy-Pregnancies.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
23 Id. 
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arrangements.24 Some of these medications come with 
potentially significant side effects.25 In preparation for embryo 
transfer, the surrogate is administered hormones which inhibit 
the brain from secreting the natural hormones that control the 
menstrual cycle.26 “The woman is put into a ‘medical 
menopause,’ so that the ovaries stop functioning and her 
menstrual cycle can be completely controlled[.]”27 One of these 
hormones, Lupron, carries a Category X classification, which 
causes harm to the fetus if the surrogate mother becomes 
pregnant while taking the medication.28 Despite the potential 
side effects of the medications, the desire for genetic linkage 
between the child and the intended parents is a compelling 





II. FOREIGN STATUTES AND CASES 
Foreign Statutes 
                                                 
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Id. (Gonadotropin releasing hormone (GnRH) agonists like Synarel 
or Lupron. Lupron is administered by injection while Synarel comes 
in a nasal spray). 
27 Id.  
28 Id.    
29 The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Ethics 
Committee Opinion Number 397, Surrogate Motherhood, p. 2, 
http://www.acog.org/~/media/Committee%20Opinions/Committ
ee% 20on%20Ethics/co397.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20140324T1309556802 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2014). [Eds. note: The American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists issued Committee Opinion Number 
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 Some contracts cannot be enforced due to their illegal 
nature.30 The word “illegal” in contract law has a broader 
meaning than simply contracts made for a criminal purpose.31 
“Illegal in the contract setting means . . .  [that] the contract or 
clause involved is void as a matter of public policy, whether or 
not technically criminal.”32 As a matter of public policy, a 
contract or contractual term will be nullified if the arrangement 
violates the precepts of the society in which the court sits.33 
 Approximately one-third of state legislatures have 
provided statutory guidance regarding surrogacy contract 
formation and enforceability.34 Of the legislatures that have 
spoken, three “camps” have formed.35 In the first camp of 
states, all types of surrogacy contracts are prohibited.36 One 
state even provides criminal penalties for forming such an 
arrangement.37 The second prohibits traditional surrogacy 
contracts.38 Finally, the third camp allows both traditional and 
gestational surrogacy contracts, subject to various 
regulations and specified limitations.39 Tennessee’s current 
surrogacy laws do not fit within any of these three established 
                                                 
30 Thomas D. Crandall & Douglas J. Whaley, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND 
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 620 (6th ed. 2012). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. (noting this potentially powerful theory is often forgotten by 
attorneys). 
33 See id. 
34 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *8. 
35 Id. 
36 See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 16-401(A)-(B), -402(a) (West 2013); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 7.22.851- .863 (West 2013); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 
§ 122 (surrogate parenting contracts declared contrary to the public 
policy of the state). 
37 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 7.22.851- .863 (West 2013).  
38 See, e.g., N.D. CODE §§ 14-18-05, -08 (West 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 
31-20-1-1(West 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.580 (2013) (limits 
applicable to gestational, rather than traditional surrogacy 
arrangements).  
39 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1 to – B:32 (West 2013); VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 20-165 (West 2013); WASH. REV.  CODE ANN. 
§§ 22.26.210- .260 (West 2013). 
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camps.40 Instead, the current Tennessee statute essentially 
consists of a definition ending with an interpretational caveat 
found in the statutory section entitled “Adoption.”41 The statute 
provides that: 
 (48)(B) “Surrogate birth” means: 
(i) The union of the wife’s egg and the 
husband’s sperm, which are then 
placed in another woman, who carries 
the fetus to term and who, pursuant to 
a contract, then relinquishes all 
parental rights to the child to the 
biological parents pursuant to the 
terms of the contract; or  
(ii) The insemination of a woman by 
the sperm of a man under a contract by 
which the parties state their intent that 
the woman who carries the fetus shall 
relinquish the child to the biological 
father and the biological father’s wife 
to parent; 
(B) No surrender pursuant to this part is 
necessary to terminate any parental rights of 
the woman who carried the child to term 
under the circumstances described in this 
subdivision (48) and no adoption of the child 
by the biological parent(s) is necessary; 
(C) Nothing in this subdivision (48) shall be 
construed to expressly authorize the surrogate 
birth process in Tennessee unless otherwise 
approved by the courts or the [G]eneral 
[A]ssembly.42 
                                                 
40 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(48)(A-C) (West 2014).  
41 Id.  
42 Id. 
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The Tennessee Supreme Court was not the only court which 
found itself without statutory guidance regarding surrogacy 
issues.  
Cases in Other Jurisdictions 
 In the absence of guiding statutes, several well-known 
cases dealing with surrogacy contracts have arisen in 
jurisdictions other than Tennessee.  Some state courts have 
focused on whether a surrogacy contract embodies a traditional 
or gestational surrogacy arrangement.43 
  In Johnson v. Calvert, the California Supreme Court held 
gestational surrogacy contracts “differ[] in crucial respects from 
adoption[.]” 44 As a result, the monetary exchange, meant to 
compensate the surrogate for her services in gestating the fetus 
and undergoing labor, detailed within the gestational 
surrogacy contract was distinguishable from the California 
adoption statutes prohibiting payment for consent to adopt a 
child.45  
 In reaching that conclusion, the California Supreme 
Court pointed to the fact that the surrogacy arrangement was 
entered into prior to the child’s conception, and as discussed 
above, the definition of gestational surrogacy rendered the 
surrogate without genetic connection to the child.46 Therefore, 
the surrogate was not vulnerable to financial inducements to 
part with “her own expected offspring[,]” an element of  the 
prohibitive California adoption statute47 at issue.48  
 Furthermore, the California Supreme Court was not 
persuaded by the argument that such contracts violate the 
public policy of California because the surrogate based her 
                                                 
43 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).  
44 Calvert, 851 P.2d at 784. 
45 Id. 
46 Id.  
47 CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West).  
48 Calvert, 851 P.2d at 784. 
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argument on the same prohibitive statute the court had just 
distinguished and thereby, rendered inapplicable.49  
 The Supreme Court of Ohio went a step further in J.F. v. 
D.B.50 by holding that the public policy of the state remained 
uncrossed by gestational surrogacy contracts, even when a 
provision of the contract requires the gestational surrogate to 
refrain from asserting parental rights so long as the child was 
generated from another woman’s egg.51 After quickly 
dispensing with the issue at hand, the Ohio Supreme Court 
curiously used the final breath of its opinion to predict what it 
saw as an imminent traditional surrogacy question by stating: 
[W]e would be remiss to leave unstated the 
obvious fact that a gestational surrogate, whose 
pregnancy does not involve her own egg, may 
have a different legal position from a traditional 
surrogate, whose pregnancy does involve her 
own egg. This case does not involve, and we 
draw no conclusions about, traditional 
surrogates and Ohio's public policy concerning 
them.52 
 In contrast, other state courts have articulated a blanket 
prohibition on surrogacy contracts.53 In Doe v. New York City Bd. 
of Health, Mrs. Roe agreed to serve as a gestational surrogate for 
her sister, Mrs. Doe, who had been unable to bear children as a 
result of cancer.54 “No consideration, except love and affection, 
[was] involved.”55 Prior to birth, Mrs. Roe and her husband 
sought judgment that the named biological parents should 
appear on each of the resulting triplet’s birth certificates, and 
the New York City Board of Health and the New York City 
                                                 
49 Id. 
50 J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio 2007). 
51 Id. at 741- 42.  
52 Id. at 742. 
53 See, e.g., Doe v. New York City Bd. of Health, 782 N.Y.S.2d. 180 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).  
54 Id. at 182.  
55 Id.  
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Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (“DOHMH”) objected 
when it answered that doing such would violate New York’s 
Domestic Relations Law.56  
 The DOHMH conceded that it would not oppose the 
post-birth amendment of the birth certificates, provided Mr. 
and Mrs. Doe established they were genetic parents of the 
triplets or the formal adoption proceedings were completed.57 
Mr. and Mrs. Doe were unwilling and proceeded with their 
pursuit of favorable rulings on their pre-birth motions.58 As a 
final answer to those motions, New York’s Superior Court held 
that any “surrogacy parenting contract is prohibited and 
unenforceable in [New York], even where no payment of funds 
is involved . . . . Domestic Relations Law makes no distinction 
between gestational surrogacy contracts and traditional 
surrogacy arrangements[.]”59  
 Moving from cases involving gestational arrangements 
to those dealing with traditional ones, in Surrogate Parenting 
Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong,60 the Kentucky 
Supreme Court held that traditional surrogacy contracts do not 
violate the state’s statute prohibiting the buying and selling of 
children,61 commonly known as “baby-selling statutes.”62 The 
court’s articulated distinction rested on the fact that the 
agreement to bear the child was entered into before conception, 
and as result, the expectant, biological mother is free from 
external “financial inducements to part with the child.”63 The 
court elaborated: 
The essential considerations for the surrogate 
mother when she agrees to the surrogate 
                                                 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 183. 
58 See id.  
59 Id. at 183 (citing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2014).  
60 Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. 
Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).  
61 Id. at 211.  
62 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (West 2014).  
63 Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d at 211.  
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parenting procedure are not avoiding the 
consequences of an unwanted pregnancy or fear 
of the financial burden of child rearing. On the 
contrary, the essential consideration is to assist a 
person or couple who desperately want a child 
but are unable to conceive one in the customary 
manner to achieve a biologically related 
offspring. The problem is caused by the wife's 
infertility. The problem is solved by artificial 
insemination.64 
 In In re F.T.R., the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, 
aside from the termination of parental rights, traditional 
surrogacy contracts are enforceable under Wisconsin law as 
long as the agreement is in the “best interest” of the child.65 The 
termination of parental rights by the parties’ private contract 
was unenforceable because the surrogate had not consented to 
that contractual provision, and no basis for the involuntary 
termination of rights existed.66 
 The legal issues presented in Tennessee’s Baby are most 
aligned with the textbook case of In re Baby M.67 In that case, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court held that traditional surrogacy 
arrangements were contrary to the State’s public policy based 
on its adoption, custody, and termination of parental rights 
statutes.68 Initially, the New Jersey trial court, at the conclusion 
of a thirty-two-day trial, held that the adoption, custody, and 
termination of parental rights statutes were inapplicable to 
surrogacy contracts because the “Legislature did not have 
[those type of contracts] in mind when it passed those laws, 
those laws were therefore irrelevant.”69 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court disagreed and held the provisions at issue “not 
                                                 
64 Id. at 211-12.  
65 In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Wis. 2013). 
66 Id. at 640. 
67 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).  
68 Id. at 1240.  
69 Id. at 1237-8.  
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only directly conflict[ed] with New Jersey statutes, but also 
offend[ed] long-established State policies.”70 
 Other than, perhaps, identifying the pulses of the 
nation’s state courts and legislatures willing to speak to the 
relevant issues, the preceding cases have little authoritative 
weight because the issue of public policy requires the Tennessee 
Supreme Court to examine and weigh various sources of public 
policy of the state in which it sits. Thus, for the purposes of the 
issue of public policy, Tennessee law exists in a vacuum.  
PART TWO: IN RE BABY 
I. FACTS 
 A man (the “Intended Father”) and woman (the 
“Intended Mother”) (collectively “Intended Parents”), both 
Italian citizens who were unable to have children, turned to a 
surrogate (the “Surrogate”), a Tennessee resident, for aid.71 The 
parties, both represented by legal counsel, contracted into a 
traditional surrogacy arrangement where the Surrogate, who 
supplied her own egg, was artificially inseminated by the 
Intended Father’s sperm.72 The Surrogate became pregnant in 
April of 2011.73 During the pregnancy, the Intended Parents 
paid the Surrogate approximately $42,000 in medical expenses 
and legal fees.74 The Surrogate also received an additional 
$31,000 for pain, suffering, and miscellaneous pregnancy and 
birth-related expenses.75  
 Prior to the birth of the child, all parties filed a joint 
petition asking a Tennessee juvenile court to declare the 
Intended Father as the genetic father of the child, grant custody 
to the Intended Parents, and terminate the parental rights of the 
                                                 
70 Id. at 1240.  
71 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211, at *1.  
72 Id. at *2.  
73 Id. at *4.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
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Surrogate.76 The petition was granted.77 Less than a month later, 
the Surrogate gave birth to a girl (the “Child”).78  
 The Intended Parents were present at the Child’s birth.79 
Following professional medical advice, all agreed the Surrogate 
would breastfeed the Child for a short period of time.80 Soon 
after the birth, the Intended Mother returned to Italy to care for 
her ailing parents.81 The Intended Father, however, remained 
with the Surrogate to assist in the daily care of the Child.82  
 A week after birth, the winds shifted.83 The Surrogate 
had bonded with the Child.84 Consequentially, the Surrogate 
sought an emergency ex parte restraining order and injunction 
which claimed that “the birth of [the] Child did not meet the 
requirements of ‘surrogate birth’ under Tennessee law” 
because the Intended Parents had not yet married, a 
requirement which implicitly appears necessary under the 
relevant statute because it uses terms such as “husband” and 
“wife.”85  
 The Surrogate asked the sitting magistrate to vacate the 
order in which she had waived her parental rights, grant her 
temporary custody, and enter an injunction prohibiting the 
Intended Parents from removing the Child from the 
jurisdiction.86 The same day motions were filed, the magistrate 
conducted a hearing.87 At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
magistrate denied the Surrogate’s motion for injunctive relief 
                                                 
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Id. at *5. 





84 See id.  
85 Id. (citing language used in Surrogate’s “Emergency. . .  Ex Parte 
Restraining Order and Injunction).  
86 Id.  
87 Id.  
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and ordered the Surrogate to relinquish physical custody of the 
Child to the Intended Father.88  
 Three weeks later, the Surrogate returned to the 
magistrate’s court.89 That day, the Intended Parents were 
married in Williamson County.90 The Surrogate filed motions 
seeking to set aside the order waiving her rights.91 After the 
second hearing, the Surrogate’s motions were, again, denied.92 
She turned to the juvenile court, which affirmed the 
magistrate’s decision.93 The Surrogate then appealed the 
juvenile court’s ruling to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.94  
 The Surrogate’s argument was fourfold.95 She argued 
that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; the 
surrogacy contract was invalid based on the unmarried status 
of the Intended Parents at the time of contracting;96 the 
proceeding which terminated her parental rights was improper 
due to lack of counsel at the proceedings; and the juvenile court 
should have set aside the magistrate’s custody order because 
the magistrate failed to conduct a “best interest” analysis.97 The 
Court of Appeals rejected each of the Surrogate’s arguments.98 
These issues were accepted by the Tennessee Supreme Court as 
matters of first impression.99  
II. SOURCES OF LAW EXAMINED IN BABY 
                                                 






94 Id. at *6.  
95 Id.  
96 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(48)(A)–(C) (2014) (labels such as 
“husband” and “wife” are used; however, this statutory definition 
refers to a gestational surrogacy, not a traditional one as is at issue in 
Baby).  
97 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *9. 
98 Id. 
99 Id.  
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 The public policy concern of traditional surrogacy 
contracts is the main issue in Baby. Curiously, neither the 
Surrogate nor the Intended Parents raised or preemptively 
answered this contractual defense. Instead, the Court raised the 
defense sua sponte.100 The Tennessee General Assembly, 
through a commission, last addressed major surrogacy issues in 
1993; however, no substantive action was taken on this 
relatively new topic.101 Surrogacy issues remained stagnant 
until 2014 when the Tennessee Supreme Court granted Baby 
discretionary review under Tennessee Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 11.102 When the Tennessee Supreme Court 
confronted the public policy issue, the Court drew from many 
sources of state law.103  
 First, Tennessee’s traditional principles of contract law 
were considered.104 “Contract law in Tennessee plainly reflects 
the public policy allowing competent parties to strike their own 
bargains.”105 Tennessee also recognizes several common law 
contract defenses, including fraud,106 duress,107 undue 
influence,108 mistake,109 and incapacity.110 Surrogacy contracts 
are not free from these common law defenses, and each defense 
may be raised in an independent declaratory judgment 
action.111 These defenses were inapplicable to the case at hand, 
                                                 
100 See Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *10. 
101 See id. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at *11. 
104 Id. at *20.  
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and the Court held that “none prohibit the enforcement of 
traditional surrogacy agreements on public policy grounds.”112 
 Second, the Court noted the neutrality of Tennessee’s 
statute regarding surrogacy.113 The statute, previously cited, 
amounts to a definition coupled with an interpretational 
caveat.114 Save subsection (C), which expressed the Tennessee 
General Assembly’s neutral stance, this statutory definition 
provided little help to the Court.115 Further lessening its 
relevance was the fact that this definition describes a gestational 
surrogacy, not a traditional one, as in Baby.116 The 
interpretational caveat to the statute states that none of the 
provisions “shall be construed to expressly authorize the 
surrogate birth process in Tennessee unless otherwise 
approved by the courts or the [G]eneral [A]ssembly.”117 The 
Court analyzed the statute in In re C.K.G., determining that the 
statute’s caveat expressed a neutral “legislative stance” with 
regard to the enforceability of surrogacy arrangements not 
memorialized by written contract.118 The Court could not 
interpret these neutral statutes to express unfavorable policy 
with regard to surrogacy arrangements.119  
 The Court next considered Tennessee’s so-called “baby-
selling” statutes.120 Such statutes provide criminal penalties for 
illegal payments in connection with the surrender of a child or 
the placement of a child for adoption.121 The Court agreed with 
other cases and commentary122 distinguishing surrogacy 
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arrangements as payment “for the services of a surrogate in the 
conception of a child[,]” rather than payment for the surrender 
of the child.123 However, the Court held that “[c]ompensation 
may not be contingent upon the surrender of the child or the 
termination of parental rights, and compensation is restricted 
to the reasonable costs of services, expenses, or injuries related 
to the pregnancy, the birth of the child, or other matters 
inherent to the surrogacy process.”124 
 The Court continued by discussing Tennessee’s custody 
statute and relevant cases which include the proverbial “best 
interest” determination. If all are applicable, there are fifteen 
statutorily-enumerated factors that a judge must consider when 
making a “best interest” determination.125 No such 
determination was made in the case of Baby, because the 
juvenile court ruled the surrogacy contract’s waiver of such 
rights was proper under Tennessee law.126 The Court 
disagreed.127  
 The Court held that the state’s obligation to make such 
a determination could not be relieved by a provision of private 
contract.128 In fact, the Court had previously decided the matter 
in Tuetken v. Tuetken.129 As a result, the Court held the term to 
be improper and unenforceable.130 
 Consequentially, the Court scrutinized statutes 
involving legal parents and the methods that parental rights 
may be terminated.131 In Tennessee, a woman may be properly 
                                                 
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 529, 547(2007); Stacy Christman Blomeke, 
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termed a “legal parent” in two ways: being “[t]he biological 
mother of a child,”132 or being “[a]n adoptive parent of a 
child[.]”133 In Baby, the Surrogate was the biological mother of 
the child, and thus, is the “legal parent” of the Child under 
Tennessee law.134  
 Under Tennessee law, legal parent’s rights may only be 
terminated in one of three ways.135 First, if a statutorily valid 
ground for termination exists and termination of the biological 
mother’s parental rights is in the “best interest” of the child, an 
involuntary termination may be initiated.136 Second, a 
biological mother may voluntarily extinguish her rights by 
signing a “surrender,” a document which provides “that [a] 
parent or guardian relinquishes all parental or guardianship 
rights of that parent or guardian to a child, to another person or 
public child care agency or licensed child-placing agency for the 
purposes of making that child available for adoption[.]”137 
Finally, when a mother consents to adoption, her parental 
rights may be terminated as part of the adoption proceeding.138 
While the Court held these statutes did not evidence any public 
policy against the enforcement of surrogacy arrangements, the 
Court did hold that the termination of the Surrogate’s parental 
rights through private contract was unlike any acceptable 
method of termination and thus, the term was unenforceable.139 
III. BABY’S HOLDING & EPILOGUE 
 The Court held that traditional surrogacy arrangements, 
including the one at issue, did not violate the public policy of 
the State of Tennessee.140 However, the private “best interest” 
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determination and the private termination of parental rights of 
the traditional surrogacy contract were improper.141 Thus, the 
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals with regard to the public 
policy issue, vacated the juvenile court’s termination of the 
Surrogate’s parental rights, and remanded the case to the 
juvenile court to determine visitation and child support.142  
Although the record is unclear as to the exact date the Intended 
Father exercised and took physical custody of the Child,143 an 
interview with the Surrogate’s attorney, Shelley Breeding, 
revealed that the Intended Father reclaimed physical custody of 
the child the evening following the magistrate’s denial of the 
Surrogate’s emergency ex parte restraining order and 
injunction.144  
On September 18, 2014, the day the opinion was issued, the 
Child was nearly three years old and resided with the Intended 
Parents in Italy,145 and the Child continued to reside in Italy as 
of December 15, 2014.146 The attorney for the Intended Parents, 
Benjamin Papa, and the attorney for the Surrogate, Shelley 
Breeding, stated that they were communicating with their 
respective clients to determine how each wanted to proceed in 
light of the Court’s unexpected analysis and holding.147 As a 
result of the Court’s unexpected public policy analysis and 
holding, no motions by either side had been filed with the 
juvenile court to which the case was remanded.148 
PART III: LEGISLATIVE DIFFICULTY 
I. JUSTICE KOCH’S CONCURRENCE 
                                                 
141 Id.  
142 Id. at *24. 
143 Id. at *8, n.4. 
144 Telephone Interview with Shelley Suzanne Breeding, Partner, 
Breeding & Lodato, LLC (Dec. 15, 2014). 
145 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *8, n.4.  
146 Breeding, supra note 144. 
147 Id.; Telephone Interview with Benjamin Papa, Attorney-Mediator, 
Founding Member, Papa and Roberts, PLLC (Dec. 20, 2014). 
148 Papa, Attorney-Mediator, Founding Member, Papa and Roberts, 
PLLC (Dec. 20, 2014). 
IN RE BABY: BLESSING OR PROBLEM CHILD?              23  
 
 Justice Koch, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the 
other members of the Court to the extent that the contract at 
issue, save the two invalidated provisions, did not violate the 
public policy of the State of Tennessee. However, he disagreed 
with the holding that traditional surrogacy contracts do not 
violate the Tennessee’s public policy, generally.149 In his view, 
the Court should have tailored its holding to the facts of the 
case, refrained from pronouncing a general rule, and thereby, 
deferred the general rule to legislative determination.150 Justice 
Koch stated:  
[t]he legal rules governing [surrogacy in 
Tennessee] are ambiguous, if not non-existent, 
and they need to be clarified . . . . While the 
desire to bring some order to the ambiguity is 
commendable, the case-by-case approach the 
courts must use is less effective in circumstances 
like this than the far more dynamic ability of the 
General Assembly to address . . . Tennessee’s 
acceptance or rejection of surrogacy contracts as 
a matter of public policy[.]151   
 Surrogacy in Tennessee is “big business[,]”152 and the 
need for clear guidance is undoubtedly great and growing,153  
and the Court emphatically called for legislative action.154 
However, one could argue the narrow holding Justice Koch 
advocates would provide a great deal of the needed clarity 
while simultaneously relieving the Court of the responsibility 
of determining the public policy of Tennessee regarding 
surrogacy as well as and any resulting political backlash.155  
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 Justice Koch’s concurrence would provide sufficient 
boundaries for practitioners to guide their clients through the 
traditional surrogacy contract formation process, (i.e., this 
contract term is proper and enforceable, and this one is not).156 
In addition, the narrow holding would show the Court passed 
on opportunity to declare a general rule, effectively 
demonstrating the Court’s powerful reluctance to be the 
governmental branch which invalidates such agreements.157 As 
a result, practitioners and citizens of Tennessee would need 
only watch (or advocate in) one governmental branch, the 
Tennessee General Assembly, for a general rule, and in the 
meantime, they may carry on aiding their clients, intended 
parent(s) or surrogate, through the surrogacy process.158 
 Of course, there is no guarantee the General Assembly 
will expressly and clearly address the topic soon or ever. Since 
the General Assembly last spoke to the issue in the mid-1990’s, 
it has had approximately twenty annual opportunities to 
address the topic.159 However, a history of legislative inactivity, 
even coupled with a likelihood of future inactivity, perhaps, 
does not obligate a state’s highest court to announce a general 
rule.160 In footnote twelve of his concurring opinion in Baby, 
Justice Koch states:  
[T]he courts’ response to legislative inaction, 
whether inadvertent or intentional, should 
always be tempered by the admonition in Article 
II, Section 2 of the Constitution of Tennessee that 
persons belonging to one branch of government 
should avoid exercising the powers properly 
belonging to the other branches. The better 
course at this juncture would be accredit the 
presumption, albeit rebuttable, that the 
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members of the General Assembly, like other 
public officials, will discharge their duties in 
good faith.161  
 To save the Court from public and political backlash, 
one could further argued that a court so high in the judicial 
system should be wary of expressing an opinion beyond what 
may be required, even if such an opinion would please a 
significant segment of the population.162 The immediate judicial 
outcomes should not “solely be evaluated according to their 
apparent desirability.”163 “Instead, decisions should also be 
evaluated according to their institutional legitimacy, their 
jurisprud[ential] soundness, and finally, the manner in which 
these decisions will affect and interact with both [the] U.S. 
government and society.”164 
 Regarding the Baby decision, the immediate judicial 
outcome is that traditional surrogacy contracts expressly 
withstand public policy scrutiny.  Lawyers who practice in a 
directly or indirectly related field find it desirable.  Lawyers 
dealing with surrogacy contracts also gain a great deal of 
guidance with which they will use to guide their clients.  
 Additionally, future surrogates in traditional 
arrangements are protected by the invalidity of contractual 
terms that deprive them of parental rights by private 
agreement, and proponents of surrogacy gained a much-
desired legal victory which will set heavy precedent for an 
entire state.  
 Next, institutional legitimacy and jurisprudential 
soundness appear to be intertwined. Unlike the legislative 
branch, the judiciary’s power is predicated on its ability to find 
support for a decision, i.e., its ability to base its decision on pre-
existing law, whether it be statutory, case law, or a mixture of 
several sources.  Without a base of precedent or fair 
                                                 
161 Id. (citing See State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Medicine Bird 
Black Bear White Eagle, 63 S.W.3d 734, 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). 
162 Faizer, supra note 155, at 411. 
163 Id. at 396. 
164 Id. 
26                     4 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2016) 
 
interpretation of an existing statute, the judicial decision and, 
by extension, the issuing court’s legitimacy may be questioned. 
 In Baby, the Court found, cited, and fairly evaluated 
many relevant sources of state law, including the Tennessee 
Constitution, relevant Tennessee statutes, Tennessee cases, and 
sources of contract principles adopted in Tennessee cases.  
Thus, having tethered its decision to a collection of existing law, 
the Court’s answer and its legitimacy as body are unlikely to be 
questioned by the reasonable critic.  Furthermore, it is unlikely 
that the Baby decision will cause inter-governmental acrimony 
because the opinion takes no power from the Tennessee 
General Assembly.  It can do what it has always had the power 
to do—pass laws detailing the requirements for valid surrogacy 
contracts within the state. Indeed, the Court encouraged the 
legislature to make a definitive statement on the issue.  
 As far as the decision’s effect on society, the impact is 
much more speculative.  The polar options are either that it has 
no effect, or that overnight, surrogacy becomes a politically-
charged banner issue causing many state election swings 
during the next cycle.  In reality, it is likely to be somewhere in-
between. In any event, the citizens of Tennessee, through their 
representatives, will have an opportunity to speak.  
 The argument against the Court’s broader holding 
would conclude by stating that legislative inaction is sometimes 
a consequence of living in a democracy.  What is the cause of 
legislative inaction regarding surrogacy? Perhaps surrogacy-
related problems are not high on the agenda of the citizens of 
Tennessee.  If surrogacy-related issues were as pressing as 
commentators claim, legislative efforts, such as those in 
Louisiana, may be more likely to occur.  
II. LOUISIANA’S LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS 
 The Louisiana State Legislature recently attempted to 
comprehensively address its surrogacy issues; however, its 
struggles exemplify the difficult position in which courts are 
placed when waiting on adequate legislative guidance. 
Louisiana State Representative Joseph Lopinto, R-Metairie, 
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filed House Bill 187 on February 17, 2014.165 Louisiana State 
Senator Gary Smith, D-Norco, sponsor of the corresponding 
Senate Bill, is the father of two children born through 
gestational surrogacy arrangements that were formed and 
signed outside Louisiana.166 Senator Smith said the Bill helps 
families become complete.167 He continued, "[i]nfertility is so 
private and personal, and . . . this Bill would . . .  help[] (parents 
with fertility problems) to be able to have a biological child of 
their own" within Louisiana.168  
 After sailing through the Louisiana House Committee 
on Civil Law and Procedure with a 10-0 vote, the Louisiana 
House passed the Bill with a vote of 80-14.169 The Louisiana 
Senate Judiciary Committee then picked up the Bill.170 
Following the adoption of amendments, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee passed the Bill with a vote of 22-11.171 Barely any 
resistance was encountered on the Senate floor during the 72-7 
vote.172  
 One of the first provisions declares traditional 
surrogacy contracts, termed “genetic surrogacy” contracts 
within the Bill, “absolutely null.”173 First, the Bill mandates that 
gestational surrogacy contracts shall be written.174 After 
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memorialization, the contract must be signed by the 
“gestational mother,” the gestational mother’s husband, if 
applicable, and the intended parents.175 With such an uncertain 
statutory requirement, one could argue that the Bill would 
exclude single parents from legally contracting with a 
surrogate.176 
 Second, the Bill states that the gestational surrogacy 
contract is enforceable only if the contract is approved by a 
court “in advance of in utero embryo transfer[.]”177 The 
surrogate must be at least twenty-five and no older than thirty-
five years old178 and have previously given birth to at least one 
child.179 Next, the Bill forbids the surrogate from receiving 
compensation for her services.180 Compensation, as defined in 
the Bill, means “a payment of money, objects, services, or 
anything else having monetary value.”181  
 However, compensation does not include 
reimbursement of actual expenses182 to the gestational mother 
or payment for goods or services incurred by the intended 
parents as a result of the pregnancy.183 If the contract is for 
“compensation,” the contract “shall be absolutely null and 
unenforceable in the state of Louisiana as contrary to public 
policy.”184 
 Furthermore, the Bill would prohibit a contractual term 
requiring the gestational mother to consent to terminate the 
pregnancy “for any reason[.]”185 “Any reason” includes 
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prenatal diagnoses of actual or potential disability, impairment, 
genetic variation, or any other health condition, gender 
discrimination, and “for the purposes of the reduction of 
multiple fetuses.”186 
 After the Bill received bicameral affirmation, it reached 
the desk of Governor Bobby Jindal, who sought counsel from, 
most notably, Reverend Gene Mills, President of the 
conservative Christian non-profit organization called Louisiana 
Family Forum.187 Reverend Mills “told his contact within the 
administration, ‘I could not advise Bobby sign this bill.’”188 
Reverend Mills cited two “irreconcilable differences” which led 
to his advisement that Governor Jindal veto the bill.189  
 To Reverend Mills, the in vitro fertilization process 
involved in gestational surrogacy births generated the first 
irreconcilable difference.190 According to Reverend Mills, the 
destruction of excess fetuses was “[t]echnically . . . abortion.”191 
However, the Bill expressly makes a contractual term requiring 
the surrogate to have such excess fetuses removed 
unenforceable, while saying nothing about the surrogate 
consenting to such a procedure in the absence of the contractual 
requirement to do so. In an interview, Reverend Mills 
confirmed that this outside-the-contract circumvention is 
where his first concern with the legislation stemmed.192 
Reverend Mills said he questioned how effectively this 
provision would be enforced stating that the “police arm, 
especially within the [in vitro fertilization] industry” is simply 
not there.193 
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 The second irreconcilable difference Reverend Mills 
cited was the language of the statute that was intended to 
prevent "commercial surrogacy," i.e., when a surrogate is paid 
to carry the child.194 The Reverend “believed [that the] 
restrictions he requested be written into the Bill to ban 
surrogacy-for-pay were insufficient.”195 This so-called 
irreconcilable difference is more difficult to understand 
because, again, the Bill expressly prohibits such a term.196 
Reverend Mills elaborated during an interview by stating “the 
[surrogacy for-pay] restrictions were too vague.”197 He 
continued by expressing concern that “[i]n such new area of the 
law, such vague language could be a detriment . . . to altruistic 
surrogacy[,]” or surrogacy done for no pay or reimbursement 
of expenses.198  
  Reverend Mills, and perhaps others, counseled 
Governor Jindal to veto the Bill, and the Bill was officially 
vetoed on May 30, 2014.199 The veto pushed the issue back to 
the legislative realm for a potential supermajority override; 
however, Louisiana Representative Joe Lopinto, the bill’s 
sponsor, surrendered just two days after Governor Jindal’s 
veto.200 Despite the overwhelming support in both houses, 
Representative Lopinto decided not to attempt to override the 
Governor’s veto because such an action would place the 
funding of other bills in jeopardy.201 
 Representative Lopinto’s loss in the final legislative leg 
has not deterred Louisiana lawmakers, who envision 
surrogacy-related legislation on the horizon.202 The Bill’s failure 
to secure the Governor’s signature notwithstanding, the 
deliberative process succeeded when a constructive, in-depth 
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discussion took place.  A similar discussion may happen within 
the Tennessee General Assembly if the concern of the citizenry 
were high enough. 
CONCLUSION 
 Save the complex custody determination, child support 
calculation, and parenting plan for the immediate parties, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Baby is relatively 
uncontentious.  The Court grappled a difficult legal question, 
a task with which it is familiar. After predicating its power on 
an assemblage of existing law, reasonable questions of 
jurisprudential soundness and institutional legitimacy are 
non-existent.  The decision is unlikely to stir inter-
governmental hostility, and properly, the opinion fervently 
calls for legislative action.  
 The nearly successful legislative efforts of Louisiana 
exhibit the frustration some may have with the deliberative 
process.  Preemptory legislative action regarding hotly-
contested social issues is a rarity.  In Baby, the Court, after 
documenting twenty years of legislative action and strongly 
noting the damage such prolonged inaction was causing, saw 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In 2013, 3.1 million Americans were victimized by 
smartphone theft, nearly double the total of a year before.2  The 
problem is particularly acute in major cities, where smartphone 
theft is now involved in 30 to 40 percent of all robberies.3  In San 
Francisco, smartphones were stolen in more than half of total 
robberies in 2012.4  These thefts cost consumers approximately 
$30 billion a year according to the FCC,5 and law enforcement 
officials worry that they pose significant public safety costs as 
well.  This is not hard to believe, given that 68% of theft victims 
would put themselves in some degree of danger to recover their 
phone.6  With 1 in 10 device owners now victims,7 the shocking 
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growth of smartphone theft and its attendant financial and 
safety costs has created an apparent epidemic. 
 But, is this theft problem really unique to smartphones?  
The increase in stolen smartphones may simply reflect the 
increase in smartphone ownership.  In other words, thieves 
may not specifically plan ahead and single out phones to steal.  
Other electronic devices such as laptops and tablets are also 
stolen regularly, but smartphone theft may occur at a greater 
rate for a variety of reasons: they are smaller, easier to mine data 
from, easier to repurpose post-theft, and people carry them 
around more routinely with less precaution.   
Whether the theft problem is unique to smartphones or 
not, a solution that reduces theft of smartphones in particular 
and electronic devices in general is desirable if it is possible.  
Perhaps the most obvious response is to make stolen phones 
less valuable.  If thieves cannot access owner data or connect 
phones to cellular or Wi-Fi networks, they may be less inclined 
to risk stealing a smartphone.  This is the crux of the leading 
anti-theft proposal.  By mandating implementation of a “kill 
switch” that can remotely disable a phone’s essential features, 
legislatures and public officials hope to disincentivize stealing 
and reverse the theft trend. 
This paper analyzes the potential efficacy of current 
proposals to deter smartphone theft and the broader 
implications they may have.  It surveys arguments of leading 
stakeholders, examines the relevant literature on technological 
feasibility and consumer behavior, and assesses the potential 
pitfalls and shortcomings in implementing a cohesive, effective 
policy.  Developing a sound theft-deterrence policy requires 
clarity on and a better understanding of kill switch technology, 
other potential approaches such as carrier registries, 
smartphone theft psychology, and the mechanics of the 
smartphone black market. This paper represents the first 
attempt at studying and answering these questions.  
 
I. HISTORY OF THE KILL SWITCH DEBATE 
A. A CALL TO MANDATE KILL SWITCHES AND SAMSUNG’S 
RESPONSE 
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 The movement to mandate the deployment of a kill 
switch, a technological method to render a stolen smartphone 
and its data unusable, first gained prominence in 2012 when 
smartphone theft began increasing rapidly.  The Secure Our 
Smartphones (SOS) campaign, led by New York Attorney 
General Eric Schneiderman and San Francisco District Attorney 
George Gascon, gathered supporters around the country as it 
pressured phone carriers and manufacturers to introduce a 
default kill switch in new phones.8 
Following this pressure, on July 18, 2013, Samsung 
proposed adding the LoJack security system, including a kill 
switch designed by Absolute Software, to its smartphones at an 
additional cost to consumers.9  The LoJack system would work 
through a desktop app and code buried with the phone’s 
firmware.  However, because most smartphones in the U.S. are 
sold by carriers, Samsung needed the carriers’ approval to pre-
install LoJack on phones.  None of the five major carriers 
agreed.10   
 
 
B. CTIA’S PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES AND RESPONSES 
THERETO 
Carriers and manufacturers, through their 
representative CTIA—The Wireless Association, initially 
denounced the SOS kill switch initiative and instead created a 
collaborative registry aimed at eliminating the stolen phones 
resale market.  Eventually, however, intensifying scrutiny 
prompted the CTIA to modify its position.  It recently created 
the Smartphone Anti-Theft Voluntary Commitment, in which 
                                                 
8 Office of the N.Y. Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman, Secure 
Our Smartphones (S.O.S.), http://www.ag.ny.gov/feature/secure-
our-smartphones-sos.  
9 Martyn Williams, U.S. Carriers Rejected ‘Kill Switch’ Technology Last 
Year, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 24, 2014 08:42 AM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9246557/U.S._carriers_
rejected_39_kill_switch_39_technology_last_year.   
10 Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of New 
York, (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-
schneiderman-requests-information-leading-wireless-carriers-
decision-reject-anti. 
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signatories declare their intent to make kill switch functionality 
available on all of their new phones by July 2015.11  
 But many kill switch advocates argue that this voluntary 
commitment falls short.  Citing the need for ubiquity to ward 
off thieves, consumer rights advocates and a handful of state 
legislatures have pushed for mandatory, rather than voluntary, 
adoption of kill switches.  One such bill, California’s S.B. 962, 
finally passed the state senate in May 2014 (and was signed into 
law on August 25, 2014)12 after Apple, Samsung, Microsoft, and 
Google withdrew opposition on the conditions that the 
implementation deadline be pushed back to July 2015 and 
tablets be dropped from the bill.  These companies already 
include software on their phones that allows owners to lock or 
erase devices from afar, but they generally accord with the 
CTIA’s position of keeping anti-theft measures voluntary and 
up to the discretion of consumers. 
C. FINDING A WAY FORWARD 
While most interested parties in the debate thus appear 
to endorse a kill switch option, kill switch implementation is not 
failsafe.  The question remains whether current statutory kill 
switch mandate proposals “will effectively deter theft without 
jeopardizing public safety, personal privacy, and civil liberties, 
or causing other undesirable consequences.”13  It is entirely 
possible that a kill switch solution could create as many 
problems as it solves. 
 
II. OPINIONS OF STAKEHOLDERS ON KILL SWITCHES 
                                                 
11 Smartphone Anti-Theft Voluntary Commitment, CTIA—THE 
WIRELESS ASSOCIATION, (accessed February 3, 2015), 
http://www.ctia.org/policy-initiatives/voluntary-
guidelines/smartphone-anti-theft-voluntary-commitment.   
12 H.R. 962, 2014 Leg. Counsel, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014). 
13 California Senate, Energy, Utilities and Communications 
Committee, March 24, 2014, 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml? 
bill_id=201320140SB962&search_keywords (click Bill Analysis tab, 
then click the link titled “03/28/14 – Senate, Utilities And 
Communications”).  
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The debate over curbing smartphone theft has 
engendered a good deal of controversy.  Some legislators have 
unabashedly attacked carriers and manufacturers for opposing 
a public safety law in order to retain profits arising from 
replacement of stolen phones.  The carriers and manufacturers 
respond by arguing that they present consumers with a variety 
of security options, to which a mandatory kill switch would 
only be a costly and burdensome addition.  On the sidelines of 
the debate are a number of privacy activists and technologists 
who worry that mandating kill switches may enable the 
possibility of widespread hacking or discourage innovation.  
Finally, smartphone owners provide insights about feasibility 
of security options with their relative apathy towards anti-theft 
measures. 
A. LEGISLATORS AND PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICIALS SUPPORT 
STRONG KILL SWITCHES 
Following the beginning of the Secure Our Smartphones 
campaign, New York Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli publicly 
pressured Google, Microsoft, Apple, and Samsung to declare 
what they were doing to “assure public officials that [they are] 
acting responsibly” in response to the rise in smartphone theft 
or else face divestment of nearly $3 billion from the state of New 
York.14  The comments confronted the companies with acting 
“disinterested when it comes to collaborating with law 
enforcement agencies in the effort to develop a meaningful 
technological solution that would effectively eliminate the 
secondary market in which criminal elements realize their 
profits.”15   
Following a decision by the major carriers to reject 
Samsung’s kill switch in late 2013, supporters of a mandatory 
kill switch became even less diplomatic in their allegations.  San 
Francisco District Attorney George Gascón accused the carriers 
of rejecting the Samsung solution “so they could continue to 
                                                 
14 Letters from Thomas P. DiNapoli, Comptroller of the State of New 
York, to Google, Microsoft, Apple, and Samsung (June 11, 2013), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/pdfs/features/sos/SOS
-Letters.pdf.   
15 Id. 
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make money hand over fist on insurance premiums.”16  
Insurance and phone replacement costs are major components 
of carrier profits, comprising $7.8 billion and $30 billion in 
revenue, respectively, of the $69 billion the industry nets every 
year.17  Captain Jason Cherniss of the San Francisco Police 
Department says the police have “tried to blow the whistle on 
this for years . . . [while] companies have had the ability to 
prevent for years . . . [and] people have been violently robbed - 
even killed - and millions of dollars have changed hands on the 
black market.”18  Secure Our Smartphones leader Eric 
Schneiderman blasted the carriers for “knowingly dismiss[ing] 
technology that could save lives.”19 
B. OBJECTIONS TO MANDATORY IMPLEMENTATION 
But the carriers (and manufacturers) see kill switches as 
not only technologically uncertain, but also as potentially 
becoming conduits of new problems.  The CTIA has expressed 
concern that ubiquitous kill switches would give hackers or 
other undesired parties the ability to disable entire groups of 
phones, with particular susceptibility for “random customers as 
retaliation by a variety of persons or entities.”20  Manufacturers 
claim that they have already made commercially available and 
promoted affordable anti-theft solutions, including Apple’s 
Find My iPhone and Activation Lock and Samsung’s 
Reactivation Lock.  The major carriers of the CTIA, though 
initially rejecting wholesale Samsung’s kill switch proposal in 
                                                 
16 Paul Wagenseil, Smartphone Kill Switch: What It Is, How it Might 
Work, TOM’S GUIDE (May 14, 2014 9:40AM), 
http://www.tomsguide.com/us/ smartphone-kill-switch-faq,news-
18772.html (internal quotations omitted, quoting Gascón).   
17 Rachel Swan, The Life of a Stolen Phone: For the Smartphone Industry, 




19 Schneiderman, supra note 10.  
20 CTIA--The Wireless Association, Why a “Kill Switch” Isn’t the 
Answer (accessed February 3, 2015), 
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/Why_a_Kill_Switch_Isn_t_the_Answer.pdf
. 
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2013, recently agreed to make available kill-switch solutions on 
a consumer-voluntary basis.21  
This voluntary-as-opposed-to-mandatory proposal 
accords with the position of many technologists and privacy 
rights activists who worry that consumers may be coerced into 
increased susceptibility to hackers.  Further, consumers already 
have a variety of security tools available to them, and legally 
sanctioning more pathways for Big Brother (or Anonymous) to 
intrude on consumers’ ability to communicate is concerning, 
particularly in light of recent crackdowns in Egypt, BART 
protests, and Occupy Wall Street.  In this regard, consumer 
safety may be diminished by an inability to reach emergency 
services or dependent contacts. 
Some technologists also fear that mandatory technology 
may create a barrier to entry for smaller innovators in the 
smartphone industry or even more simply create more costs 
than benefits.  In comments filed with the California Senate, the 
San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce reminded 
legislators “to be sensitive to the regulatory environment 
necessary for innovation” and asserted that different 
technology mandates in states across the country “could create 
considerable market barriers for innovative manufacturers and 
the consumers they serve, and mandating technology is usually 
a recipe for the creation of an anticompetitive and anti-
consumer choice environment.”22  
C. CONSUMER BEHAVIOR PROVIDES LITTLE CLARITY ON 
THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF A MANDATORY KILL 
SWITCH 
In the midst of this debate, smartphone owners--
perhaps the stakeholders with the most at stake--seem to 
                                                 
21 CTIA--The Wireless Association, Smartphone Anti-Theft Voluntary 
Commitment (accessed February 3, 2015), 
http://www.ctia.org/policy-initiatives/voluntary-
guidelines/smartphone-anti-theft-voluntary-commitment.   
22 Comments of San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce in 
Senate Floor Analysis, May 7, 2014, California State Senate, 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=
201320140SB962&search_keywords (click Bill Analysis Tab, then 
click the link titled “05/07/14 – Senate Floor Analysis). 
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collectively demonstrate the least bit of interest.  Less than half 
of smartphone users secure their phones with a homescreen 
passcode, and among those that do, the most popular passcodes 
are among the simplest: 1111, 0000, and 1234.23  Aggregating the 
passcode with other phone security measures such as antivirus 
software and data backup, 34% of smartphone owners take no 
measures at all.24  This seeming indifference may support the 
notion that a mandatory anti-theft solution could produce 
radical effects, but it may also reveal that smartphone users 
simply prefer more straightforward usage with fewer security 
barriers.  Regardless of what it means, interested parties on both 
sides of the table have mobilized consumer behavior data to 
support their positions.  Currently proposed kill switch bills in 
state and federal legislatures, for instance, base their rationales 
in consumer protection. 
III. HOW THE LEGISLATION CONCEIVES OF KILL SWITCHES 
 While the various bills25 active in state legislatures and 
Congress differ in how they describe the ideal features of kill 
switches, they all allude to kill switches vaguely as a sort of 
“technological solution.”  The pending federal bill goes even 
further, exempting from the mandate any smartphone provider 
that incorporates technology that “accomplishes the functional 
equivalent of the [defined technological] function.”26  By 
keeping the definition broad, the bills enable companies to use 
technology compatible with their business and design 
strategies, hence making it more palatable to comply with the 
mandate.  However, the broad definitional scope also reflects a 
degree of legislative uncertainty on what constitutes the most 
effective functionality. Reflecting this point, the five pending 
and passed bills--California, Minnesota, New York, Illinois, and 
the federal bill--all have important differences. 
                                                 
23 Corinne Iozzio, Kill Switches Will Save Your Smartphone, POPULAR 
SCIENCE (May 5, 2014), 
http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/kill-switches-will-
save-your-smartphone.   
24 Stephen Schenck, US Smartphone Thefts Explode, Nearly Doubling 
Since 2012, POCKETNOW (April 18, 2014, 5:18 PM), 
http://pocketnow.com/2014/04/18/smartphone-theft.   
25 See Appendix for excerpts of selected bill text.  
26 Smartphone Theft Prevention Act, H.R. 4065, 113th Cong. (2014).  
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 While all of the bills agree that a kill switch must involve 
software or hardware (or a combination of both) that can render 
inoperable the essential features of the device to an 
unauthorized user, they vary in their interpretation of 
“inoperability” and “essential features.”  The bills generally 
accord that the kill switch should disable voice 
communications, Internet accessibility, and application 
functionality, but the proposed Illinois and federal bills go 
further to clarify that this must be achieved “even if the device 
is turned off or has the data storage medium removed.”27  In 
this regard, the Illinois and federal bills would require a 
permanent solution that prevents re-programmability after the 
phone is rendered inoperable. 
The treatment of data also reveals the bills’ different 
conceptions of kill switch functionality.  The California bill, for 
instance, is silent on the technology’s effect on user data, 
whereas the other bills require the kill switch to either lock or 
disable the stored data.  The Minnesota bill requires the kill 
switch to lock all data, but retain future accessibility, while the 
Illinois bill would require permanent removal.  The federal bill 
splits the difference between the two and leaves the option open 
to manufacturers and providers. 
Compliance enforcement also varies from bill to bill.  
Each bill, aside from Illinois’s, supports a per-phone monetary 
penalty levelled against those who manufacture and sell non-
conforming phones, while Illinois would require violating 
providers to insure the phones for theft at no cost to the 
customer.  Minnesota’s bill contains additional provisions that 
prevent purchasers of used or secondhand phones from buying 
in cash and requires these buyers to keep records of their 
purchases.   
In total, the current legislative proposals are united in 
calling for a mandate on some sort of technological solution that 
would help consumers render some subset of key features 
inoperable on a stolen phone.  The various approaches on 
specifics, from definitional differences to dealing with data on 
a permanent or reversible basis, underscores some of the 
uncertainty on how a kill switch could work most effectively.  
                                                 
27 Id.  See also IL S.B. 3539 (“SIM card or data storage medium 
removed”).    
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IV. TECHNICAL ISSUES INVOLVED WITH IMPLEMENTING KILL 
SWITCHES 
The state and federal kill switch legislation as well as the 
Voluntary Commitment from the CTIA both suffer from a 
dearth of detail about technical specifications and how a kill 
switch would be implemented.  The bills simply call for any 
hardware or software “technological solution” that is 
mandatory and can survive a factory reset.28 However, a kill 
switch solution implemented entirely in software will likely not 
work flawlessly, especially if the software is implemented at a 
high level of abstraction—in the operating system (OS) or as an 
app.  
A. KILL SWITCHES IMPLEMENTED IN SOFTWARE 
Software kill switches depend on users running the 
latest OS and software patches necessary to enable the kill 
switch feature to work.  For example, Apple’s Find My iPhone29 
app and Activation Lock30 feature in iOS 7 were designed to 
function as a kill switch.  Once enabled, Activation Lock is 
designed to make a stolen iPhone unusable even if the phone is 
reset. However, only 85% of iPhones ran iOS 7 at the time the 
first smartphone bills got introduced.31  Therefore, there was 
still a large chance that a stolen iPhone either did not run iOS 7 
or have the Find My iPhone app enabled.  For example, a recent 
theft victim had shut off the Find My iPhone app after reading 
about how it had been abused by a hacker to remote-wipe tech 
writer Mat Honan’s iPhone, iPad, and laptop.32  With the large 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., H.R. 962, 2013 Leg. Counsel, Reg. Sess. § 2(b)(1) (Cal. 
2013). 
29 Apple Computer Inc., Find My iPhone, 
http://www.apple.com/icloud/find-my-iphone.html. 
30 Apple Computer Inc., iCloud: Activation Lock, 
http://support.apple.com/kb/PH13695. 
31 Christian Zibreg, According to Apple, 85 percent of iPhone, iPod touch 
and iPad devices run iOS 7, IDOWNLOADBLOG (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.idownloadblog.com/2014/03/24/apple-85-percent-
devices-ios-7.  
32 Rob Pegoraro, Will Apple's ‘kill switch’ tamp down iPhone thefts?, 
USA TODAY (May 4, 2014, 7:00 AM), 
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number of smartphone offerings, OSs, and app versions on the 
market today, designing a set of reasonably foolproof kill 
switch apps that have similar levels of protection for users 
across industry platforms will require a significant standards-
setting initiative and frequent communication between 
smartphone manufacturers and carriers on bug fixes, 
technology updates, and software patches. 
California’s kill switch bill and the CTIA’s Voluntary 
Commitment would require any smartphone manufactured in 
the United States for retail sale after July 1, 2015 to have a kill 
switch (the latter on a voluntary commitment).  However, most 
users keep their smartphone models for two to three years.  
Hence, even after July 1, 2015, there will be millions of 
smartphones that were purchased previously running older OS 
versions that do not support the kill switch.  Moreover, iPhones 
running iOS 7 (with the kill switch) look almost identical to 
models without it.  Therefore, smartphone thieves will likely 
not be deterred by kill switches for a few years after July 1, 2015, 
and will take the chance that a given smartphone does not have 
a properly functioning kill switch.  Even if a stolen iPhone has 
the kill switch app installed and functional, if a user waits too 
long to run Find My iPhone, that can give the thief time to 
unload the device. (The average duration of time from theft to 
recognition of theft is one hour.)33  
B. SOFTWARE KILL SWITCHES CAN BE BROKEN INTO 
Thieves may also be able to defeat kill switches if the 
user has not installed the latest software security patch. For 
example, Apple recently put out a security fix for a 
vulnerability that allowed a thief to disable Find My iPhone on 
iOS 7 without a password.34  That defense was also 
                                                 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/2014/05/04/wil
l-apples-kill-switch-tamp-down-iphone-thefts/8577215. 
33 Phone Theft in America, LOOKOUT MOBILE SECURITY (May 7, 2014), 
https://www.lookout.com/resources/reports/phone-theft-in-
america. 
34 Carly Page, iOS 7 Exploit Disables Find My Iphone Without a 
Password, THE INQUIRER (Feb. 7, 2014, 1:10 PM), 
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2327573/ios-7-exploit-
disables-find-my-iphone-without-a-password. 
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circumvented in cases where a user did not set a screen-unlock 
passcode.35  
Most recently, hackers have even broken into Apple’s 
Activation Lock installed on the latest iOS 7 with all the latest 
software patches.  The two hackers who call themselves doulCi 
(iCloud, fashioned roughly backwards), claimed to have made 
the workaround “for people who have retrieved their lost or 
stolen iDevice, in an effort to recover access to contacts, email, 
notes, and more.”36  The system works by “plugging [an] 
iPhone or iPad into a computer and altering a file inside . . . 
trick[ing] the device into connecting to the hackers’ server 
instead” and causing the phone to unlock.37  Shortly following 
the release of the doulCi hack, pictures on social media 
appeared “show[ing] that thousands of locked iPhones around 
the world [were] bypassed using the tool just [in the first 
day].”38  Most of the tweets thanking the two hackers come 
from outside of the U.S, where stolen smartphones are shipped 
and sold at a premium on the black market.39  For example, an 
iPhone 5S that costs $707 in the US costs $1,090 in Jordan and 
$1,196 in Brazil.40  The doulCi hack suggests that software kill 
switches on phones are certainly not immune, even from the 
work of a couple of rogue hackers. 
 
C. REMOTE ACTIVATION OF KILL SWITCHES 
A true software kill switch, as opposed to a simple lock-
and-wipe app, would require sending a signal to the phone 
                                                 
35 Pegoraro, supra note 32. 
36 Stephanie Mlot, Hackers Breach Apple’s Activation Lock, PC 
MAGAZINE (May 22, 2014, 9:50 AM), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2458399,00.asp. 
37 Jose Pagliery, Hackers Can ‘Un-Brick’ Stolen iPhones, CNNMONEY 




39 Alex Heath, Apple Too Late to Stop Massive iCloud Breach, Hackers 
Claim, CULT OF MAC (May 21, 2014, 4:46 PM), 
http://www.cultofmac.com/280189/icloud-hacker-calls-apples-
response-little-late. 
40 Swan, supra note 17. 
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over the cellular network or the Internet to “brick” the phone 
by deleting the OS or by sending out a poisoned firmware 
update.  Absent of physical damage to the hardware, the phone 
could still be made functional by installing a new OS or by 
using special tools to fix the firmware.41  iPhones, in particular, 
are “jailbroken” routinely, with the smartphone running a 
knock-off OS.  Therefore, a purely software-based approach to 
render a smartphone forever nonfunctional is unlikely to work.  
A kill switch implemented in software can also be 
avoided.  A thief would have to shut the smartphone off 
immediately after he steals it, which most experienced thieves 
already do to avoid tracking software.  The thief could 
alternatively place the stolen smartphone into a Faraday Bag42 
that blocks Wi-Fi, cellular, and GPS signals and wait until he 
reached a location without a cellular signal, e.g., a metal shed 
or basement.  At that point, the SIM card can be removed and 
discarded, the phone can be turned on, the data wiped, and the 
15-digit International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) 
number changed.43  The carrier network, and kill switch that 
depends on it, would be totally ineffective. 
D. KILL SWITCHES EMBEDDED IN HARDWARE 
 Samsung proposed a more permanent solution, the 
Absolute LoJack kill switch,44 to carriers in 2013, but the carriers 
rejected the proposal.  The Absolute LoJack method embeds the 
kill switch in the smartphone’s BIOS (firmware) that can 
withstand a factory reset and wiping or replacing the hard 
                                                 
41 Jesse Emspak, Why a smartphone ‘kill switch’ won't deter theft, 
MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Aug 27, 2013, 02:19 AM), 
http://www.mnn.com/green-tech/gadgets-
electronics/stories/why-a-smartphone-kill-switch-wont-deter-theft. 
42 Kelsey D. Atherton, Hide From GPS With This Signal-Blocking Phone 
Case, POPULAR SCIENCE (Aug. 6, 2013, 1:15 PM), 
http://www.popsci.com/gadgets/article/2013-08/how-protect-
yourself-your-phone. 
43 Emspak, supra note 41. 
44 Absolute Persistent Security Software. The Only Solution That Can 
Survive a Factory Reset, ABSOLUTE SOFTWARE, 
http://lojack.absolute.com/en/persistent (last visited May 30, 2014). 
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drive.  However, hacker websites45 offer instructions for 
computer-savvy hackers on how to edit a smartphone’s BIOS to 
disable LoJack.  Hence, a truly tamper-proof kill switch would 
have to be either embedded in read-only memory (ROM) or 
built into the integrated circuits (ICs) on the motherboard itself.  
The logic on an IC could be programmed to (1) cause the IC to 
malfunction; (2) reset the memories; or (3) destroy the IC by 
creating a short in the circuit.  Because the kill switch would be 
within the IC, detecting it and disabling it would be near 
impossible.46  In addition, the kill switch would have to be 
embedded on every motherboard manufactured so that if a thief 
tried to replace the motherboard on a smartphone, the new 
replacement motherboard would also have the kill switch.  At 
this point, working around the kill switch would still be 
possible for the thief.  However, because a new motherboard 
costs upwards of $100,47 it might serve as a sufficient deterrence 
to theft. 
E. HARDWARE REDESIGNS THAT COULD WORK 
Modern electronic devices, such as smartphones, have 
sleep states that are in between fully on and fully off.  In sleep 
mode, some circuits on the smartphone are powered up and 
others are powered down.48  “These modes often allow the 
device to wake up autonomously if certain conditions are met, 
such as pressing a certain key or even receiving certain data 
                                                 
45 See, e.g., How to Remove Computrace LoJack, FREAKY ACRES, 
http://www.freakyacres.com/remove_computrace_lojack (last 
visited May 30, 2014). 
46 Email from Mark Tehranipoor, Charles H. Knapp Associate 
Professor of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of 
Connecticut, to authors (May 30, 2014, 11:06 AM) (on file with 
authors). 
47 iPhone 5 Replacement Motherboards, EBAY, 
http://www.ebay.com (search “iphone 5 replacement 
motherboard”) (last visited May 30, 2014). 
48 Heather Murphy, Why Snowden Asked Visitors in Hong Kong to 
Refrigerate Their Phones, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 25, 2013, 9:41 AM), 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/why-snowdens-
visitors-put-their-phones-in-the-fridge/?_r=0&pagewanted=all 
(quoting Seth Schoen, Senior Staff Technologist, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation).     
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over the Internet. . . .”49  Therefore, a kill switch that could be 
activated to wake up and “brick” the smartphone even when 
the smartphone were switched off by a thief would be useful.  
In addition, a hardware redesign to thwart thieves that remove 
the smartphone battery to evade tracking could be to insert 
secondary power sources within the apparatus.  “Some phones 
[already] use an additional battery for memory management; 
it’s unclear whether this battery could be used by logging 
and/or tracking systems. . . .”50  Such a secret secondary power 
source could be used to power tracking apps and the kill switch. 
F. FOOLPROOF BUT EXPENSIVE SOLUTIONS 
Militaries around the world have designed “remote 
shut-down” solutions on defense systems since at least 2008 to 
disable ICs on equipment that might fall into hostile hands.  
These generally consist of kill switches or backdoors.  A 
military-style kill switch manipulates the system’s software or 
hardware to cause the system to die outright, for example, to 
shut off an F-35’s missile-launching electronics.51  A backdoor, 
on the other hand, lets the designer gain access to the system to 
disable or enable a specific function.  Because a backdoor does 
not shut down the entire system, hostile users remain unaware 
of the intrusion.  For example, a designer could use it to bypass 
battlefield radio encryption. Similarly, smartphone 
manufacturers or carriers could use a backdoor to continue 
tracking a thief while blocking access to the owner’s sensitive 
data.  However, military-style designs, while foolproof, would 
likely prove too expensive for commercial smartphones unless 
breakthroughs in technology and design occur. 
Boeing recently filed documents with the FCC to build 
a tamper-proof android smartphone it calls the “Black” phone.  
The “Black phone will be sold primarily to government 
agencies and companies . . . related to defense and homeland 
                                                 
49 Id.  
50 Id. 
51 Sally Adee, The Hunt for the Kill Switch, IEEE SPECTRUM (May 1, 
2008, 7:57 PM), 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/design/the-hunt-for-the-
kill-switch. 
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security,” says a letter accompanying the filing.52  There are no 
serviceable parts on Boeing’s Black phone and any attempted 
servicing or replacing of parts would destroy the product.  The 
phone is sealed with epoxy around the casing and with screws, 
the heads of which are covered with tamper proof covering to 
identify attempted disassembly.  While such a device would 
provide high security indeed, the need for commercial devices 
to be serviced or repaired likely precludes a specialized solution 
like Boeing’s for commercial smartphones.  In addition, Boeing 
will not provide technical and operational information about 
the product to the general public for security purposes.53  
Technical information distributed at trade shows will be 
protected by non-disclosure agreements.  With the proliferation 
of hacker sites instructing the public on jailbreaking 
smartphones and evading kill switches, commercial 
smartphone companies might soon decide to follow this route 
in the future. 
Finally, researchers at Rice University and the 
University of California, Los Angeles recently invented a new 
method to protect integrated circuits (IC) against piracy.  The 
new method exploits the inherent variability in modern IC 
manufacturing to create a unique identifier for each IC and 
integrate the identifier into the IC’s functionality.54  However, 
while this novel method solves the IMEI erasing problem and 
is attack-resilient, it would likely lead to a large overhead cost 
for smartphone manufacturers and would be difficult to 
standardize across smartphone platforms. 
                                                 
52 Letter from Bruce A. Olcott, The Boeing Company, Supplemented 
Request for Confidential Treatment  
 FCC Identification Number H8V-BLK1 (Model: BLACK), to Joe Dichoso, 
Chief Equipment Authorization Branch, Office of Engineering and 




54 Yousra Alkabani, et al., Remote Activation of ICs for Piracy Prevention 
and Digital Rights Management, Proceedings of the Int’l Conference on 
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V. NON-KILL-SWITCH SOLUTION: CARRIER REGISTRIES AND 
MOBILE DATA MANAGEMENT 
A. CARRIER REGISTRY OPERATION 
Seeking to deflect legislation that would mandate kill 
switches for all smartphones, and seeking to avoid dealing with 
the technical challenges enumerated above, U.S. carriers 
implemented databases in November 2013 that use unique 
GSM and LTE (advanced GSM) smartphone ID numbers to 
prevent stolen smartphones from being re-activated on GSM or 
LTE networks in the U.S. and on appropriate international LTE 
networks.55  At present in the U.S., consumers that lose their 
smartphones may call their service provider and have service 
suspended to the smartphone.56  However, it is the consumer’s 
responsibility to know the device’s make, model number, serial 
number, and unique device identification number (either the 
International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI) or the Mobile 
Equipment Identifier (MEID) number).57  Different smartphone 
models and carriers may use GSM networks, CDMA networks, 
LTE networks, or a mix of the three.58  Therefore, a stolen 
smartphone that is blocked on one registry could be activated 
on a registry using a different network standard.  
Additionally, consulting the registries and blocking 
activation of phones reported as stolen is a voluntary action of 
carriers.59  Remote phone location, locking, and data-wiping 
                                                 
55 Letter from Brian M. Josef, CTIA Stolen Smartphones Status Update, 
to Kris Monteith, Acting Bureau Chief, Consumer and Governmental 
Affairs Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, 
http://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/default-document-
library/july-2013.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
56 FCC, How to Report a Lost or Stolen Smart Device, 
http://www.fcc.gov/stolen-phones-contact-numbers. 
57 FCC, Protect Your Mobile Device, 
http://www.fcc.gov/guides/stolen-and-lost-wireless-devices. 
58 European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), Mobile 
Communications, http://www.etsi.org/technologies-
clusters/technologies/mobile. 
59 Daniel E. Dilger, Apple Gov't rep says next two iPhones were designed 
under Steve Jobs, APPLEINSIDER (April 01, 2013, 12:03 PM), 
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services depend entirely on whether the manufacturer and 
carrier provides them on the particular smartphone model; the 
features are not uniformly offered on all models or by all 
carriers.60   Manufacturer or third-party apps available for some 
models today can locate a stolen device from a computer, lock 
the device to restrict access, wipe sensitive data from the device, 
and make the device emit a loud sound (“scream”) to help the 
police locate it.  However, carriers and manufacturers are not 
required to make such apps available on all phones or on all 
networks.61  
Once service is suspended on the smartphone, the 
consumer cannot wipe or lock it. Monthly plan charges 
continue while service is suspended, and the consumer must 
have bought insurance ahead of time to get the smartphone 
replaced.62 
B. AUSTRALIA’S REGISTRY PROGRAM HAS PRODUCED 
RELATIVE SUCCESS 
Australia implemented an IMEI blocking program a 
decade ago and has deemed it successful at deterring theft with 
“net blocking activity [falling] by nearly 25% from 169,000 
mobile handsets blocked to 127,750 [from 2004-2011] . . . against 
the background of an 80% increase in the number of mobile 
services in operation over this period.”63  The IMEI is an integral 
phone “fingerprint” that is transmitted whenever the phone is 
used.  Supporters of an IMEI system claim that it may prove 
                                                 
http://appleinsider.com/articles/13/04/01/apple-govt-rep-says-
next-two-iphones-were-designed-under-steve-jobs.   
60 See e.g., AT&T, Replace your lost or stolen device and suspend service, 
http://www.att.com/esupport/article.jsp?sid=52993&cv=820&_req
uestid=1370759#fbid=COrGqYlcbAL. 
61 Supra note 57.  
62 Id.   
63 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association, Australian 
Anti-Theft Mobile Phone Technology Highlighted on U.S. Television 
(accessed May 21, 2014), 
http://www.amta.org.au/articles/Australian.anti-
theft.mobile.phone.technology.highlighted.on.US.television 
(additionally noting that “[t]he net blocking figures are derived from 
subtracting unblocking requests (if the handset is subsequently 
found and returned to its legal owner) from blocking requests”). 
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more failsafe than mandatory kill switches.  Speaking with 
American media, Randal Markey of the Australian Mobile 
Telecommunications Association highlighted the ease of 
implementing and operating a shared database, which just 
requires collaboration amongst carriers, and the relative 
difficulty for unsophisticated thieves to wipe the IMEI 
number.64   
C. PROBLEMS WITH A REGISTRY SOLUTION 
 However, there are a number of problems plaguing 
voluntary carrier registries.  Many consumers do not know 
about them and do not report stolen phones.  Many stores or 
fly-by-night operations “will jailbreak a stolen phone ‘no 
questions asked,’ and thieves can then re-activate the 
smartphone with a smaller carrier that is not participating in the 
registry.”65  Carrier registries may thus simply encourage more 
black market workarounds.  Moreover, the registries mainly 
apply in the U.S. and Europe and could encourage thieves to 
ship stolen phones to other areas, where they are more valuable 
because of export restrictions and tariffs.  Additionally, any 
projected effect of IMEI blocking on theft depends on the 
assumption that thieves require cell service at all, not just in the 
registry-covered areas like the U.S. and Europe.  Deterrence of 
an IMEI system may fail to prevent thieves who simply wish to 
profit off of hardware resales, user data mining, or use of other 
smartphone functions (digital music, camera, etc.).  A hack-
proof mechanism to track and shut down stolen devices 
anywhere in the world, regardless of which carrier is used and 
without burdening the consumer with the responsibility of 
purchasing and downloading apps (or remembering the 
                                                 
64 C.W. Nevius, An Easy Way to Curb Smart Phone Thieves, S.F. GATE 
(Dec. 3, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/nevius/article/An-
easy-way-to-curb-smart-phone-thieves-2344797.php.  
65 Josh Harkinson, For Apple and the Phone Companies, "All a Theft 
Means Is Another Sale," MOTHER JONES (Mar. 18, 2013 8:58 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/03/stolen-iphone-theft-
imsi (describing San Francisco District Attorney George Gascón’s 
views on mobile device makers and carriers doing little to fix the 
problem).   
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smartphone’s 15-digit IMEI number), would likely be a 
stronger deterrent to smartphone theft.66 
D. MOBILE DATA MANAGEMENT 
 Growing employee demand for bringing their personal 
smartphones to work has driven security-minded employers to 
use Mobile Data Management (MDM) services provided by 
third-party vendors.  MDM provides increased security for 
both the devices and the enterprise they connect to by 
controlling and protecting the data and configuration settings 
for all mobile devices in the network.67  MDM solutions can 
control the apps installed or available on an employee’s 
personal smartphone and disable the camera when on company 
premises.  In addition, MDM software can lock and wipe a lost 
or stolen smartphone, display a message on its screen, and 
cause it to emit a high-volume sound.  Other options include a 
wireless or Bluetooth tether that ties a smartphone to a key fob 
and locks or wipes the smartphone if it is separated from the 
key fob by a maximum specified distance.68  However, MDM 
solutions do not prevent theft; they merely secure data in the 
event of theft. 
VI. THE MANDATORY KILL SWITCH SOLUTION’S RELATIVE 
EFFECTIVENESS AT DETERRING THEFT 
 In theory, implementing a default kill switch in every 
smartphone is seen as the ideal deterrent to theft because it 
would decrease the expected value a thief gets from stealing 
while presenting fewer points of confusion to consumers and 
fewer available black market workarounds to thieves, fly-by-
night operations, or crime syndicates.  However, even 
assuming that a mandatory switch could be implemented 
                                                 
66 Id. (quoting Kevin Mahaffey, Chief Technology Officer, Lookout (a 
maker of anti-theft smartphone apps,) “That seems like something 
that is reachable[]”).     
67 BYOD Requires Mobile Device Management, INFORMATIONWEEK 
(May 5, 2011, 4:25 PM), 
http://www.informationweek.com/mobile/byod-requires-mobile-
device-management/d/d-id/1097576?.   
68 DEBORAH MORLEY, CHARLES PARKER & JANET LAVINE, 
UNDERSTANDING COMPUTERS : TODAY AND TOMORROW 597 (2004). 
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without technical difficulties or hacking susceptibility, it may 
fail to deter thieves for a number of reasons.  At the same time, 
mandating kill switches may help correct, for consumer 
security, apathy that indirectly encourages theft.  Without more 
information about theft incentives and characteristics, the 
effects of a kill switch cannot be predicted for certain.  
A. THE MANDATORY KILL SWITCH SOLUTION REQUIRES 
MANY ASSUMPTIONS AND MAY MISINTERPRET 
THIEVING BEHAVIOR 
 The premise that putting kill switches in every phone 
will stop thieves from stealing phones relies upon a number of 
assumptions, including that: (1) thieves specifically target 
phones; (2) thieves target phones for their operability and will 
actually learn of kill switches; and (3) thieves cannot benefit 
from workarounds, such as hacks, which may pop up from time 
to time.  Because of legislative requirements, any kill switch 
underpinning these assumptions must also be costless to 
consumers, leading to another constraint on likely effectiveness 
since more expensive and potentially more effective solutions 
are foreclosed.  
1. THIEVES MAY NOT SPECIFICALLY TARGET PHONES TO 
STEAL 
 First, the increasing incidence of smartphone theft may 
belie the conclusion that thieves are specifically seeking to steal 
smartphones.  While smartphone theft nearly doubled last year, 
most of the growth came from large urban areas.69  It is entirely 
possible that spikes in smartphone theft simply reflects the fact 
that more theft victims carry visible smartphones in their bags 
                                                 
69 Samantha Murphy Kelly, What’s the Worst U.S. City for Smartphone 
Theft?, Mashable (Nov. 8, 2012), 
http://mashable.com/2012/11/08/smartphone-theft-city/ (noting 
that the top ten locations for smartphone theft are Philadelphia, 
Seattle, Oakland, Long Beach, Newark, Detroit, Cleveland, 
Baltimore, New York, and Boston); Phone Theft in America, LOOKOUT 
MOBILE SECURITY (May 7, 2014), 
https://www.lookout.com/resources/reports/ phone-theft-in-
america (noting that 55% of thefts occur in urban areas). 
54                     4 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2016) 
 
or on their person, or that smartphone owners have become less 
protective of their phones as they take them all over town.   
 The former point may have some statistically significant 
effect, as smartphone ownership has increased from 45% of 
Americans in 2012 to 58% by the end of 2013.70  Part of this may 
also have to do with the fact that phones are getting bigger (and 
thus more apparent to would-be-thief passersby): global 
shipments of smartphones with screens over 5 inches more than 
doubled from 25.6 million in 2012 to 60.4 million in 2013.71 
 The latter point is also somewhat reflected in the 
available data: according to a recent survey by the mobile 
security firm Lookout, 44% of phones are stolen because they 
are left behind in a public setting.72  Though it may be possible 
that thieves are purposefully staking out public places like 
restaurants, clubs, or workplaces (the three most common 
places for phone theft to occur),73 much of the rise in theft may 
simply be attributable to growing owner forgetfulness that 
comes along with increased smartphone usage in public.  The 
fact that the average victim takes an entire hour to realize a 
theft74 probably indicates that most stolen phones are not 
quickly swiped from right under the owner’s nose.  More likely, 
a restaurant or club patron leaves her phone on a table and 
another patron (or an employee) snatches it after the owner has 
left.  If these circumstances are more likely to occur than specific 
targeting by thieves, then kill switches may not have their 
intended deterrent effect since many thieves seem to not 
calculate the risks of a theft ahead of time. 
                                                 
70 Device Ownership over Time, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT 
(accessed June 2, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/data-
trend/mobile/device-ownership/.  
71 Global Shipment of Smartphones with a Screen Size of 5 Inches or Larger, 
STATISTA (accessed June 2, 2014), 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/253350/shipments-of-
smartphones-with-screen-size-5-inches-or-larger/.  





COULD KILL SWITCHES KILL PHONE THEFT?              55  
 
2. THIEVES MAY NOT LEARN ABOUT KILL SWITCHES OR 
EVEN CARE ABOUT STOLEN PHONE OPERABILITY 
 Even assuming that thieves engage in a risk calculus 
before attempting a theft, they may ignore the presence of a kill 
switch because they either do not know it exists or they do not 
care.  It is often so easy to steal a smartphone that a thief may 
not mind the probability that he will be stuck with a bricked 
device.  Thieves’ opportunism not only takes advantage of the 
fact that “people on phones can be so oblivious to surroundings 
they are not aware of a potential thief”75 but also of the 44 % of 
thefts that occur when phones are left behind in public settings.  
In these cases, taking a kill-switch-enabled phone presents little 
risk if the thief avoids getting caught, which most often is 
independent of the presence of a kill switch. If the phone is 
disabled, thieves may simply discard it and seek to steal 
another one. 
Thieves also have another option. An inoperative 
smartphone can still retain some resale value, even if only for 
parts.  Smartphone OS consultants and developers have 
suggested that components like the camera or the screen could 
fetch a price making it worthwhile to steal, while a thief could 
even damage a stolen smartphone and then claim the lower 
price that gadget recycling sites pay for broken hardware. 
Would publicity about the mandatory deployment of 
kill switches in smartphones create a powerful enough 
deterrent for thieves? That depends on a number of factors, 
such as (1) whether thieves would find out about kill switches 
personally, or through their fences; (2) how long would it take 
for theft to decrease once kill switches are deployed, which in 
turns depends on how long older versions of smartphones and 
OSs remain in use with consumers after the July 1, 2015 
deadline; and (3) what thieves are stealing smartphones for.  
The first factor above is at the center of a debate between 
state legislators trying to enact kill switch bills and 
manufacturers of security systems. While legislators want to 
publicize the deployment of kill switches to deter theft, security 
companies such as Absolute (the creator of the LoJack)76 want 
unwitting thieves to continue connecting to the internet and 
                                                 
75 Pegoraro, supra note 32 (internal citations omitted). 
76 Absolute, supra note 44. 
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cellular towers so that the company may track the thieves and 
gain remote access to stolen smartphones. 
The third factor above is related to whether smartphone 
theft is targeted more at sensitive data than at the hardware 
itself. While a stolen smartphone may fetch a thief a few 
hundred dollars, access to financial apps, even for a short 
period of time, may be far more valuable.  
What thieves are targeting ties into kill switch technical 
design choices as well.  A software kill switch could protect a 
phone from getting wiped and reset, but it would not protect 
sensitive data encrypted on the smartphone. A hardware kill 
switch would be more secure, as described in Part V. However, 
while it would protect encrypted personal data, it could make 
it possible for thieves to reactivate the phone for resale. “We 
need to understand what the motivation is in the theft before 
instilling a solution,” says Greg Kazmierczak, CTO of Wave 
Systems, a provider of hardware-based encryption technology, 
“What’s the most valuable component — the hardware or the 
data you are storing in your device?”77 
3. THIEVES MAY TRUST THE BLACK MARKET TO END-
RUN AROUND THE KILL SWITCH 
 Thieves, even if they learn of and care about the 
effectiveness of kill switches, may still steal because they have 
access to workarounds or are willing to wait for them.  In 
Washington, D.C., a spokesman for the Metro transit system, 
Dan Stessel, pointed out that some stolen smartphones could be 
resold through buy-back programs like ecoATM kiosks that do 
not require face-to-face transactions.78  ecoATM responded 
with a statement: “Our policy is not to knowingly purchase 
phones with Find My iPhone activated, and we continue to 
improve our technology to that end.”79   
Even if no mechanism for resale is available at the time 
of theft, thieves may still impute some expected value from the 
                                                 
77 Jane Porter, Is a Mandatory Kill Switch the Solution to Smartphone 
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stolen phone by sitting and waiting for a hack or new 
distribution stream.  This is precisely what happened with the 
doulCi hack mentioned above in Part V(B), where pictures of 
groups of newly jailbroken iPhones appeared on social media 
the day the hack was publicized.  The hackers posted server 
data corroborating claims that “more than 5,700 devices [were 
hacked] in just five minutes.”80  Precedents like these encourage 
thieves that “brickable” phones may still be worth stealing, so 
long as waiting for a value-adding hack to come along is 
possible.  The assumptions in this section highlight the 
uncertain effect a kill switch may have at deterring theft, if it 
even has an effect at all. 
B. WHAT MINIMUM LEVEL OF KILL SWITCH TECHNOLOGY 
WOULD SUFFICIENTLY DETER THEFT? 
 As discussed in Part V, a kill switch would be less 
vulnerable to hacking or jailbreaking, as its level of 
implementation gets lower. For higher levels of implementation 
in software, a thief could jailbreak the smartphone (done today 
for security apps installed on top of the OS), replace the OS, edit 
the BIOS file, or wipe the IMEI number (listed with increasing 
levels of difficulty and therefore increasing levels of deterrence 
to theft). To be more secure, a kill switch should be 
implemented at a lower level or directly in hardware. However, 
the lower the level of implementation and more secure the kill 
switch, the more expensive it will be to design and implement 
for manufacturers. 
1. IN SEARCH OF AN OPTIMAL KILL SWITCH SOLUTION 
 Designing the best kill switch is an optimization 
problem: what is the minimum level of kill switch technology 
needed that will prove enough of a deterrence to a thief?  The 
most expensive military-style solutions may not be needed as 
long as there is a sufficient deterrence to reduce theft by a 
desired amount.  As with most optimization problems, an 
optimal solution would depend on the value of the inputs and 
ensuring the correct inputs have been chosen.  It is hard to 
predict what factors of a kill switch would be optimal.  In Figure 
                                                 
80 Heath, supra note 39. 
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1, we illustrate an example graphical representation of theft 
deterrence versus kill switch technology, showing how the cost 
of a kill switch and the cost of cracking it could lead to an 
optimal solution. 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of the potential relationship 
between kill switch technology and levels of theft deterrence. 
Making no special effort has little to no theft deterrence. 
Multiple carrier registries for difference carriers and different 
wireless standards (CDMA, GSM, and LTE) that carriers must 
only voluntarily consult provides a slightly higher level of 
deterrence. Using a single, shared carrier registry that carriers 
may be required to use to block stolen IMEI numbers by law, as 
in the case of Australia’s EMTA, provides an even higher level 
of theft deterrence. Mandating the most secure (and expensive) 
military-style solution, such as the Boeing black phone, may 
provide the maximum possible level of theft deterrence.  
However, the expense of implementing it may not be 
commercially feasible: a cheaper hardware implementation 
alternative may be provide nearly as much deterrence at a far-
reduced cost.  The optimal solution may be a mixed 
software/hardware implementation at the knee of the curve 
that provides a high level amount of theft deterrence at a 
cheaper cost. 






2. A SIMPLISTIC MODEL OF THEFT BEHAVIOR 
An empirical study on theft deterrence versus kill 
switch technologies that takes into account factors such as the 
notice of a kill switch to thieves, the amount of implementation 
cost that industry is willing to absorb if mandated by law, and 
the cost of jailbreaking each level of kill switch technology 
would be useful to flesh out what an optimal solution may look 
like. Finally, a study on whether smartphone thieves are 
rational actors would be useful.  This is because models such as 
the one illustrated above operate on a number of assumptions 
that may be incorrect.  The following simplified model of 
thieving behavior demonstrates that—assuming thieves are 
rational actors—much is unknown about why thefts occur.  If a 
kill switch solution misunderstands the reason for theft, it may 
prove costly and ineffective. For example, a thief’s decision in 
deciding to steal a smartphone can be represented by the 
following equation.  
Steal if:  U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] > 𝑈𝑈[|𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)|], 
where U represents utility, E(phone) represents the expected 
value of the stolen smartphone, and E(caught) represents the 
expected value of getting caught. U[E(phone)] may be calculated 
as follows.  
U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] = {[1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐ℎ,𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐ℎ)−  𝑝𝑝(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)]
∗  𝐸𝐸[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)]}
+ {[𝑝𝑝(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐ℎ,𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐ℎ)−  𝑝𝑝 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)]
∗  𝐸𝐸[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)]} +  𝛽𝛽, 
where 𝛽𝛽 represents any extraneous positive or negative utility 
(over the sale value) that a thief gets from successfully stealing 
and selling a phone. Further, U[|E(caught)|] may be calculated 
as follows. 
U[|𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)|] = 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) =  𝑝𝑝(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) ∗ |𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)| 
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 If we assume a 15% catch rate of thieves and a 75% 
probability of a thief evading capture and encountering an 
unbreakable kill switch, we have the following incentive 
structure: 
U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] = (.1)* 𝐸𝐸[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] + 
(.6)* 𝐸𝐸[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)] + 𝛽𝛽. 
To continue working through the simplified model, assume a 
thief can net $200 profit on average for fencing a jailbroken 
phone and a $100 profit on average from either selling the parts 
on a kill-switch-enabled phone or (if available) paying a hacker 
to bypass the kill switch.  A thief can expect: 
U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] = 80 +  𝛽𝛽; 
Steal if : 80 +  𝛽𝛽 > 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) 
 A rational thief will therefore steal the phone so long as 
the expected value of stealing a phone (here, 80 +  𝛽𝛽) exceeds 
the expected value loss from being caught.  Assuming that 𝛽𝛽 is 
nominal and the probability of being caught remains 15%, a 
rational thief will steal a phone unless his expected value loss 
from being caught is greater than roughly $533: 
(. 15) ∗ 𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) ≥ 80,  
𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠: |𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)| ≥ ≈ 533  
 To take it a step further, even assuming that a thief has 
a 100% chance of either being caught or encountering a kill 
switch (say, 𝑝𝑝(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) = .15 and 𝑝𝑝(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐ℎ,𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐ℎ) =
.85), the thief may still gain utility from selling the parts or 
awaiting a hack to bypass the switch: 
U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] = (0)* 200 + (.7)* 100 + 𝛽𝛽 = 70 + 𝛽𝛽; 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝: 70 +  𝛽𝛽 > 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡); 
(. 15) ∗ 𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) ≥ 70,  
𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠: |𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)| ≥ ≈ 467  
Thus, a rational thief who fully comprehends the existence and 
effect of a kill switch ubiquitous on all phones could still decide 
to steal a phone, if only to make a profit off of selling hardware 
or data on the black market. 
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Clearly, this exercise does not purport to represent the reality of 
thieving behavior, but rather to show how difficult it is to 
understand the rationale behind stealing a phone.  An endless 
number of additional assumptions can be introduced to the 
model (such as a negative effect on utility when encountering a 
kill-switch-enabled phone to represent confusion), and the 
model still remains a gross oversimplification of reality.  The 
core assumption that thieves are rational actors is also 
incredibly dubious.  Most phone thieves probably won’t bother 
to calculate a detailed incentives equation like the one above, 
and thus they may not respond well to changing incentives (like 
the introduction of kill switches). 
C. COULD VIGILANTISM HURT THE KILL SWITCH’S SAFETY 
OBJECTIVE? 
The stated objective of both the SOS initiative and the 
various kill switch bills in state legislatures is to increase 
consumer safety by preventing (violent) theft.  However, only 
11% of smartphone theft involves a robber taking a smartphone 
from a person.81  Moreover, 68% of theft victims reported a 
willingness to resort to vigilantism to recover their 
smartphones.82  New apps such as Find My iPhone offer GPS 
tracking capabilities for those desperate to recover their 
smartphones, stirring worries among law enforcement officials 
that people are putting themselves and others in danger.83  
“Some have been successful,” said George Gascón, the San 
Francisco district attorney and a former police chief, “others 
have gotten hurt.”84 
Pursuing a thief can lead to violence, especially when 
people arm themselves—hammers are popular—while hunting 
for stolen smartphones.  A New Jersey man was arrested after 
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he tracked his stolen smartphone and ended up attacking the 
wrong man, mistaking him for the thief.85   
A kill switch could lead to increased violence in three 
ways.  First, the way in which it is implemented could make it 
easier to track a stolen smartphone and take the law into one’s 
own hands.  Second, a thief who knows that an owner can brick 
a stolen smartphone may violently attack the owner during the 
robbery to prevent the owner from recovering and “bricking” 
the stolen smartphone too soon.  Third, if the “bricked” 
smartphone displays the owner’s address, as some security 
apps and MDM solutions do, that could invite retribution from 
a frustrated thief.86  Further investigation of whether a kill 
switch implementation would increase vigilantism and 
violence above the level already occurring with apps such as 
Find My iPhone is critical before defining a kill switch standard 
and settling on a particular implementation. 
However, vigilantism is also fueled by the dismissive 
responses that victims of theft receive from manufacturers and 
service carriers.  For example, a victim who tracked his stolen 
smartphone to a particular house and called AT&T was given 
two options by the carrier: either deactivate the phone and buy 
a new one, or find a cop willing to subpoena AT&T for 
information, file a lengthy police report, and go through a long 
bureaucratic process.87  Manufacturers and carriers have little 
incentive to help a victim recover a device because the 
manufacturer profits by hawking a replacement phone; and the 
carrier profits by locking the crime victim into a new contract, 
then opening an account with whomever ends up with the 
stolen phone.88  Carriers even profit from the specter of phone 
theft, by selling expensive insurance policies to protect their 
users.  A mandatory kill switch could reverse this trend and 
potentially reverse the need for vigilantism by turning stolen 
smartphones worthless or promoting their recovery. 
D. EXEMPT DEVICES COULD REDUCE THEFT DETERRENCE 
                                                 
85 Id. 
86 MORLEY, supra note 68. 
87 Swan, supra note 17.  
88 Id. 
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As we describe in Part V, the millions of older versions 
of smartphones still in use by the deployment deadline would 
defeat the theft deterrence objective of the kill switch legislation 
by around two years.  In addition, the presence of other exempt 
devices would also drag the level of deterrence downward.  For 
example, the California Senate Energy, Utilities, and 
Communication Committee listed the following exempt 
devices that would not be required to have a kill switch.   
 
All devices that fall within the exception for 
resale and pawnbrokers; All devices sold out of 
state and brought into California; All devices 
currently in the market, which customers 
typically replace every 18 to 24 months; All 
devices provided “free” as part of a promotion 
or a wireless lifeline plan; and All devices that, 
even if rendered inoperable by a kill switch, may 
have value for parts.89   
 
Such devices would continue to have value for resale on the 
black market. Moreover, the potentially large number of such 
devices in use would incentivize thieves to take their chances 
with a kill switch and continue with smartphone theft. 
E. The Power of Default 
The various pieces of legislation mandating a kill switch 
for smartphones have provisions stating that each smartphone 
sold must have the kill switch enabled but that consumers 
should have the ability to disable the kill switch upon purchase.  
On the other hand, the CTIA and third-party security app 
vendors such as Absolute would prefer that any kill switch be 
deployed on an opt-in basis, with consumers choosing whether 
to opt in to the program.  While an opt-in program puts 
consumer choice front and center in deciding how a kill switch 
                                                 
89 California Senate, Energy, Utilities and Communications 
Committee, March 24, 2014, 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml? 
bill_id=201320140SB962&search_keywords (click Bill Analysis tab, 
then click the link titled “03/28/14 – Senate, Utilities And 
Communications”). 
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would be deployed, the choice of whether a kill switch program 
is opt-in or opt-out will have a significant impact of whether kill 
switches will be adopted  by the majority of smartphone 
owners.  
The choice of the default position is based on three 
assumptions from behavioral economics.  First, more 
consumers stay with the default than would choose to do so if 
forced to choose.90  Second, only consumers who prefer the opt-
out choice will opt out.  And third, where carriers oppose the 
default position, they will be forced to explain it to smartphone 
owners, resulting in well-informed decisions by consumers.  
However, Professor Willis asserts, in the privacy context, that 
these assumptions are unlikely to hold.  
The default position, such as an opt-in kill switch, 
favored by companies is often surrounded by a powerful 
campaign to keep consumers there, but a default position set 
contrary to company interests can be met with an equally 
powerful campaign to drive consumers out.91  Therefore, 
companies can either bolster the mechanisms behind the inertia 
that leads consumers to stick with defaults or they can weaken 
them to induce consumers to opt out.  Rather than forcing 
companies to facilitate consumer exercise of informed choice, 
many defaults leave companies with opportunities to play on 
consumer biases or confuse consumers into sticking with or 
opting out of the default.92  However, to really deter theft, 
smartphones will require near–100 % adoption, such that 
thieves stop taking the chance that a given smartphone will 
have the kill switch disabled. 
F. TRACKING LOCAL SMARTPHONE SALES AND INCREASED 
PENALTIES FOR IMEI WIPING 
In 2013, New York State Senate Co-Leader Jeffrey Klein 
and Assemblyman Jeff Dinowitz, Chair of the Assembly’s 
Consumer Affairs and Protection Committee, introduced new 
legislation to require smartphone sellers to prove that they are 
                                                 
90 Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy By Default?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 61 (forthcoming 2014). 
91 Id. 
92 Id.. 
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the rightful owners of the phones they sell.93  The objective of 
the legislation is to curtail the local black market for stolen 
smartphones.  Non-compliant sellers face the possibility of 
steep fines or jail time.94  The state lawmakers hope that this 
legislation would stop stolen smartphones being sold at 
neighborhood stores, laundromats, and flea market stands. 
The legislation would require smartphone sellers to 
provide detailed receipts for every phone sold, including the 
IMEI number.  It is hoped that these records could provide 
additional information on how and where stolen phones move 
in the marketplace.  However, Arieanna Schweber of Absolute 
Software claims that although the bill could make the sale of 
stolen mobile phones locally more difficult, it will not diminish 
the demand for stolen devices.95  This is because the majority of 
stolen smartphones are now being shipped abroad.  Therefore, 
local legislation will likely be inadequate to address the global 
issue. 
Also in 2013, U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer 
reintroduced legislation that would make it a federal crime to 
wipe an IMEI number by imposing a five-year criminal 
penalty.96  Senator Schumer noted that without a criminal 
penalty for tampering with IMEI numbers, thieves could 
simply alter the IMEI number to evade carrier registries and 
reactivate a smartphone phone.  Because the bill has the full 
support of the CTIA and the FCC, it could prevent reactivation 
of stolen smartphones.  However, it may have little deterrence 
value if smartphones are primarily being stolen for an 
international black market. 
VII. ADDITIONAL CONCERNS AND PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES 
OF A MANDATORY KILL SWITCH 
                                                 
93  S. 5976, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).  
94 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22761(c) (West 2014) (“The 
knowing retail sale of a smartphone in California . . . may be subject 
to a civil penalty”).  
95 Arieanna Schweber, New York Legislators Propose Law to Reduce 
Black Market for Mobile Devices,  INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 21, 2013), 
http://theft319.rssing.com/browser.php?indx=16105444&item=24. 
96 S. 1070, 112th Cong. (2013). 
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 A government-mandated kill switch, as opposed to 
allowing individuals to make their own security choices, raises 
several additional concerns and risks of misuse and 
surveillance. 
A. GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL 
 Although Internet companies and government agencies 
already track bulk and targeted data on the Internet, 
individuals today have the ability to erase and block tracking 
cookies, prevent the transmission of specified local data, and 
even use encryption technology, given enough technical 
savvy.97  However, mandatory phone kill switches have the 
potential to significantly increase government surveillance and 
control over speech and political behavior. On August 11, 2011, 
the Bay Area Rapid Transit system (BART) shut down 
cellphone service to four stations in San Francisco in response 
to a planned protest, because in July 2011 protesters disrupted 
BART service in response to the fatal shooting of a passenger by 
BART police.98 BART first approached carriers directly and 
asked them to turn off service.  Later, a BART officer asserted 
that “BART staff or contractors shut down power to the nodes 
and alerted the cell carriers” after the fact.99  A smartphone kill 
switch that the government can control by exerting authority 
over carriers could even more greatly empower the government 
to squelch political protests by disrupting smartphone service 
and making organization and coordination of citizen 
movements or protests difficult.  
 The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) compared 
BART’s actions with those of former President Hosni Mubarak 
of Egypt who ordered the shutdown of cellphone service in 
                                                 
97 Thomas Claburn, Kill Switches: Phones Just the Start, 
INFORMATIONWEEK (Feb. 19, 2014, 9:06 AM), 
http://www.informationweek.com/mobile/mobile-devices/kill-
switches-phones-just-the-start/d/d-id/1113887.  
98 Eva Galperin, BART Pulls a Mubarak in San Francisco, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Aug. 12, 2011), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/08/bart-pulls-mubarak-san-
francisco. 
99 Id. (quoting James Allison, deputy chief communications officer for 
BART). 
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Tahrir Square in response to peaceful, democratic protests in 
2011.100  Moreover, British Prime Minister David Cameron is 
considering new, broad censorship powers over social 
networks, such as Facebook and Twitter and mobile 
communication in the UK.101  The ability to peremptorily 
control smartphone kill switches could have grave concerns for 
free speech and democracy.  However, BART was able to shut 
down cellphones without a kill switch.  Therefore, whether kill 
switches really represent a broad enlargement of the 
government’s power requires information on how much a kill 
switch would add to the government’s current ability to turn 
off smartphone communications.  The advantage of a kill switch 
that the government has the ability to control is that it could 
prevent theft of trade secrets and national secrets from stolen 
smartphones.  Further study would be welcome on how this 
would work with or without the consent of the smartphone’s 
owner.  
B. INSECURE NON-OWNER CONTROL 
As the CTIA points out, even if a kill switch is 
technologically feasible, it could have serious risks.  If a 
mandatory kill switch is created, every smartphone would have 
the capability. Depending on the implementation, the “kill” 
message could be known to every operator and could not be 
kept secret.102  A private party with malicious intent could 
therefore replicate the “kill” message, such as a text or other 
message sent to the smartphone to disable it.  In another 
scenario, if “killing” a smartphone requires a call to the carrier, 
that call could be placed by an identity theft who does not 
possess the smartphone or an abusive spouse who actually 
owns the family account to which his wife’s smartphone is tied.  
Where a smartphone is disabled by the malicious use of a “kill 
switch,” the safety of the user may be jeopardized, as in the 
                                                 
100 Id. 
101 James Kirkup, UK Riots: Tougher Powers Could Curb Twitter, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 12, 2011, 8:20 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8697142/UK-
riots-tougher-powers-could-curb-Twitter.html. 
102 CTIA, Why a “Kill Switch” Isn’t the Answer, 
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/Why_a_Kill_Switch_Isn_t_the_Answer.pdf
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abusive spouse scenario, because the wife will be unable to 
make emergency calls. 
By sending multiple messages, such as by incrementing 
the telephone number or IMEI number, groups of smartphones 
could be disabled.  This could be used to disable entire groups 
of customers, such as the Department of Defense, the 
Department of Homeland Security or emergency services and 
law enforcement.103  If the kill switch is a permanent switch, a 
smartphone could be disabled forever.  The risk of denial of 
service could be far too large. Therefore, the carrier community 
maintains that control of operation (and denial of service) be 





C. FARADAY BAG WORKAROUNDS 
 
Driven by high prices for non-contract smartphones 
overseas, the underground trade of stolen smartphones has 
now become a global enterprise that connects violent street 
thieves in American cities with buyers as far away as Hong 
Kong, according to law enforcement and the wireless industry.  
Jerry Deaven, an agent with the Department of Homeland 
Security, which is tasked with preventing the trafficking of 
stolen goods, told The Huffington Post that traffickers are 
responsible for “a tremendous amount of phones being shipped 
out of the country,” adding that “some organizations are 
shipping a couple million dollars worth of phones per 
month.”105  Some stolen smartphones are placed into Faraday 
Bags immediately after being stolen to block GPS tracking.  
Further study is required on whether a Faraday Bag could be 
used to circumvent a kill switch, and, if so, whether a 
smartphone stolen in the U.S. could then be activated abroad.  
How about a stolen smartphone with a “kill switch” taken from 
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105 Gerry Smith, Inside the Massive Global Black Market for Smartphones, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2013, 2:56 PM), 
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California in a Faraday Bag to Arizona or Nevada, states 
without corresponding kill switch legislation.  Ultimately the 
answers to these questions will help determine whether a kill 
switch would be a better solution than carrier registries, and, if 
so, help drive the design of an optimal kill switch.  
D. MINIMIZING THE BURDEN ON SMARTPHONE OWNERS 
 Finally, the amount of user effort needed to deal with 
kill switch systems, including notifying carriers in the event of 
theft or loss, reversing the data wipe and "un-bricking" a 
smartphone after recovery, or heading off the kill command in 
the event a misplaced smartphone is found, should not burden 
smartphone owners in the same way passwords do.  For 
example, computer users today are required or strongly 
encouraged to employ different, long, and complicated 
passwords on each of multiple devices: laptops, tablets, 
desktops; and multiple accounts: financial websites, health 
websites, company logins, Google, etc.106  
 The Office of California Attorney General Kamala 
Harris advises users and businesses on computer security, 
including using firewalls, anti-virus software, and complex 
passwords.107 However, passwords have done little to prevent 
hacking of sensitive information and cyber-attacks.  California 
businesses and the government have experienced 300 separate 
data breaches exposing the personal information of more than 
20 million customer accounts during the past two years.108  
Complex password requirements therefore simply burden 
users without actually preventing hacking.  Any proposed kill 
switch technology and carrier response protocols should be 
                                                 
106 Chenda Ngak, The 25 Most Common Passwords of 2013, CBS NEWS 
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designed to minimize the burden on users while burdening 
smartphone thieves instead.  A study on the lessons the 
industry or analysts have learned from the failed decades-long 
password experiment would be useful to prevent repeating this 
costly mistake on smartphone kill switches. 
VIII. EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES: 
PATCHWORK REGULATION IN A NATIONAL / 
INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE 
 The decentralized nature of the mandatory kill switch 
movement presents a host of concerns for proper 
implementation of an effective and democratic solution.  The 
practical reality of state-by-state piecemeal legislation is that the 
bigger, more influential states tend to drive policy.  Thus, while 
Minnesota has passed its kill switch legislation and gained a 
first mover’s advantage, pragmatically the bill only applies to 
phones sold or purchased new in Minnesota.  This is not to say 
that threats of foreclosing a state market will have no effect on 
phone providers—risking infringement of the Minnesota bill 
may encourage all phone manufacturers and carriers to comply 
with the kill switch mandate.  However, patchwork state 
mandates of kill switches may do little to deter thieves, 
particularly where there is doubt over where the phone was 
bought.   
 The real test of the legislation’s viability (and the site of 
potential legal challenges) however arises in the larger states 
where more phones are sold.  Hence, California and New York 
are the likely battlegrounds for policy development and 
industry regulation.  Because roughly one-eighth of all 
Americans live in California, and Apple and Google are based 
there, the California law may very well produce an immediate 
national default.109 
 This potential California effect risks legislating national 
policy at the state level and may very well overstep the ability 
of other democratically elected leaders to have a say in how kill 
                                                 
109 Wagenseil, supra note 16.  See also Elizabeth Weise, Google, 




COULD KILL SWITCHES KILL PHONE THEFT?              71  
 
switches should be adopted, if they should at all.  The CTIA 
claims, for instance, that the Minnesota bill creates interstate 
commerce concerns “because it heavily burdens the national 
wireless device and service market by dictating operational and 
technical specifications of mobile devices.”110  At the same time, 
coordinating state legislation is potentially challenging, 
unnecessary, and time-consuming.  According to the Secure 
Our Smartphones initiative, twenty-three state Attorneys 
General support the proposal, among many other district 
attorneys and other state political figures.111  Many of these 
states whose attorneys general support a mandatory kill switch 
may simply prefer to conserve political resources and allow 
other states, like California, to drive the policy.  Kill switch 
opponents, however, will then likely argue that such a proposal 
has no opportunity to be debated by democratically elected 
state representatives, who may have valuable input on the 
matter.  In truth, kill switch bills are not passing legislatures 
easily.  There are only five state bills and one federal bill passed 
or pending, and California’s version was rejected once in the 
state senate before narrowly passing recently.112  The federal kill 
switch bill, which would pose fewer of the risks that accompany 
state piecemeal legislation, has experienced little movement 
since being announced in February 2014. 
 Technological mandates in general are difficult to 
accomplish successfully by government legislation, much less 
state-by-state legislation.  As the CTIA explains, there is little 
reason to “limit consumer choice by mandating the use of any 
solution . . . [because] [a]ny mandated technology standard will 
quickly become outdated in the fast-moving world of wireless 
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applications and technology.”113  The private sector’s hesitance 
to accept government technology mandates is not 
unreasonable, particularly in a sector of rapid innovation like 
mobile phones.  Politicians, many of whom have little technical 
comprehension of the issue, are likely not the ideal decision-
makers on how technology must be used. 
 Nonetheless, there is a fitting example of an effective 
technological mandate on a similar issue as the smartphone kill 
switch.  Car theft laws, passed in the 1980s and 1990s, 
successfully decreased auto theft by increasing penalties for 
thieves and mandating implementation of anti-theft vehicle 
identification numbers on the engine, transmission, and other 
main body parts (which became illegal to remove).114  This 
movement, however, was aided in large part by federal 
legislation, namely the 1984 Motor Vehicle Theft Law 
Enforcement Act, which federally implemented the above, and 
the 1994 Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Act, which mandated 
federal cooperation with states to create an opt-in program 
whereby volunteers would consent to law enforcement 
stopping the car if it were operated in certain conditions (such 
as late at night).115  Further, the anti-auto-theft movement had 
federal oversight of exported cars to check for owner vehicle 
identification numbers.116 
 Clearly, no such solution is viable for smartphones, 
which are smaller and harder to track.  While no authoritative 
data exists on this point, the international black market 
certainly provides an integral boon to smartphone theft.  
Especially in countries where smartphones are not widely 
imported, stolen phones can sell for incredibly high amounts 
that only reinforce the motive to internationally traffic stolen 
phones.  In March 2013, California charged two men with 
operating a stolen phone trafficking ring to Hong Kong from 
which they made over $4 million in a year.117  Another man 
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being charged reportedly bought iPhones from people at coffee 
shops for $250 to $350 and trafficked them on his person to 
Vietnam, eleven at a time, making trips as often as he could, 
apparently making enough profit to justify the trips.118  
Anecdotes such as these highlight the limits with even a 
comprehensive federal regulation aimed at deterring 
smartphone theft.  A patchwork approach of kill switch 
mandates risks exploitation by both inter-state limitations and 
international black market workarounds.  Mandatory kill 
switches, regardless of how effective they may seem, face many 
roadblocks to attaining their stated goal of deterring theft.  
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND A CONCISE LIST OF OPEN QUESTIONS 
As we have shown in this paper, the stakeholders in the 
kill switch debate, including legislators, smartphone 
manufacturers, and carriers are each operating on the basis of a 
large number of assumptions and unknowns, including the 
following: 
• What an optimal technical implementation of a kill 
switch at no additional cost to the consumer would be, 
including whether it should be implemented in 
software, hardware, or an automated form of the 
present manual IMEI blocking registries; 
• What role MDM solutions and carrier registries will 
play in or out of an environment in which kill switches 
are deployed; 
•  Whether the large increase in smartphone theft is 
because thieves are specially targeting smartphones or 
whether smartphone theft is only incidental or 
unrelated to typical robberies; 
• Whether an effective kill switch will actually deter theft 
or only incentivize them to ship more stolen 
smartphones to the international black market; and 
• Whether a kill switch presents concerns, such as 
government surveillance and malicious activation or 
circumvention. 
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In addition to the assumptions and unknowns above, 
there are significant practical concerns about actually 
implementing a kill switch at no cost to the consumer across 
varying industry smartphone platforms and operating systems 
by the legislation’s deadline of July 1, 2015.  A necessary first 
step to such an implementation would be for the wireless 
industry to properly define kill switch standards so each 
manufacturer could conform their hardware, operating 
systems, and design platform accordingly. The short runway 
presented by the state bills allows very little time for such 
standard-setting activity.  Requiring a solution too soon may 
not consider the balance between (1) the nature, urgency and 
magnitude of the problem, and (2) the cost, harm to innovation, 
and burden on the wireless industry of any mandated change. 
For example, in discussing the possibility of adding a theft-
resistant “kill switch” to future iPhone models, Apple noted 
that the next two generations of the iPhone have already been 
developed, and were designed before Steve Jobs’s death in late 
2011.119  Therefore, the challenges of effectively implementing a 
technological mandate too quickly could be a significant 
burden on smartphone manufacturers to modify their planned 
pipeline of designs. 
Developing sound policy to deter smartphone theft 
would therefore benefit from more in-depth investigation of 
smartphone theft psychology, the mechanics of the black 
market for smartphones, the merits of technological solutions, 
and how to most effectively implement an overall solution.  The 
time for such investigation is now, as the landmark California 
legislation’s mandate goes into effect on July 1, 2015. 
 
APPENDIX: SELECTED TEXT OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 
 There are four state bills and one federal bill demanding 
mandatory kill switches: California S.B. 962; Minnesota H.B. 
1952; Illinois S.B. 3539; New York A.B. 8984; and the federal 
Smartphone Theft Prevention Act, H.R. 4065.  Minnesota’s bill 
was signed into law on May 14, 2014, while California’s bill 
                                                 
119  Daniel E. Dilger, Apple Gov’t Rep Says Next Two iPhones Were 
Designed Under Steve Jobs, APPLEINSIDER (Apr. 1, 2013, 12:03 PM), 
http://appleinsider.com/articles/13/04/01/apple-govt-rep-says-
next-two-iphones-were-designed-under-steve-jobs.  
COULD KILL SWITCHES KILL PHONE THEFT?              75  
 
passed the state senate on May 8, 2014 and became law on 
August 25, 2014.  What follows is a brief description of key text 
from the bills. 
 California legislation S.B. 962 applies to smartphones 
manufactured and sold in California on or after July 1, 2015.  It 
requires these smartphones to “[i]nclude a technological 
solution . . . [that] can render the essential features of the 
smartphone inoperable to an unauthorized user” (emphasis 
added).  This technological solution “may consist of software, 
hardware, or a combination of both software and hardware.”  
Here are some selected quotes from the bill, with underlines of 
key phrases:  
• “The technological solution should be able to 
withstand a hard reset or operating system 
downgrade, come preequipped, and the default 
setting of the solution shall be to prompt the 
consumer to enable the solution during the initial 
device setup.” 
• “‘Essential features’ of a smartphone are the ability 
to use the device for voice communications, text 
messaging, and browse the Internet, including the 
ability to access and use mobile software 
applications.” 
• “The technological solution shall be reversible, so 
that if the rightful owner obtains possession of the 
device after the essential features of the smartphone 
have been rendered inoperable, the operation of 
those essential features can be restored by an 
authorized user.” 
•  “An authorized user of a smartphone may 
affirmatively elect to disable or opt-out of enabling 
the technological solution at any time.” 
• “In order to be effective, antitheft technological 
solutions need to be ubiquitous, as thieves cannot 
distinguish between those smartphones that have 
the solutions enabled and those that do not.” 
• “The Legislature finds and declares that the 
enactment of a uniform policy to deter thefts of 
smartphones and to protect the privacy of 
smartphone users if their smartphones are 
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involuntarily acquired by others is a matter of 
statewide concern.” 
  
 Minnesota H.B. 1952, now passed as law, becomes 
effective on July 1, 2015 on all smartphones sold or purchased 
new in Minnesota.  It provides that these smartphones “must 
be equipped with technology designed to render the device 
inoperable in the event of theft or loss.”  Here are some selected 
quotes from the bill: 
• “Smart phone does not include an electronic reader, 
tablet, or other similar device not primarily intended 
for two-way voice communication.” 
• “[Must] be reversible in the event of the smart 
phone’s recovery by its owner” 
• “Lock all of the smart phone’s user data, and ensure 
that it is only accessible to the user or a law 
enforcement officer subject to a valid search 
warrant” 
• “Render the smart phone core functionality 
inoperable on any wireless telecommunications 
service provider’s network globally” 
• “Prevent the smart phone from being reactivated 
without a passcode or other similar authorization, 
even if the device is reprogrammed, is turned off 
and subsequently turned back on, has its network 
connectivity disabled and subsequently re-enabled, 
or has its SIM card removed” 
 
 New York’s proposed A.B. 8984 (which did not make it 
out of the legislative committee) would be applicable to any 
advanced mobile communications device sold in New York on 
or after July 1, 2015, with “advanced mobile communications 
device” defined very similarly to California’s definition with 
the exception of including tablets.  A.B. 8984’s description of the 
kill switch functionality is also highly similar to California’s, 
and its legislative intent tracks the rationale of California as 
well.  The following two quotes are also of note: 
• “It is the further intent of the legislature to prohibit 
any term or condition in a service contract between 
a customer and a commercial mobile radio service 
provider that requires or encourages the customer to 
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disable the technological solution that renders the 
customer’s smartphone or other advanced 
communications device useless if stolen.” 
• “The rightful owner of an advanced mobile 
communications device may affirmatively elect to 
disable the technological solution after sale. 
However, the physical acts necessary to disable to 
the technological solution may only be performed 
by the end-use consumer or a person specifically 
selected by the end-use consumer to disable the 
technological solution and shall not be physically 
performed by any retail seller of the advanced 
mobile communications device.” 
 
 Illinois proposed S.B. 3539 (which did not make it out of 
the legislative committee) would apply immediately upon 
passage to any smartphones manufactured and sold in Illinois.  
S.B. 3539 is similar to the other legislation, but uniquely would 
require all violating providers to insure the phones at no cost to 
the consumer, rather than levying a per-phone monetary 
penalty.  The following quotes are of note: 
• “‘Smartphone’ means a cellular phone that is built 
on a mobile operating system and possesses 
advanced computing capability. Features a smart 
phone may possess include, but are not limited to, 
built-in applications, Internet access, digital voice 
service, text messaging, e-mail, and Internet 
browsing.” 
• “[P]ermanently remove all saved data on the 
device” 
• “[R]ender the smart phone completely inoperable 
on any wireless telephone service provider’s 
network, including a wireless telephone service 
provider’s global network” 
• “[P]revent the smart phone from being reactivated 
or reprogrammed without a password or other 
similar authorization” 
• “[D]isable the device even if it is turned off or the 
SIM card or other data storage medium is removed” 
• “[B]e reversible if the device is recovered by its 
owner.” 
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 The federal proposed Smartphone Theft Prevention Act, 
H.R. 4065, would have applied beginning January 1, 2015 on 
any mobile device manufactured in the U.S. or imported for sale 
to the public in the U.S. (it did not make it out of legislative 
committee).  It would have covered any “‘mobile device’ 
[which] means a personal electronic device on which 
commercial mobile service or commercial mobile data service is 
provided” and included an exemption for any technology that 
“accomplishes the functional equivalent of the function” 
defined in the bill as being able to remotely and costlessly:  
• “Delete or render inaccessible from the device all 
information relating to the account holder that has 
been placed on the device” 
• “Render the device inoperable on the network of 
any provider of commercial mobile service or 
commercial mobile data service globally, even if the 
device is turned off or has the data storage medium 
removed” 
• “Prevent the device from being reactivated or 
reprogrammed without a passcode or similar 
authorization after the device has been rendered 
inoperable or subject to an unauthorized factory 
reset” 
• “[R]everse any action . . . if the device is recovered 
by the account holder.” 
 
 In response to these pieces of legislation, the CTIA has 
produced its own voluntary opt-in commitment for carriers and 
manufacturers.  The main provisions are as follows: 
• Remote wipe the authorized user’s data that is on 
the smartphone in the event it is lost or stolen. 
• Render the smartphone inoperable to an 
unauthorized user (e.g., locking the smartphone so 
it cannot be used without a password or PIN), 
except in accordance with FCC rules for 911 
emergency communications, and if available, 
emergency numbers programmed by the authorized 
user (e.g., “phone home”). 
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• Prevent reactivation without authorized user’s 
permission (including unauthorized factory reset 
attempts) to the extent technologically feasible  
• Reverse the inoperability if the smartphone is 
recovered by the authorized user and restore user 
data on the smartphone to the extent feasible (e.g., 













BITCOIN: THE CONFLICTING CURRENCY 
SEAN GREENWALT, B.A. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Bitcoins are a new and successful form of virtual 
currency or digital money. A bitcoin is an electronic item of 
value that can be used as a medium for exchange of goods 
and services and even conversion to real currency backed 
by recognized national governments. Like all new 
conceptions that break traditional boundaries, bitcoins or 
virtual currencies are still misunderstood from a legal 
perspective. Currently, no federal legislation has been 
created with respect to virtual currencies, and regulatory 
bodies such as the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), the U.S. 
Department of Treasury and Financial Crime Enforcement 
Network (“FinCEN”), and the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) have all been left to interpret existing 
law against the new monetary medium. Meanwhile, federal 
courts have only occasionally ruled on the legal status of 
bitcoins themselves, but at all times found that the virtual 
currency should be treated as a form of online money. While 
the federal court rulings are still in infancy, they may pose 
complications for certain federal regulatory bodies that 
wish for the bitcoin currency to be legally treated as 
property such as the IRS. 
 
PROSPECTUS 
 This note will break down what bitcoins are and 
how the federal government is currently classifying and 
treating them, before moving towards analyzing how 
bitcoins will be classified in the future once full harmony is 
reached between all the branches of government. The note 
will: analyze the main federal court cases (there are only 
three); explain how the federal government has reached the 
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classification of bitcoin as money before applying its 
significance to IRS, Treasury and SEC publications; and 
look at the inconsistent treatment of bitcoins throughout the 
government. The note will go on to analyze the IRS and 
other regulatory bodies and their treatment of bitcoins as 
either property or at least “not currency,” and whether or 
not it matters that the federal courts, and regulatory bodies 
are inconsistently treating bitcoins for criminal and tax 
purposes. Finally, the note will touch on the legislative 
opinion (or lack thereof) on bitcoins and how current laws 
are meant to apply to them.  
 Part I of this note will give the history and origin of 
bitcoins, and explain where the concept of virtual currency 
came from. Parts II and III will discuss the inner workings 
of the bitcoin system and how it survives as a viable 
currency without a third party facilitator to back its value. 
Part IV explains the current U.S. government treatment of 
bitcoins by breaking the topic down into subparts for each 
government branch: subpart A is the judicial branch, 
subpart B is the executive branch, subpart C is the 
legislative branch, and subpart D will showcase state 
sovereign bitcoin treatment. Part V and VI will analyze the 
current state of affairs and determine a likely path for the 
legal future of bitcoins and whether or not the different 
apparatus’s of the U.S. government have to be in harmony 
in their respective bitcoin treatment. Finally, the conclusion 
will consider all the relevant factors discussed within the 
note in determining the correct current legal standard for 
bitcoins. 
 
BITCOINS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 
I. IN THE BEGINNING THERE WAS BITCOIN 
   Bitcoins are the first open source digital currency to 
operate over a peer to peer payment network.1 Bitcoin is the 
world’s first decentralized digital payment system.2 It does 
                                                 
1 Bitcoin Project, Frequently Asked Questions, 
https://bitcoin.org/en/faq (last visited Oct. 17, 2004). 
2 Jerry Brito & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin: A Primer for Policymakers, 
Mercatus Center, George Mason University, 3 (2013), 
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not require a bank or a middleman.3 Bitcoins have been 
described as “cash for the internet” by some of the 
software’s core developers.4  
   Bitcoins stemmed from the idea of “crypto-
currency” as coined by one Wei Dai in 1998.5 The idea was 
a new form of currency that used encryption to control 
inflation and transactions, instead of a centralized 
authority.6 The bitcoin concept itself and supporting 
software specifications were first published in 2009 by one 
Satoshi Nakamoto to a cryptography mailing list.7 
Nakamoto left bitcoin development in 2010, and details of 
his past and whether or not he was a real person or just a 
pseudonym have been speculative ever since.8 However, 
the bitcoin concept continued to grow and has since been 
fostered by a group of “core developers.”9 Bitcoin itself is 
simply openly shared software that any developer could 
review or even make their own version of.10  
   Bitcoins are not technically controlled by anyone. 
While a group of core developers improve and manage the 
software, the core developers have no power to force bitcoin 
users to use a completely changed bitcoin software.11 
Bitcoins will only work when there is a consensus of users 
using the same software version, and therefore all users and 
developers have a strong motivation to keep the bitcoin 
system constant.12 
II. BITCOIN 101 
   For the average bitcoin user, the digital currency is 
simply a computer application that provides a digital 








8 Benjamin Wallace, The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin, Wired (Nov. 23, 
2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/11/mf_bitcoin/all/. 
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“wallet” and allows for bitcoins (the form and 
denomination of the digital currency) to be sent and 
received in an effort to create consideration.13 The value of 
bitcoins are not derived from any precious metal or 
government, but only what people believe they are worth.14 
However, what makes bitcoins special is that they created a 
solution to a fundamental problem that plagued all past 
incarnations of virtual currency.  
   The issue with past decentralized digital currency is 
that it lacked a trusted third party intermediary.15 For the 
majority of transactions over the internet, a service such as 
PayPal or Visa records the transaction and keeps a record or 
a “ledger” of the user’s account balance.16 Without such 
third-parties to act as ledgers, decentralized digital 
currencies could easily fall prey to “double-spending”.17 
This means the digital currency could possibly be spent 
multiple times.18 The double-spending problem arises from 
the format of digital currency: if the currency is truly just a 
digital computer file, what is to stop its circulators from 
simply copying the file and sending it to multiple 
destinations? 
   Bitcoins are the first format of digital currency to 
solve the problem of double spending.19 Bitcoins 
accomplish this feat by creating a public ledger called the 
“block chain” that records every user’s transaction.20 All 
new transactions are checked against the block chain to 
ensure that previous bitcoins are not being used again by 
the same user.21 Each bitcoin transaction is verified by 
requiring the parties to “sign” their transaction with a key 
code.22 Every signature includes two types of key codes: a 
public key and a private key.23 The two types of keys are 
                                                 
13 Bitcoin Project, supra note 1. 
14 Brito & Castillo, supra note 2, at 4. 




19Id. at 4. 
20 Bitcoin Project, supra note 1. 
21 Brito & Castillo, supra note 2, at 4. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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used in every signature help prevent fraud and double 
spending.24 
   Although each user has a public and private key to 
use as a signature for each transaction, the public keys are 
not linked to anyone’s identity.25 This helps bitcoin 
transactions stay anonymous, but also raises concerns of 
criminal activity. However, the anonymity of bitcoins is 
only half-fold. Each bitcoin transaction and public key 
records the user’s IP address which can be tracked to them 
in case of illegal activity, but there is nothing to stop a user 
from using a proxy server for each transaction to hide their 
real IP address either.26 In this regard, bitcoin transactions 
can be analogized to cash and a form of public receipt. 
Finally, it is speculated, as the bitcoin currency becomes 
more adopted, it will become more and more regulated in 
line with banking and financial regulations, and total 
anonymity will become much more difficult.27  
III. DO STORKS DELIVER BITCOINS? 
      Since there is no central bank or authority in control 
of the bitcoin supply, the bitcoin software application 
creates new bitcoins based off of users who voluntarily 
verify the “block chain” transactions as discussed earlier.28 
These users that verify the block chain are called “miners” 
and in exchange for their work they receive new bitcoins or 
an actual transaction fee.29  
      However, the bitcoin mining process is more 
complicated than just verifying a signature; transactions can 
only be verified by using computing power to solve 
complex math problems.30 The equations are designed to 
become more complicated as more bitcoins are mined, and 
as more bitcoins are mined, transaction fees will replace 
                                                 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 8. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 9. 
28 Id. at 5. 
29 Bitcoin Project, supra note 1. 
30 Brito & Castillo, supra note 2, at 7. 
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bitcoins as compensation for mining.31 The bitcoin system is 
designed like a traditional money system based off precious 
metals or items of value because the number of bitcoins that 
can ever be mined has been limited to 21 million as part of 
the software’s parameters.32 This is in opposition to most 
government monetary structures that operate under fiat 
conditions where the amount of money in circulation can be 
continuously created. However, similar to the fiat system is 
the fact that bitcoin value is only as much as the public 
ascribes to it. 
IV. DOES UNCLE SAM KNOW ABOUT THIS? 
   Unfortunately, there is a dark side to bitcoin use, 
and things are not as homologous as they could be within 
the United States Government branches. For the purpose of 
judicial proceedings, the U.S. District Courts and executive 
regulatory bodies are split on whether bitcoins qualify as 
money or property.  
A. TELL IT TO THE JUDGE 
   On August 6, 2013, the Eastern District of Texas, in 
SEC v. Shavers, decided whether or not Investments in a 
Bitcoin Trust were considered securities under federal 
securities law.33 It was the first bitcoin definition case heard 
around the world.  
 The Defendant was charged by the SEC with 
operating a Ponzi scheme, where investors invested into his 
Bitcoin Trust.34 The Defendant argued that the Bitcoin Trust 
investments were not securities by simple virtue, that 
bitcoins are not money.35 The SEC countered that 
investments in bitcoins and the Bitcoin Trust are investment 
contracts, and therefore, qualify as securities.36 
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018, 
at *3-4 (E.D. TX. Aug. 6, 2013). 
34 Id. at 2-3. 
35 Id. at 4. 
36 Id. 
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 A “security” is “any note, stock, treasury stock, 
security future, security-based swap, bond… [or] 
investment contract” (Emphasis added).37 In pertinent 
part, an “investment contract” is any contract, scheme, or 
transaction involving an investment of money.38  
 The Court held that the Bitcoin Trust investment did 
amount to an investment of money.39 However, even more 
importantly, the Court specifically identified bitcoins as a 
“currency or form of money.”40 In fashioning its 
determination of whether or not the Bitcoin Trust 
investments constituted an investment of money, the Court 
first notes that “it is clear that bitcoin[s] can be used as 
money.”41 Bitcoins can be “used to purchase goods or 
services, and as [the Defendant] stated, used to pay for 
living expenses.”42 While the Court did note that bitcoins 
are limited to “those places that accept it as currency,” the 
Court also reasoned that this was not a hindrance because 
bitcoins can also be exchanged for many strong currencies 
such as the U.S. Dollar, Euro, and Yen. For these reasons, 
the Court felt that bitcoins do qualify as a “form of 
money.”43 
 United States Magistrate Judge Amos Mazzant 
wrote not only the first opinion by a United States District 
Court on the issue of whether bitcoins constitute money, but 
he likely also wrote the strongest opinion to this day in 
terms of diction on the issue. Judge Mazzant comes right 
out and calls bitcoins a “currency or a form of money”44 It 
is important to note that this opinion was written before an 
applicable IRS Notice which states bitcoins should be 
treated as property (at least for tax purpose, but including 
tax crimes).45 However, the ruling was decided after the 
                                                 
37 15 U.S.C.S. § 77b (LexisNexis 2016). 
38Shavers, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018, at *4 (citing SEC v. W. J. 
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946)). 
39 Id. at 5. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 4. 
42 Id. at 4-5. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 5. 
45 Internal Revenue Service, I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2 (Mar. 25, 
2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf. 
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U.S. Department of Treasury, Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued an official 
Guidance on March 18, 2013, that stated bitcoins are not a 
form of currency or legal tender.46 It’s unclear whether the 
Defendant in Shavers relied upon the FinCEN Guidance or 
his own logic for his argument. Regardless, Judge Amos 
makes no reference to persuasive or binding authority on 
either side of the issue.  
 What stands out about the Shavers ruling is the fact 
that it rests on practicality and common knowledge. Since 
there is limited federal precedent on the issue, instead of 
looking to outside sources and persuasive authority, Judge 
Mazzant simply states the attributes of bitcoins in a very Res 
Ipsa Loquiter fashion and comes to the conclusion that 
bitcoins are indeed money. In later federal cases, a common 
theme will be using common sense and common definitions 
of money, while ignoring technical definitions of electronic 
software or property.  
 Summary judgment was ruled in favor of the SEC 
and against Shavers on September 18, 2014.47 No appeal had 
been filed against the determination of bitcoins as money 
ruling, which was a central jurisdiction issue to the case, as 
of March 3, 2015. 
On July 9, 2014, the Southern District of New York, 
in United States v. Ulbrict, involved a Defendant charged 
with money laundering conspiracies that involved the 
operation of a website known as the Silk Road, which acted 
as an online marketplace for illicit goods and services.48  
The Defendant was charged under 18 U.S.C § 
1956(h) with participation in a money laundering 
conspiracy.49 The contested element of money laundering 
conspiracy by the Defendant involved:  
 
                                                 
46 FinCEN Guid. FIN-2013-G001, 1 (Mar. 18, 2013), 
http://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-
G001.pdf. 
47 SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130781, 
at *38. (E.D. Tex. Sep. 18, 2014). 
48 United States v. Ulbricht, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93093, at *1-2. 
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014). 
49 Id. at 66. 
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“It was part and an object of the conspiracy 
that … the defendant, and others … knowing 
that the property involved in certain 
financial transactions represented proceeds 
of some form of unlawful activity, would 
and did conduct and attempt to conduct 
such financial transactions, which in fact 
involved the proceeds of specified unlawful 
activity[.]” (emphasis added).50  
 Under the above money laundering statute, a 
financial transaction is “the movement of funds by wire or 
other means, … or involving one or more monetary 
instruments[.]”51 The term “monetary instrument” 
includes: bank checks, personal checks, the currency or coin 
of a country, money orders, or negotiable instruments or 
investment securities. 52 
The Defendant challenged the money laundering 
charge by claiming it was impossible for him to launder 
money because bitcoins are not “monetary instruments” 
that can form the basis of financial transactions. The 
Defendant, for his defense, cleverly relied on a very recent 
IRS Notice that confirmed the IRS would treat virtual 
currency as property and not currency for tax purposes.53 
The Defendant also referenced FinCEN’s recent Guidance 
that declared virtual currencies are not “legal tender,” nor 
do they have the attributes of real currency which need to 
be issued by a country.54  
 The Court disagreed, and found the Defendant’s 
contention and cited support unpersuasive. The Court 
stated that “neither the IRS, nor FinCEN ha[ve] addressed 
the question of whether a ‘financial transaction’ can occur 
with bitcoins[,]” nor do they have any power to amend and 
interpret the money laundering statute for the Courts.55 The 
Court concluded that “financial transaction” is broadly 
                                                 
50 Id. at 67. 
51 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4) (2016). 
52 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(5) (2016). 
53 See Ulbright, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93093 at 69-70 (citing I.R.S. 
Note. 2014-21). 
54 Id. (citing FinCEN Guid. FIN-2013-G001). 
55 Id. at 69. 
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defined, and it includes all movements of “funds” by any 
monetary instrument or other means.56 The Court applied 
the ordinary meaning to the term “funds” because the 
definition was not included in the money laundering 
statute.57 Citing to the dictionary definition, “funds” are 
defined as “money” and “money” is defined as “an object 
used to buy things.”58  
 The Court held from these definitions that bitcoins 
are indeed encompassed under the term “financial 
transaction.”59 The District Court Judge was either very 
careful not to explicitly state that bitcoins are funds or 
money or simply pressed for time, but the deduction is self-
evident by the Court’s conclusion that bitcoins are 
encompassed under “financial transactions,” which include 
all movement of funds.60 The Court held that “[p]ut simply, 
‘funds’ can be used to pay for things in the colloquial sense. 
Bitcoins can either be used directly to pay for certain things 
or can act as a medium of exchange [and] … the value of 
bitcoins lie in their ability to pay for things[.]”61  
 The Ulbirct Case was the second in a line of three 
District Court cases that have shown resistance to any 
persuasive authority in regards to the monetary status of 
bitcoins, including the previous SEC v. Shavers case. Judge 
Forrest, of the Southern District of New York, at times even 
appeared hostile to the contention that bitcoins were 
anything but money. From an objective point of view, the 
interpretation the Court took towards bitcoin was very 
practical, opting for a common sense breakdown of what 
bitcoins are meant to do, while avoiding technical semantics 
of currency and bartering.  
 A little over a month later, on August 18, 2014, the 
Southern District of New York was faced again with the 
                                                 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 69-70. 
58 Id. at 70 (citing Cambridge Dictionaries Online, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/american-
english/funds?q=funds (last visited July 3, 2014)). 
59 Id. at 71. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 70. 
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issue of whether or not bitcoins qualify as money.62 This 
time with one District Court Judge Jed Rakoff presiding. 
The Defendant was charged with operating an unlicensed 
money transmitting business under 18 U.S.C. § 1960.63  
 18 U.S.C. § 1960 includes references to the words 
“money” and “funds.” Under Section 1960, “money 
transmitting” is the “transferring funds on behalf of the 
public by any and all means.”64 The Defendant argued that 
bitcoins do not qualify as money under Section 1960, and 
used the FinCEN Guidance ruling that states bitcoins are 
not a currency.65  
 The Court disagreed, and like previous cases, 
looked to the plain meaning of the words “money” and 
“funds.”66 In this case the court took the time to explain (via 
footnote) that words like “funds” or “money” deserve an 
ordinary dictionary definition, contrary to any Black Letter 
Law definition because the statute 1960 does not even 
“remotely” suggest that the words are legal “terms of art,” 
thus ordinary meanings are intended, although under most 
Black Letter definitions, the result would be the same.67  The 
court found that “money” in ordinary context means 
“something generally accepted as a medium of exchange, 
measure of value, or a means of payment.”68 Prominently, 
an example of money includes “money of account” which 
is “a denominator of value or basis of exchange which is 
used in keeping accounts and for which there may or may 
not be an equivalent coin or denomination of paper 
money.”69 “Funds” were also defined as “available money 
                                                 
62 United States v. Faiella, No. 14-cr-243, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
116114 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2014). 
63 Id. at 2. 
64 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(2). 
65 Faiella, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116114 at 6.   
66 Id. at 2. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. (quoting Merriam-Webster Online, http://www. merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/money (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
69 Id. at 2 (quoting Merriam-Webster Online, http://www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/money (last visited Aug. 18, 
2014)). 
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[or] an amount of something that is available for use: a 
supply of something.”70  
 The Court held that it was obvious bitcoins qualify 
as money or funds under their ordinary meanings.71 
Reasoning that “bitcoin[s] can be easily purchased in 
exchange for ordinary currency, acts as denominator of 
value, and is used to conduct financial transactions.72 For 
the first time, we see a Court cite to persuasive judicial 
authority too, quoting SEC v. Shavers, “[i]t is clear that 
bitcoin[s] can be used as money … to purchase goods or 
services.”73 The Court also found that Section 1960, 
although legislated in 1990, was written to combat 
“evolving threats” such as “nonbanking financial 
institutions” that “convert street currency into monetary 
instruments” for the purpose of drug sales.74  
 Judge Rakoff in the Southern District of New York 
writes a very broad opinion, but leaves no question as to 
what bitcoins are; they are money. In a way, his opinion 
seems much more well-rounded than his counterpart Judge 
Forrest in Ulbrict. Judge Rakoff made sure to specifically 
state that bitcoins are money, and actually cited to 
persuasive authority for the first time (albeit he bypasses the 
previous Southern District case in favor of SEC v. Shavers).  
 However, what makes the Faiella opinion unique, 
compared to Shavers and Ulbrict, is that the “ordinary” 
definition used is much more inclusive than either of the 
previous cases. Where Shavers simply stated a practical 
common knowledge view that bitcoins are money because 
they act like money, Ubrict, while not citing to Shavers, 
seemed to solidify the notion that bitcoins are money by 
using a dictionary definition.75 It appears not all dictionary 
definitions are created equal though. Ubrict used the 
                                                 
70 Id. at 2-3 (quoting Merriam-Webster Online, http://www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/money (last visited Aug. 18, 
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71 Id. at 3. 
72 Id. 
73 SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130781, 
at *38, 4 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 18, 2014). 
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75 See SEC v. Shavers, 2014 U.S. Dist. at 4-5, Contra United States v. 
Ubrict, 2014 U.S. Dist. at 70 
90                     4 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2016) 
 
 
Cambridge dictionary to determine that “funds” are 
defined as “money” and “money” is defined as “an object 
used to buy things”76 Faiella (most likely intentionally) used 
a much broader definition from Merriam dictionary:  
“[M]oney” in ordinary context means 
“something generally accepted as a medium 
of exchange, measure of value, or a means of 
payment. Prominently, an example of 
money include “money of account” which is 
“a denominator of value or basis of exchange 
which is used in keeping accounts and for 
which there may or may not be an equivalent 
coin or denomination of paper money.” 
“Funds” were also defined as “available 
money [or] an amount of something that is 
available for use: a supply of something.”77 
The difference is immediately apparent between 
both definitions. While the Cambridge definition (money is 
an object used to buy things) seems very broad, the Merriam 
version (something accepted as a medium of exchange or 
payment means) goes even further, even implying that if 
bitcoins were simple bartering chips that they would be 
classified as money.  
 Faiella also attempts to use legislative intent to 
bolster its conclusion. It is a creative effort to use a Senate 
Report from 1990 that references “evolving threats,” but it’s 
very likely this would not hold water in a Court of Appeals 
because of the large time span since it was authored and the 
creation of bitcoin in 2008, especially with how fast digital 
progress occurs year to year.78  Faiella, was the final of three 
U.S. District Court cases to address the classification of 
bitcoins, and it was the first to start using persuasive judicial 
and legislative authority. It is likely that the case will be 
                                                 
76 United States v. Ulbricht, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93093, at *1-2, 70 
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used as reference point for future cases whether they be in 
a District or Court of Appeals. 
B. THE EXECUTION 
The United States Department of Treasury Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network or FinCEN was the first 
regulatory body to issue a statement regarding bitcoins. 
FinCEN issued a Guidance on March 18, 2013, concerning 
FinCEN’s regulations involving exchanging or using virtual 
currencies.79 The Guidance makes no reference to bitcoins, 
but discusses in depth virtual currencies, which includes 
bitcoins.80 The Guidance’s purpose was to clarify the 
applicability of the regulations that implement the Bank 
Secrecy Act (“BSA”) to persons “creating, obtaining, 
distributing, exchanging, accepting, or transmitting virtual 
currencies.”81 The guidance does not go as far to quantify 
virtual currency as property, but it does state that virtual 
currency is not “real” currency or legal tender.82 
 Under FinCEN regulations, currency (also described 
as “real currency”) is defined as “coin and paper money of 
the United States or of any other country that [i] is 
designated as legal tender and that [ii] circulates and [iii] is 
customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in 
[its] country of issuance.”83 FinCEN contrasts currency to 
“virtual currency” by defining virtual currency, for the first 
time, as “a medium of exchange that operates like a 
currency in some environments, but does not have all the 
attributes of real currency.”84 The Guidance continues to 
note that “virtual currency does not have legal tender status 
in any jurisdiction.” Further, virtual currencies that have 
“an equivalent value in real currency, or act[] as a substitute 
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for real currency” are referred to as “convertible virtual 
currency.”85 
 The FinCEN Guidance has been used as support in 
several United States District Court cases to help argue that 
bitcoins do not qualify as money, but as property. While the 
Guidance holds only persuasive authority because it only 
concerns the implementation of the BSA (more on the BSA 
later), a main distinction in the judicial definitions of 
currency versus the FinCEN definition is the element of a 
country of issuance.86 However, even though the FinCEN 
does not wish for bitcoins to be an official currency, they 
may still wish to have them treated as money for crime 
enforcement, thus, making the distinction between 
currency and money null. Courts have looked to the plain 
ordinary or dictionary meanings of money, which for the 
most part only requires an item to be a medium of exchange, 
where under FinCEN a real currency must be backed by the 
trust of a sovereign nation. Further, the FinCEN Guidance 
makes no reference to what virtual currencies are classified 
as, and nowhere in the Guidance can the word “property” 
be found.87  
 Ironically enough, the FinCEN Guidance requires 
those who exchange bitcoins to register as Money Services 
Businesses, which is a type of financial institution that deals 
with cash, checks or currency exchanges.88 Although the 
FinCEN Guidance gives bitcoins a sub-currency like 
designation, it is clear that the department wishes bitcoins 
to be treated much closer to money or cash than as property 
as the IRS and others may hope, as well as why Courts have 
not been persuaded to consider bitcoins as property.    
Bitcoins currently do not have status as legal tender 
in any one jurisdiction, but they are being used as a form of 
money in many.89 In March 2014, the IRS ruled that virtual 
currency, including bitcoins, should be treated as a form of 




88 Id. at 3.  
89 Internal Revenue Service, I.R.S. Note. 2014-21, 1 (Mar. 25, 2014), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf. 
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property instead of actual money.90 This means that bitcoins 
could begin acting more as stock and less than an item that 
immediately trades for goods and services.91 This 
unfortunately raises undesirable tax issues such as 
appreciation, and much more record keeping for legal 
transactions.92 For Example, if a person bought $10 worth of 
bitcoins, and the bitcoins appreciate in value to $500, and 
then are used to buy a deluxe easy bake oven. The $490 
realized is now a taxable profit as far as the IRS is concerned. 
It is likely many may try to ignore the tax consequences 
because bitcoins are not in heavy circulation at the moment, 
but such a scenario could be a huge stumbling block to the 
success of virtual currency in the mainstream. The IRS’s 
Notice by far is the most direct regulatory opinion 
classifying bitcoins as property and not money. This has 
made it a favorite of defendants in court arguing against 
money laundering charges, but the persuasive authority of 
the IRS’s ruling on criminal law seems to be limited at best.  
The Federal Elections Commission (“FEC”) also 
released a recent advisory opinion on bitcoins after a federal 
Political Action Committee submitted the question of 
whether federal political committees and candidates may 
accept bitcoin donations.93 The FEC decided to allow bitcoin 
donations, but avoided classifying them as money or non-
money directly stating they concluded bitcoins are “money 
or anything of value” under the Federal Election Campaign 
Act.94 However, the advisory opinion also stated that for 
reporting purposes, bitcoins should be reported as in-kind 
donations and not cash.95 However, this is likely meant to 
solve the problem of fluctuating bitcoin value and the “cash 
on hand” reporting requirement of PACs. Interestingly 
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as a currency?, The Guardian (Mar. 31, 2014), 
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93 Len E. Goodman, F.E.C. Op. 2014-02 (May, 8, 2014), 
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/2014-02.pdf. 
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enough, a bitcoin worth $50 donated to a PAC, would be 
allowed to appreciate to $5000 and be converted to cash 
without issue despite the $2600 cash limit on 
contributions.96 
The Security Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is 
primarily responsible for enforcing federal securities law 
and regulating the securities industry and stock and options 
exchanges, including electronic security markets.97 The SEC 
has used the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a,  and 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a, as a basis 
to prosecute at least one offender who created a Ponzi 
scheme that involved investing in bitcoins.98 As seen above, 
the Court found these laws to have authority over bitcoins 
and other virtual currency. In order to do this, the Shavers 
Court had to declare that bitcoins were indeed money, and 
therefore under the jurisdiction of these laws. The SEC 
seems more in line with the FinCEN in their desired 
treatment of bitcoins as both would prefer the currency to 
be treated more like cash money, in contrast to the IRS’s 
newfound position which advocates for bitcoins to be 
treated as property.  
C. POWER TO THE PEOPLE 
The United States legislative branch has not passed 
any definitive law concerning bitcoins whatsoever at this 
time.99 Congressional action on bitcoin has been limited to 
only two occasions where the Senate Committee on Finance, 
in May 2013, and the Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs committee, in August 2013, sent letters to various 
federal agencies to survey their treatment of virtual 
currencies.100 Both of these actions took place before the IRS 
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issued their 2014 Notice and their results lacked a clear 
consensus and answer as to how virtual currencies were to 
be treated for tax reporting purposes and national security 
threats.101  
 The Congressional Research Service prepared a 
report specifically on bitcoins (not virtual currency in 
general) on July 15, 2014.102 While the report is not in any 
fashion binding law, it will likely be the first resource used 
by lawmakers as it is prepared specifically for members of 
congress, assuming congress can pass a law before the 
information becomes outdated in the fast moving digital 
world. While the report did not make any definitive 
statement as to whether bitcoins should be classified as 
money instead of property, the report at times simply 
referred to bitcoins as “digital money” as well as 
“currency.”103 However, the report omits any reference to 
the recent IRS Notice 2014-21 even though it was published 
after the notice. The Congressional Service Report also 
recognized that the status of bitcoins is still up to 
determination when it referenced the above Shavers 
decision stating “[the SEC] successfully convinced a federal 
district court that bitcoins are money.”104 The report also 
quickly notes that bitcoins are not legal tender, and no 
merchant is required to accept them as a form of payment, 
unlike the actual U.S. dollar.105 
 A central power of the congress, granted by the U.S. 
Constitution, is its authority to “coin money [and] regulate 
the value thereof.”106 Although no specific law has been 
passed to regulate bitcoins or other virtual currencies, 
bitcoins are finding treatment under two main areas of law: 
Federal Anti-Money Laundering laws and Federal Taxation 
law.  
 Federal Anti-Money Laundering laws such as 18 
U.S.C. § 1956 and 1957 prohibit engaging in financial 
transactions that are designed to finance illegal activities or 
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involve proceeds of such activities.107 Most money 
laundering crimes involve financial institutions, which 
triggers transaction reporting requirements under the Bank 
Secrecy Act (“BSA”).108 The Currency and Foreign 
Transactions Reporting Act complements the BSA by 
requiring these financial institutions, designated as “money 
services businesses” (“MSBs”), to file suspicious activity 
reports when cash transactions break certain monetary 
thresholds set by the Secretary of Treasury office.109 MSBs 
may include check cashers, foreign currency exchangers, 
traveler’s and cashier’s check issuers, prepaid cards, and 
money wire transmitters.110 MSBs are all required to register 
with the Department of Treasury.   
 At first glance, it may not appear that the BSA 
concerns bitcoins at all. However, as previously referenced, 
FinCEN has used the BSA as their legal authority to require 
bitcoin exchanges that convert U.S. or foreign currency into 
bitcoins or vice versa to be registered as an MSB.111 This was 
memorialized in the FinCEN Guidance issued on March 18, 
2013 concerning virtual currency.112 Such an action does not 
appear to stretch the law either because the purpose of the 
BSA is to deter under the table, cash or cash-like, financial 
transactions. Bitcoins can readily be exchanged for US 
currency, and therefore, would need to be treated as a form 
of cash under the law to avoid easy exploitation of anti-
money laundering laws. Whether or not this cash-like 
treatment of bitcoins under the BSA can be used to bolster 
an argument against the IRS’s recent declaration that 
bitcoins are to be considered property is yet to be seen. 
As discussed above, the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 have been successfully 
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proven in court to apply to bitcoins and virtual currencies 
of the like.113  
 The tax law applicable to bitcoins is limited to the 
IRS’s recent Notice 2014-21. Congress has passed no statute 
or federal taxation code regulation specifically addressing 
virtual currencies. Currently the federal taxation law 
regarding bitcoins is solely vested in the IRS’s treatment of 
the currency, which leaves the bitcoin designation as 
property for tax reporting purposes as discussed in the 
previous section. Unlike the FinCEN that uses anti-money 
laundering laws as the basis of its virtual currency 
treatment, the IRS did not include in its Notice the general 
tax law it used as authority to couple bitcoins into the 
property designation.114 Calls to the IRS Notice Author 
Keith Aqui for further comment have not been returned as 
of Mar. 4, 2015.115 
 International law is also a concern for bitcoin’s 
future because virtual currency has no geo-political bounds. 
A recent study by the European Central Bank (similar to the 
United States’ Federal Reserve) speculated that based on the 
growth of virtual currency, international regulation will be 
inevitable.116 The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) 
currently is not permitted to acquire currency not issued by 
one of its members. Some concern has been raised over the 
IMF’s ability to combat a speculative attack via virtual 
currency such as bitcoin against the traditional currency on 
one of its member countries.117  
D. CO-EQUAL SOVEREIGNS AT-LARGE 
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  Several states have begun regulating bitcoins, with 
even more following suit every year.118 The typical issue 
state regulators face is whether bitcoins fall under current 
money transmission statutes or whether new regulations 
are required to monitor bitcoin use and prevent possible 
money laundering and fraud.119 Some states, like Texas, 
have simply issued Guidance’s suggesting that bitcoins do 
not qualify as money and therefore businesses dealing in 
bitcoins do not need money transmitter licenses.120 
However, other states, such as Washington, have decided 
that bitcoins (and all virtual currencies) do fall within their 
money transmitting statutes and therefore businesses that 
deal in bitcoin exchange have been required to apply for 
money transmitter licenses.121  
 Two states that have particularly led the charge in 
bitcoin state monetary policy are New York and 
California.122 New York, one of the major financial hubs of 
the world, is currently gearing up for a massive bitcoin 
licensing regime.123 Meanwhile, California has recently 
become the first state enacting law that gives virtual 
currency legal money status as opposed to mere legal 
tender or currency status.124 Similar paths may follow or 
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are already paving the way like California and New York. 
Furthermore, Texas’ designation of virtual currency as 
non-money could cause unintended consequences in their 
state courts.  
 
 
I. EMPIRE STATE OF MIND 
New York proposed its first major bitcoin or virtual 
currency regulations on July 17, 2014 and then, after 
comment period, released proposed updates on February 4, 
2015.125 The proposed regulations were issued by the New 
York Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”).126  
The main thrust of the proposed rules is that 
businesses “that receive, transmit, store or convert virtual 
currency for customers; buy and sell virtual currency as a 
customer business; control, administer or issue a virtual 
currency; or perform conversions between bitcoin and fiat 
or any value exchange will need to be licensed to operate in 
New York.”127 The revised version made an exception for 
virtual currency software developers, persons using bitcoin 
for “non-financial means,” and possible conditional licenses 
for virtual currency startup companies.128 Further, 
Merchants that merely accept bitcoins as a form of payment 
are not subject to the proposed licensing requirements nor 
are merchants that use bitcoins for investment purposes 
only.129 For the most part, the proposed regulations appear 
aimed at entities solely involved in making money (outside 
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of long-term investment) from virtual currencies 
themselves.  
Record keeping methods to prevent fraud and 
money laundering are the main tools of the NYFDS 
regulations. Accounts and transaction records with verified 
party identities, capital and balance statements, as well as 
quarterly financial reports are all expected to help bring 
virtual currency into the monetary mainstream.130 Further, 
all transactions involving value over $10,000 are expected to 
be reported the day of their request.131 The NYFDS’ revised 
regulations are only subject to comment for only 30 days, 
and will likely go into effect without much change from this 
point.132 NYFDS’ rules and regulations are important 
because many states that have not undertaken virtual 
currency guidance will likely be influenced by such a large 
state with a booming financial sector. While the proposed 
rules in regulations do not specify that bitcoins are money, 
from the treatment they are receiving from the NYFDS, it’s 
all but implied that bitcoins and bitcoin related business’ are 
being considered in the same manner as businesses that 
deal in cash money exchange.  
II. THE GOLDEN STATE 
California has become the first state to legally 
recognize bitcoins and other virtual currencies as legal 
money.133 Assembly bill 129 was signed into law on June 28, 
2014, which recognized nontraditional mediums of value as 
actual money such as rewards points and digital currencies, 
which were technically illegal under previous unenforced 
law.134 However, the measure was largely symbolic because 
the law does nothing to regulate bitcoins further, besides 
slapping a monetary label on them.135 Still, in terms of the 
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classification of bitcoins as money, it certainly sets a 
precedent for other states and even the federal government. 
The actual regulation of virtual currency in 
California will come from the California Department of 
Business Oversight (“DBO”), which has yet to formally rule 
on virtual currency regulations, but has given some hints as 
to the direction it’s taking.136 The DBO has indicated that it 
is currently exploring options for how it would license 
bitcoin operators and how virtual currencies fit into current 
California money transmitter regulations.137 However, in 
response to rumors that Coinbase, a prominent bitcoin 
exchanger, received regulatory approval to operate a 
bitcoin exchange in California, the DBO affirmed that while 
bitcoin exchanges are permissible as of January 2015, the 
DBO has still not decided whether or not to regulate such 
exchanges under California’s money transmission 
statutes.138  
V. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE BITCOIN 
   Bitcoins are the first viable form of virtual or digital 
currency that does not have a third party regulator. This 
allows for greater anonymity (but not total) as well as 
greater uncertainty in the value of bitcoins. It is likely the 
use of bitcoins will continue to grow, but the prospect of 
over-regulation by the IRS and other regulatory bodies 
could be a threat to their use in large quantities or 
mainstream commercial transactions. Alternatively, the 
continuing classification of bitcoins as money or currency 
by the Courts could make its use unattractive to criminals 
as well. All of this is not even tied to the extreme volatility 
of bitcoins as an item of value either.  
 It is clear that the IRS is resisting the classification of 
bitcoins as actual money or currency. Contrast this to the 
SEC and FinCEN that for the purpose of crime enforcement 
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are much more apt to have bitcoins treated like cash or 
securities involving money. SEC went as far as suing an 
individual in court to prove bitcoins are money under the 
law. Perhaps this does not matter for the purpose of 
taxation, but at some point the IRS will likely find itself in 
court over a tax crime involving bitcoins, even if it is just a 
failure to pay property tax. When this day comes, 
supposing congress has not yet acted, it will be highly 
probable that there will be a majority of case law and other 
treatment by regulatory bodies designating bitcoin as cash-
money type asset and not capital.  
 On the other hand, Federal Courts see no reason to 
dive into the technicalities of virtual currency. The 
reasoning of all three main District Court opinions 
concerning bitcoin can be summed up as: if it looks like a 
duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck… it is a 
duck. The no nonsense, practical approach of the District 
Courts is likely to continue, especially with the Faiella 
opinion using the most persuasive authority in its analysis; 
look for the Faiella opinion to pop up in most future bitcoin 
classification cases because it used the most authority and 
most encompassing definition for “money” (as well as 
rebutting any claim that money should be construed as a 
technical legal term of art).139 
 It appears a technical refusal of bitcoin as property 
(involving the details of software engineering and 
reasoning of regulatory bodies) may be reserved for the 
Appellate Courts or a very overzealous District Court 
judge. However, it appears that bitcoins will likely stay as 
money for the purpose of criminal charges because it would 
be a heavy toll on public policy to allow drug traffickers and 
conspirators to get away with money laundering because in 
the semantic technical sense they are not dealing with real 
money. This leads to the speculation that bitcoins will 
almost certainly stay classified as money in the Federal 
Courts. How this may affect future tax law if and when 
bitcoins become mainstream is up to dispute. 
 While it may not be something that matters initially, 
eventually there will be a legal action that intertwines 
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criminal and tax law that will require the issue of whether 
bitcoins are classified as money or property to be addressed. 
This note predicts it will occur in the federal courts within 
the next 20 years if the issue is not congressionally settled. 
When a court finally hears the bitcoin classification issue, 
the IRS’s property definition will likely be outbalanced by 
the forming precedent. 
 The legislative branch is in a unique position 
because they will ultimately be the last ones to act on bitcoin 
law, but will also have the final authority on the subject as 
well. It would be naïve to believe that no regulation will 
occur from bitcoin legislation. Bitcoins and virtual currency 
of the like will be regulated, as is every new legal entity or 
conception. The question is how, and will it be 
constitutional? Certain state legislatures have already taken 
the lead to classify bitcoins as legal money, but real 
treatment of the currency is being left up to state regulators 
anyway, so the gesture may merely be symbolic. 
  There will also be a number of unseen interests 
involved when creating the first bitcoin legislation. These 
will include the governmental interests that favor bitcoin 
regulation such as the SEC, IRS, FinCEN, FEC, and even 
state governments could be affected. Based off of the actions 
and publications from the various regulatory bodies, the 
IRS will likely be the only one to favor a property 
designation. However, there is no downside for the SEC or 
FinCEN if bitcoin can constitutionally maintain its tax status 
as property and still be considered as money for criminal 
prosecutions and civil recoveries. In a perfect world, the 
government would get more tax revenue, and prosecute 
citizens as they find most convenient. Other balancing 
interests include U.S. citizens that use bitcoins, especially 
U.S. businesses that accept bitcoins and may face adverse 
tax consequences. North America’s major bitcoin 
exchanger, Coindesk, as well as other bitcoin arbitrators 
such as Bitpay, will all have high stakes in future bitcoin 
regulations. Most nongovernmental entities will likely 
favor a monetary treatment of bitcoins for all legal 
occasions.  
VI. THE FUTURE IS NOW 
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 The federal courts seem unlikely to budge in their 
classification of bitcoins as money. The logical follow up 
question is: why should they? Most cases that find 
themselves debating the legal status of bitcoin involve drug 
trafficking money launderers or Ponzi scheme operators; all 
of which come charging into court with the IRS notice or 
FinCEN guidance claiming bitcoins cannot be money. 
However, bitcoins are a new creation, and it is the judge’s 
job to “discover” the law through a multitude of factors, 
including public policy, until lawmakers say contrary.  
  Bitcoins are a situation where blind reading of 
regulatory directions would lead to absurd results. Bitcoins 
are already a magnet for controversial and illegal purchases 
because of their difficulty to track. To allow a legal cloud for 
online criminal activities would create a situation that the 
bitcoin creator and core developers never intended. Money 
launderers and scammers could walk free on a mere 
technicality of diction and aging statutes under a strict 
interpretation of money. From the District Court opinions, 
this notion has not been lost on the judiciary either. There is 
simply no way drug traffickers, money launderers and 
investment con-artists are going to avoid justice so 
contritely. If an Appellate Court ever heard the issue, an 
affirmation of bitcoins as money would be a mere formality 
to set a higher precedent. The attorneys of these defendants 
must obviously feel that there is enough conflict in the IRS 
Notice and other regulatory publications to mean 
something. However, according to the decisions of the 
federal courts, what they likely mean is that the current tax 
treatment of bitcoins is in danger. If bitcoins are ever to be 
universally classified as property and not money, the 
decision is not going to come from the federal courts.  
 Regulatory publications are not all encompassing 
nor fully consistent either. While the FinCEN Guidance 
does not go as far as stating bitcoins are money, it does 
require those business dealing in bitcoin currency exchange 
be registered as money service businesses in order to be 
regulated under the Bank Secrecy Act.140 FinCEN can refuse 
                                                 
140 FinCEN Guid. FIN-2013-G001, 1 (Mar. 18, 2013), 
http://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-
G001.pdf. 
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to label bitcoins as money until the cows come home, but 
the purpose of the BSA is to regulate the flow of cash 
money, and by including bitcoins, they are effectively 
labeling it as de facto cash money. The FEC opinion allowing 
political campaigns to accept bitcoins as donations left the 
question of their money status up to interpretation. The 
opinion itself described, bitcoins as “money or anything of 
value,” but for FEC reporting purposes, the donations 
should be reported as “in-kind” or property donations.141 
While this may lean in favor of treating bitcoins as property, 
it was likely not intended to be a definitive answer, but a 
solution to fluctuating bitcoin value and the “cash on hand” 
reporting requirement of political campaigns. 
 Finally, there is the IRS Notice proclaiming that 
bitcoins should be treated as property for tax purposes.142 
Treating bitcoins as property and subjecting them to capital 
gains treatment is not likely to spur their growth, especially 
as more businesses look to accept bitcoins for payment of 
normal goods and services. While the criminal law 
determinations on bitcoin’s money status may seem like a 
separate realm to some, they will not remain separate 
forever. At a certain point, a company is likely to sue the IRS 
for a refund for the difference in tax revenue between 
capital gains and cash transaction. When this occurs, the 
appeals court (after the tax court inevitably agrees with the 
IRS) will look to a multitude of factors for its decision, 
including public policy and similar court decisions. Does 
this mean the federal courts will unilaterally strike down 
the IRS’s tax designation of bitcoins? Perhaps not, but likely 
so. Like the previous federal judicial opinions that look 
beyond the strict interpretation of text, the odds do not look 
great for the IRS. Tax evasion, money laundering, 
investment fraud, and the like; all go hand in hand. The 
momentum of the federal judiciary is swinging in favor of 
classifying bitcoins as money, and public policy supports 
this. A decision to the contrary (affirming bitcoins as 
property) is only sure to bring more criminals out of the 
                                                 
141 Len E. Goodman, F.E.C. Op. 2012-02 (May, 8, 2014), 
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/2014-02.pdf. 
142 Internal Revenue Service, I.R.S. Note. 2014-21, 1 (Mar. 25, 
2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf. 
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woodwork claiming precedent against their bitcoin related 
crimes under money statutes. 
THE FINAL VERDICT 
 The future of bitcoins is still uncertain. At certain 
times, its future looks stable, where bitcoin companies are 
even sponsoring college football bowl games.143 On the 
opposite end of the spectrum, there is a major bitcoin 
exchange marketplace declaring bankruptcy after hackers 
infiltrated its security network.144 However, what is certain 
is the fact that a revolution in monetary exchange has 
begun. There are many roadblocks to virtual currencies 
mainstream acceptance, but it is no longer a hypothetical 
venture of a pseudonymous man in his mother’s basement. 
The law will have to play catch up or different agencies will 
lose synergy in the new challenges that face them when it 
comes to tax shelters, money service businesses, and money 
laundering. These early days of bitcoin use will one day be 
compared to the early days of internet use. 
 More legal clarity is needed for bitcoins to become a 
mainstream success. Congress must pass a law verifying the 
tax regulations, and giving designated authority to 
regulatory bodies for crime enforcement concerning 
bitcoins. Without such an action, bitcoins and virtual 
currency will continue to be used as money in the “wild 
wild west” of the internet. Bitcoins already operate in the 
gray lines of regulation and criminality. Tax shelters will 
become much more frequent if the duties of each regulatory 
body and tax law is not reformed. Further, the IRS will 
likely be challenged in court down the road for its 
                                                 
143 Michael Casey, BitPay to Sponsor St. Petersburg Bowl in First 
Major bitcoin Sports Deal, Wall Street Journal, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/bitpay-to-sponsor-st-petersburg-
bowl-in-first-major-bitcoin-sports-deal-1403098202. 
144 Rachel Abrams and Nathaniel Popper, Trading Site Failure 
Stirs Ire and Hope for bitcoin, New York Times (Feb. 25, 2014), 
dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/trading-site-failure-stirs-ire-
and-hope-for-bitcoin/. 
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inconsistent treatment of bitcoin, whether or not it is 
actually constitutional. 145 
 
                                                 
145 This note is dedicated to my wonderful fiancée Angela 
Swagler, and in memory of Sterling Earhart.   
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In October of 1983, Donald V. Morano stood before the 
United States Supreme Court and argued his position in 
Dixson v. United States.2 In his thick New England accent, he 
argued that his clients, city officers responsible for the 
management and expenditure of federal funds, were not 
“public officials” within the definition of a federal bribery 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, which prohibits offering something 
of value to a public official with the illicit intent of 
influencing an official act. If his clients were not public 
officials within the meaning of the statute, then they could 
not be convicted under the statute.  
At a superficial glance, a question of this nature would 
appear immaterial. The defendants were criminals who 
misappropriated funds for an amount of personal gain. 
Why care whether federal or state law pursued them? They 
                                                 
1 Jacob Baggett, Juris Doctor (2015) and former Editor-in-Chief of 
the Lincoln Memorial University Law Review. The author would 
like to thank Assistant Professors Akram Faizer and Melanie 
Reid for their substantive knowledge, valuable criticism, and 
unwavering encouragement.      
2 465 U.S. 482 (1984) (holding that executives of private,  
nonprofit corporation having operational responsibility for 
administration of federal housing grant program within city 
under terms of subgrant from city were “public officials” within 
meaning of federal bribery statute, and thus were subject to 
prosecution under statute).  
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were malefactors; they deserved punishment; (seemingly) 
end of story. However, a second, more careful look reveals 
the issue was not only material, but foundational-- 
foundational in that the prosecutorial authority and role of 
the federal government was arguably beyond the federal 
scope, i.e., beyond the role of the federal government. 
Fearing the Court would rule unfavorably in Dixson, 
Congress quickly augmented § 201 by passing 18 U.S.C. § 
666, which detailed federal program bribery. Section 666 
serves as a statutory mechanism for the federal prosecution 
of bribery and corruption of persons who are not federal 
employees or “public officials” under § 201. It is § 666 which 
draws similar, arguably more complicated, foundational 
issues.  
The role in and authority of the federal government to 
prosecute federal corruption charges levied against state 
and local officials has historically been a relatively 
uncontentious issue. However, the development of so-
called New Federalism principles articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court in, most notably, United States v. 
Lopez3 and United States v. Morrison,4 caused far-reaching 
stir. The stir’s effect raised the question of whether § 666, the 
bribery statute applicable to state and local officials, was 
legislated with proper congressional authority.  
Part One of this note will discuss the elements and 
jurisprudential evolution of § 201, which criminalizes the 
bribery of federal officials and the payment or receipt of 
official gratuities. Part Two will detail federal program 
                                                 
3 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding the Gun Free School Zone Act 
exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause authority, since 
possession of gun in local school zone was not economic activity 
that substantially affected interstate commerce).  
4 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding the Commerce Clause did not 
provide Congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision 
of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), inasmuch as the  
relevant provision was not regulation of activity that 
substantially affected interstate commerce).  
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bribery under § 666, which criminalizes the bribery and 
corruption of non-federal employees, including state and 
local officials. Part Three will dissect New Federalism and 
its impact on the discussion surrounding the federal interest 
on which congressional authority to pass § 666 rests. Finally, 
Part Three, set against the backdrop of one of Tennessee’s 
infamous corruption investigations, Operation Rocky Top, 
will attempt to provide a solution to the illusive, missing 
federal interest in the prosecution of corrupt state and local 
officials by adding a requirement to § 666’s jurisdictional 
hook. Such a solution potentially satisfies federalism 
principles while keeping the federal anti-corruption statues 
intact. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF § 201 
 
Due to the supplementary nature of § 666, it is nearly 
impossible to meaningfully discuss § 666 without 
addressing the statutory section which it supplements, § 
201. Section 201 covers two branches of corruption: bribery5 
and illegal gratuities.6 Both bribery and illegal gratuities 
require proof that (1) with illicit intent, (2) something of 
value was requested, offered, or given to a (3) public official, 
with the goal of (4) influencing an official act.7 
An act of bribery differs from an illegal gratuity in a crucial 
respect, the intent element. Bribery8 requires quid pro quo— 
an official act in exchange for something of value.9 An 
illegal gratuity, on the other hand, requires that the thing of 
value be offered or solicited “otherwise than as provided for 
the proper discharge of [the federal official’s] official 
duty[.]”10 In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of 
                                                 
5 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2014). 
6 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2014).  
7 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2014).  
8 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (2014) (applicable to the offeror/payor);18 
U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2014) (applicable to the offeree/payee).  
9 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2014).  
10 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2014).  
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California,11 the Court elaborated on this distinction. The 
Court stated that the illegal gratuities prohibition,12 unlike 
the bribery statute did not require a connection between the 
offeror’s intent and the specific official act. Thus, for the 
purposes of illegal gratuities, the intent requirement is 
satisfied if the offeror sought merely “to build a reservoir of 
goodwill” which may be connected to a future or past 
unspecified act.13 
A. QUID PRO QUO AND CORRUPT INTENT 
 
Under § 201’s bribery prohibition, the corrupt intent 
element is intertwined with the concept of quid pro quo. 
Foundationally, in United States v. Johnson, the Tenth Circuit 
held that “[section 201’s intent element required that] the 
government must show the money was knowingly offered 
to an official with the intent and expectation that, in 
exchange for the money, some act of a public official would 
be influenced.”14 The money must be given with more than 
“some generalized hope or expectation of ultimate benefit 
on the part of the donor.”15 
An adjacent issue is what if the illegal quid pro quo bargain 
goes unfulfilled? Under § 201, the offense is complete when 
a bribe or gratuity is either offered or solicited.16 The 
bargained for act need not be done to give rise to criminal 
act. Additionally, if the offeree never performs the 
requested action or has no authority to perform, a 
criminally briberous act has nonetheless been committed.17  
                                                 
11 526 U.S. 398 (1999). 
12 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (2014) (applicable to the 
offeror/payor); 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B) (2014) (applicable to the 
offeree/payee).  
13 Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 405.  
14 United States v. Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073, 1076 (10th Cir. 1980).  
15 Id. (citing United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 
1976)).  
16 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2014).  
17 United States v. Valle, 538 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 2008).  
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As an illustration, in United States v. Valle, the defendant, an 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent, solicited a 
$20,000 bribe from an immigrant in return for removing 
“criminal charges” from the immigrant’s file.18 The 
defendant knew the file contained no criminal charges, and 
as a result, he argued that he never intend to follow through. 
Thus, he argued, he could not be convicted.19 The court 
rejected this argument, citing the Second Circuit case of 
United States v. Meyers.20 In Meyers,21 a defendant 
unsuccessfully asserted the defense that he was 
“playacting,” i.e., never intended to commit the act for 
which the bribe was exchanged.22 
In response to such reasoning, Judge Weiner offered an 
intriguing dissent in Valle.23 He reasoned that if the offeree 
has no legal authority or actual ability to do the official act, 
then the offeree could “never have specifically intended to 
deliver the quid pro quo required by Sun-Diamond. . . .”24  
Valle is significant because it is an ideal example of the 
statutory interpretative lengths to which courts have gone 
to expand the conduct covered under § 201’s umbrella, as 
evidenced by Judge Weiner’s well-reasoned specific-intent 
objection to the majority’s holding.  
Moreover, if § 201 had been ruled inapplicable to the facts 
of Valle, it is not as if the defendant would have walked out 
the courthouse doors. Under the same facts, the defendant  
was convicted of extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 872.25 The 
extortion statute, unlike § 201, required no interpretational 
gamesmanship to fit the crime. 
B. BRIBERY AND GRATUITIES- “OFFICIAL ACT” 
                                                 
18 Id. at 343.  
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 347.  
21 United States v. Meyers, 692 F.2d 823 (2nd Cir. 1982).  
22 Id. at 831. 
23 Valle, 538 F.3d at 350 (5th Cir. 2008) (Weiner, J., dissenting).  
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 352. 




Another element of § 201 requires that the briberous actor seek to 
influence an “official act.”26 Generally, courts have also read the 
“official act” language broadly to force the statute fit the crime.27 
In United States v. Biaggi, the court held that the statute “refers to 
‘any’ action taken on a matter brought before the public official in 
[the official’s] capacity.”28  
However, the D.C. Circuit had a different perspective on the 
interpretation of “official act.” In Valdes v. United States,29 the D.C. 
Circuit read the “official act” requirement narrowly. In that case, 
an officer searched a law enforcement data base to obtain vehicle 
registration information in exchange for cash from an undercover 
informant. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the “officer’s actions” 
lacked a sufficiently “formal” relationship to his official duties, 
and thus, an official act was not influenced.30 The court provided 
a helpful example: 
[A]sking questions (of people, databases, and real 
evidence) is certainly a part of investigating. . . . 
But it would constitute an enormous expansion 
of the gratuities provision to define “action” on a 
“matter” as encompassing every question asked 
and answered, or even every question that 
somehow parallels those an official might ask as 
part of his official duty and whose answer might 
entail a use of government resources. It would 
bring under the clause a broad range of 
moonlighting activities that in any way 
paralleled an official's regular work (and perhaps 
that of a broad spectrum of fellow workers, as 
well). Thus, a Department of Justice lawyer who 
used a government Westlaw account to look up a 
legal question for a friend would be, in the 
                                                 
26 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(a).  
27 See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 97-99 (2nd Cir. 
1988).  
28 Id. at 98. 
29 Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en 
banc).  
30 Id. at 1342-3.  
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dissenters' view, “deci[ding]” a “question” that 
might “be brought before [him].”31 
This D.C. Circuit rationale signaled that the seemingly ever-
expanding, nearly-boundless scope of federal corruption statutes 
must have limits.  
C. BRIBERY AND GRATUITIES - “THING OF VALUE” 
 
Section 201 also requires that the offeror offer, or the offeree 
accept, something of value for an official act. The “thing of 
value” has been understood to comprise anything that has 
a subjective value to the accepting party, the offeree.32 The 
Second Circuit, in United States v. Williams,33 held that 
“corruption of office occurs when the officeholder agrees to 
the misuse of his office in the expectation of gain, whether 
or not he has correctly assessed the worth of the bribe.”34  
D. BRIBERY AND GRATUITIES- “PUBLIC OFFICIAL” AND 
DIXSON V. UNITED STATES 
 
As the final, heavily litigated element, § 201 requires that 
the bribe or gratuity be offered, requested, or received by a 
“public official” or a “person who has been selected to be a 
public official.”35 This element brings us squarely back to 
the Supreme Court chamber in October of 1983 with Donald 
Morano. Following opening pleasantries and rehearsed 
opening points, the degree to which most Justices were 
unconvinced by Morano’s defensive argument was evident 
                                                 
31 Id. at 1326.  
32 See generally 1 SARAH N. WELLING ET AL, FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
LAW AND RELATED CIVIL ACTIONS § 7.3 (1988).  
33 United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2nd Cir. 1983). 
34 Id. at 623.  
35 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) & (2) (2014).  
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from the tone of their questions and responses to Morano’s 
less-than-helpful answers.36    
In the midst of oral argument, Morano’s sympathizers 
showed their cards as well. For instance, during the 
government’s segment, Justice O’Connor stated, “It is 
somewhat of a concern to think that any potential recipient 
of federal money might be subject to [§ 201].”37 The 
government’s advocate, Richard G. Wilkins, responded by 
stating, “Certainly, it is a matter of some concern, but . . . [§ 
201] applies only to a person acting for or on behalf of the 
United States in an official function, so it isn’t just anyone 
who receives some sort of federal fund or some sort of 
federal subsidy.”38  
The Court found the government’s answer persuasive 
because it echoed similar sentiments in its majority opinion. 
The majority held that § 201 was a comprehensive statute 
applicable to all persons performing activities for or on 
behalf of the United States.39 Articulating in more detail, the 
Court pronounced “the proper inquiry [when determining 
whether an individual is a public official] is not simply 
whether the person had signed a contract with the United 
States or agreed to serve as the Government’s agent, but 
rather whether the person occupies a position of public trust 
with federal responsibilities.” Thus, in Dixson, despite 
Congress’s fear it would rule otherwise, the Court 
concluded that “[t]he government has a strong and 
legitimate interest in prosecuting [local officials in charge of 
distributing federal funds] for their misuse of government 
                                                 
36 Dixson v. United States- Oral Argument, Oyez: U.S. Supreme 
Court Media, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-
1989/1983/1983_82_5279#sort=vote.  
37 Dixson v. United States- Oral Argument, Oyez, at 34:15 (Justice 
O’Connor speaking).  
38 Dixson v. United States- Oral Argument, at 34:23 (Richard G. 
Wilkins speaking).  
39 Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 496 (1984).  
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funds,” due to the fact that these officials had the sort of 
national, public trust Congress intended to encompass.40 
E. JUSTICE O’CONNOR’S DISSENT IN DIXSON 
 
In Dixson, Justice O’Connor found the majority’s “public 
officer or employee with federal responsibilities” answer to 
be overly inclusive and vague, and she sought to provide 
legal ammunition to those who might challenge the 
majority’s broad interpretation of “public official” in the 
future. Her dissent, in which an unlikely cast of Justices 
Brennan, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined, maintained the 
position that grantee autonomy,  i.e., the independence and 
relatively high level of discretion of  a state or local grantee 
with regard to how federally granted funds are used, 
should be determinative.41 “The main defining 
characteristic of the category is the principle of grantee 
autonomy: although grants impose conditions on the use of 
grant funds, grantees are left considerable discretion to 
design and execute the federally assisted programs without 
federal intrusion.”42 As a result, grants-in-aid to state or 
local governments, managed and dispersed by their state 
and local employees or contractors, should be treated as 
categorically different from other types of federal 
activities.43 Thus, Justice O’Connor reasoned, § 201 was not 
applicable to facts of Dixson.44 
Justice O’Connor expounded on this concept of grantee 
autonomy by explaining the principle has particular 
importance in two circumstances. First, grantee autonomy 
                                                 
40 Id. at 482. 
41 Id. at 508 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
42 Id. (citing 41 U.S.C. § 504 (definition of “grant” requires that 
“no substantial involvement is anticipated between the executive 
agency, acting for the Federal Government, and the State or local 
government or other recipient during performance of the 
contemplated activity”)). 
43 Dixson, 465 U.S. at 508 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
44 Id. at 510-11.  
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is strongest in “block grant” programs, such as the program 
at issue in Dixson. “In such programs, federal control over 
the spending of the distributed funds is minimized, and the 
grant recipient cannot plausibly be said to be acting for 
anyone but itself.”45 Second, due to longstanding federalism 
principles, “the principle of grantee autonomy applies with 
special force when federal grant recipients are state or local 
governments.”46 She stated: 
Such principles must shape the construction 
of the statutory language . . . [And] demand 
a strong presumption that state and local 
governments are carrying out their own 
policies and are acting on their own behalf, 
not on behalf of the United States, even when 
their programs are being funded by the 
United States.47 
In the years that followed Dixson, circuit courts embraced 
the “public officer or employee with federal 
responsibilities” rationale of the majority and were 
reluctant to seize and act on the grantee-autonomy 
distinction articulated in Justice O’Connor’s dissent.48  
As a final note, the expansion of § 201’s applicability 
widened further in 2001 when a private citizen, who 
performed some delegated government function, was held 
to be a “public official.” In United States v. Thomas,49 the Fifth 
Circuit held that a prison guard who was employed by a 
private company, which contracted with the Immigration 
                                                 
45 Id. at 509. 
46 Id.(citing See Shapek, MANAGING FEDERALISM: 
EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRANT-IN-AID 
SYSTEM (1981)).  
47 Dixson, 465 U.S. 509-10 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
48 See, e.g., United States v. Strissel, 920 F.2d 1162 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(executive director of city housing authority who distributed 
HUD funds); United States v. Velazquez, 847 F.2d 140 (4th Cir. 
1988) (county deputy who worked in local jail with contract to 
house federal prisoners). 
49 240 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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and Naturalization Service to run a prison, and who 
performed the same duties, had the same responsibilities 
and potential criminal culpability as a federal prison 
guard.50 
III. 18 U.S.C. § 666 - FEDERAL PROGRAM BRIBERY 
 
Congress feared the Supreme Court would rule the 
opposite way it did in Dixson, i.e., that the defendants, city 
employees in charge of dispersing and managing federal 
funds, were not public officials under § 201, so as an 
uncharacteristically preemptive measure, Congress 
augmented § 201 with § 666 while Dixson was being 
litigated.51 This federal program bribery statute is a 
mechanism by which the federal prosecution of bribery may 
be undertaken against persons who are not federal 
employees or “public officials.” Rather than predicate the 
statutes applicability on federal employment or public 
official status, § 666 predicates its applicability on the 
receipt of federal “benefits.”52 
The statute makes it a federal criminal offense if (1) an agent 
of a state, local government or agency (2) corruptly solicits 
or accepts anything of value of $5,000 dollars or more (3) 
intending to be influenced in connection with any 
transaction the state or local organization for whom the 
agent works, and (4) such organization receives $10,000 in 
federal benefits within a year’s time.53 
The statute met its first major challenge in 1997 when the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer whether 
government must prove the bribe at issue, in some way, 
affected federal funds before the bribe violated § 
                                                 
50 Thomas, 240 F.3d at 448.  
51 Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 58 (1997).  
52 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2014).  
53 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) & (d)(5) (2014). The statute provides the 
applicable punishment, a fine and imprisonment of “not more 
than ten years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (2014). 
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666(a)(1)(B). The case, Salinas v. United States, involved the 
chief deputy of a state prison facility.54 The facility housed 
several federal prisoners, and in exchange for housing 
them, the state facility received considerable federal funds, 
and these funds easily constituted $10,000 in benefits 
required by § 666.55 The chief deputy at the facility received 
two designer watches and a truck, which had a value 
greater than $5,000, in exchange for allowing a federal 
prisoner conjugal visits.56  
The defense made a nexus argument which would require 
the federal government to prove that the bribery affected 
federal funds in order to convict a state or local actor under 
§ 666. Focusing on the word “any” in § 666(a)(1)(B), the 
Court stated the statute broadly encompassed an agent of a 
state or local government which receives $10,000 in federal 
benefits be influenced or rewarded in connection with any 
business, transaction, or series of transactions of the defined 
organization, government or agency.57 As a result, the 
Court held that the “expansive and unqualified [language], 
both as to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered” 
does not support the argument that federal funds must be 
affected before the acts could be criminal in nature.58 
A. 18 U.S.C. § 666 - CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY 
CHALLENGE TONED IN FEDERALISM 
 
The Salinas opinion was equivocal, and as an aftereffect, a 
circuit split developed on the issue of whether the criminal 
acts prohibited by § 666 required any type of nexus between 
the corrupt act and a risk to federal funds. To address this 
split, the Court heard the case of Sabri v. United States.59 As 
a ramification of the presented nexus issue, congressional 
                                                 
54 Salinas, 522 U.S. at 52.  
55 Id. at 54. 
56 Id. at 55.  
57 Id. at 57.  
58 Id. at 52.  
59 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).  
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authority to enact § 666 became integral to the proceedings 
and decision.  
Sabri concerned a member of the Minneapolis Community 
Development Agency (“MCDA”) and a real estate 
developer.60 Both were accused of violating § 666(a)(2) 
when each was involved in bribes and kickbacks, which 
exceeded $5,000, relating to various regulatory approvals 
and eminent domain proceedings.61 Minneapolis received 
approximately $29,000,000 per year in federal funds, and 
the MCDA received $23,000,000 per year, which easily 
satisfies the statute’s other jurisdictional requirement.62  
Sabri raised a facial challenge to the statute when he argued, 
“the law can never be applied constitutionally because it 
fails to require proof of any connection between a bribe or 
kickback and some federal money.”63 The Court replied that 
it “do[es] not presume the unconstitutionality of federal 
criminal statutes lacking explicit provision of a 
jurisdictional hook[,]”64 the nexus between the corrupt act 
and federal funds. Further, the Court expressed, “there is no 
occasion even to consider the need for such a requirement 
where there is no reason to suspect that enforcement of a 
criminal statute would extend beyond a legitimate interest 
cognizable under Article I, § 8.”65 The Court further stated: 
Congress has authority under the Spending 
Clause to appropriate federal moneys to 
promote the general welfare, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 
and it has corresponding authority under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 
18, to see to it that taxpayer dollars 
appropriated under that power are in fact 
spent for the general welfare, and not 
                                                 
60 Id. at 602. 
61 Id. 602-3. 
62 Id. at 602. 
63 Id. at 604. 
64 Id. at 605. 
65 Id.  
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frittered away in graft or on projects 
undermined when funds are siphoned off or 
corrupt public officers are derelict about 
demanding value for dollars.66 
After losing the first portion of the Spending Clause round, 
the petitioner went into the remainder of the round 
wielding Morrison67 and Lopez.68 In those cases of similar 
rationale, the Court reasoned, it would be necessary “to pile 
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to 
convert congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the 
States.”69 Thus, the congressional authority to enact such 
statutes was not present. In Sabri, however, the Court found 
that no pile of inference upon inference was needed. The 
federal government was within its “power to keep a 
watchful eye on expenditures and on the reliability of those 
who use public money[.]”70 
In a final effort, the petitioner asserted that the condition 
attached to such funds, i.e., that their misuse would result 
in criminal culpability, was unduly coercive under the 
Tenth Amendment-related test established in South Dakota 
v. Dole.71 If such were held true, then § 666 would be 
unconstitutional. However, the Court quickly distinguished 
Dole from the facts of Sabri by aptly stating that § 666 brings 
“federal power directly to bear on individuals who convert 
public spending into unearned private gain,” not on a 
State’s public policy decision-making ability, as in Dole.72  
                                                 
66 Id.  
67 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
68 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
69 Id. at 608 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567). 
70 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 608.  
71 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).  
72 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 601.  
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Concurring,73 Justice Thomas expressed his doubt about the 
federal government’s interest his colleagues used to justify 
the congressional authority to enact § 666 under the 
Spending Clause. He reasoned that merely noting the 
fungible nature of money does not explain how the federal 
government could gain an interest in all instances of local 
bribery. Justice Thomas provided an example: “noting that 
‘[m]oney is fungible,’ . . .  for instance, does not explain how 
there could be any federal interest in ‘prosecut[ing] a bribe 
paid to a city's meat inspector in connection with a 
substantial transaction just because the city's parks 
department had received a federal grant of $10,000[.]’”74 
Justice Thomas concluded the federal interest in the bribe at 
issue in Sabri was comparably attenuated, “yet the bribe is 
covered by the expansive language of § 666(a)(2).”75 
B. THE ACADEMIC DISCOURSE SURROUNDING § 666 
 
Sabri was announced in 2003, the same term as McConnell v. 
FEC.76 McConnell held that the federal government’s interest 
in combatting corruption outweighs the ever-important 
First Amendment rights involved in the political process.77 
This decision coupled with Sabri, “confirm[ed] the high 
priority that the Court places on the National Government’s 
authority to fight corruption at any level in order to protect 
the democratic process and public confidence in it.”78 
                                                 
73 Id. at 610 (Justices Kennedy and Scalia also concurred, but only 
for the purpose of revoking their indorsement of Part III of the 
opinion, which the authoring justices deemed an “afterword”). 
74 Id. at 623 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing United States v. 
Santopietro, 166 F.3d 88, 93 (2nd Cir. 1999)). 
75 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 601 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
76 McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), 
overruled by Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010).  
77 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143-44, overruled by Citizens United, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010). 
78 George D. Brown, Carte Blanche: Federal Prosecution of State and 
Local Officials After Sabri, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 404 (2005).  
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Accordingly, George D. Brown, Professor of Law at Boston 
College Law School, labeled the Court’s 2003 term the 
“Anti-Corruption Term.”79  
Further, Brown predicted these two cases could be seen as 
“two important steps down the road toward more vigorous 
anti-corruption efforts.”80 On a federal level, the federal 
government’s concern with the efficiency of its operations 
is clear.81 However, the federal government’s interest in 
“sub-national” corruption is significantly more 
attenuated.82 Brown posed, “What concern is to 
Washington if Smallville is inefficient, lax on ethical 
standards, and even allows their salaries through liberal use 
of municipal property and funds?”83  
First, “the conduct of all government officials is something 
the public views in unitary terms, regardless of the level at 
which it occurs. Thus, corruption at any level can 
undermine confidence in the system as a whole.”84 This 
argument is “short on empirical justification”85 but has an 
“intuitive appeal.”86 In other words, at the time this article 
was written, no studies had been conducted much less 
conclusively proven that members of the general public 
were unable to distinguish between federal, state, and local 
officials. Even if such a distinction could not be made in the 
minds of average citizens, it is unlikely that such a lack of 
understanding or misconception provided a solid basis for 
establishing the federal government’s interest necessary for 
§ 666’s legislation. 
                                                 
79 Id. at 405.  
80 Id. at 407. 
81 Id. at 409.  
82 Id. at 409-10. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 410.  
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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Second, Brown stated that “interstate externalities” may be 
offered as a federal government’s interest.87 Essentially, 
corruption in State A may affect State B. This inference-
based justification is “the familiar race to the bottom 
argument for national intervention.”88 Brown dismissed 
both of these potential federal interests as “hardly 
overwhelming.”89 Moreover, conceivable federal interests 
used to justify federal prosecution of state and local actors 
under federal bribery programs “run directly counter to . . . 
New Federalism.”90 
IV. NEW FEDERALISM AND FEDERAL ANTI-CORRUPTION 
STATUTES 
 
The late 1990’s and early 2000’s saw, perhaps, the main 
thrust of the resurgence of federalism principles.91 “New 
Federalism,” as it was dubbed, is essentially two principles: 
an emphasis on the Constitution’s enumeration of federal 
powers as limiting the powers of the federal government,92 
and the concept of states as quasi-sovereign, largely 
autonomous entities owed great respect by the co-equal 
national government.93 New Federalism principles are 
likely the most controversial Rehnquist Court legacies.94  
                                                 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 411.  
90 Id.  
91 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 
N.M. L. REV. 7, 7 (2001) (“[T]here has been a revolution with 
regard to the structure of the American government because of 
the Supreme Court decisions in the last few years regarding 
federalism.”); Lynn Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist 
Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195, 195 (2001).  
92 See, e.g., Pritnz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929-30 (1997).  
93 See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44, 47, 54, 72, 76 (1996). 
94 Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, The Spending Power, 
and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 (2003).  
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One prevailing theme of the Rehnquist Court’s New 
Federalism “insiste[d] that it is the task of the Justices to 
enforce both textual and structural limitations on federal 
power – i.e., that ‘political safeguards are not enough[.]’”95  
Structural federalism is sometimes said by 
the Justices not only to facilitate optimal 
outcomes through competition and choice, 
or diversity and experimentation; the Court's 
decisions and reasoning are animated as well 
by claims that decisionmakers and 
regulators ought to be “accountable” to 
those they serve, and that this accountability 
is enhanced by the dual sovereignty and 
decentralization preserved by our 
Constitution.96 
It is from this view of the Constitution’s “text, history, and 
structure”97 that produces the congressional authority 
battle played out in the context of federal corruption 
statutes. Particularly at issue is the federal government’s 
power or authority to enact legislation which reaches state 
and local officials. 
A. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF CONGRESSIONAL 
AUTHORITY TO ENACT § 666: HENNING’S 
CORRUPTION LEGACY 
 
                                                 
95 Id. at 15 (citing See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards 
Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951 
(2001)). 
96 Garnett, 89 CORNELL L. REV. at 20 (citing See, e.g., Geier v. Am. 
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 908 (2000) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“We have addressed the heightened federalism and 
nondelegation concerns that agency pre-emption raises by using 
the presumption to build a procedural bridge across the political 
accountability gap between States and administrative 
agencies.”)). 
97 Garnett, 89 CORNELL L. REV. at 22. 
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Peter J. Henning, Professor of Law at Wayne State 
University, offered a potential source of congressional 
authority to enact § 666 by offering a novel argument that 
the Constitution has an “Anti-Corruption Legacy.”98 
Henning argued that congressional involvement in the 
prosecution of state and local official is not a threat to 
federalism.99 In fact, Henning believed federalism is 
strengthened by federal prosecution of such crimes because 
corruption at state and local levels undermines the balance 
federalism creates.100  
In support of congressional authority to combat corruption 
at the federal level, Henning cited:  
“Bribery” as one of the grounds for 
impeachment; the prohibition of both 
change in the President's compensation 
during his term of office and of his receipt of 
“‘any other Emolument from the United 
States, or any of them”’; the prohibition on 
federal officeholders' receipt of emoluments 
from foreign sources; the prohibition on 
members of Congress being appointed “to 
any federal office ‘which shall have been 
created, or the Emoluments whereof shall 
have been encreased during such time’ that 
the member was in office[; and,] [t]he 
Appropriations Clause requir[ing] 
congressional authorization before [the 
executive] can disburse funds.”101 
Taken in conjunction with one another, Henning asserted 
these Constitutional provisions are “structural standards 
                                                 
98 Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution of State 
and Local Corruption, 92 KY. L.J. 75, 80-2 (2003).  
99 Id. at 81-2.  
100 Id. 
101 George D. Brown, Carte Blanche: Federal Prosecution of State and 
Local Officials After Sabri, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 415-416 (2005) 
(citing Henning, 92 KY. L.J. at 86-7).  
126                     4 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2016) 
 
 
designed to limit the possibility of corruption in the Federal 
government.”102 
Regarding Constitutional provisions creating structural 
standards applicable to the federal government combatting 
corruption at the state level, Henning cites two 
constitutional provisions: the Seventh Amendment 
guarantee of a jury trial and the Article III provision for 
diversity jurisdiction of federal courts.103 Both, in his view, 
provide a certain level of protection against corrupt state 
and local government bias in judicial proceedings.104  
Henning’s “Anti-Corruption Legacy” argument regarding 
the federal government’s authority to criminalize acts of its 
own employees is unnecessary. The federal government has 
a clear interest in and authority to regulate the acts of its 
employees which are likely to undermine the employee’s 
duties. Thus, Henning likely made those points for 
purposes of boosting his Anti-Corruption Legacy argument 
relating to the criminalization of acts of state and local 
officials.  
After close examination, the inferences and logical backflips 
needed to find congressional authority to criminalize and 
prosecute various acts of state and local officials under this 
Anti-Corruption Legacy argument are hardly persuasive 
due to their less-than-concrete nature. Such inferences may 
frighten a jurist or academician wishing to build a 
congressional authority argument on such a basis. George 
D. Brown agreed that Henning’s an argument is “hardly 
dispositive”105 and he, along with Adam H. Kurland, 
discussed another potential source of congressional power 
to regulate the conduct at issue, the Guarantee Clause. 
B. KURLAND AND THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE 
                                                 
102 Henning, 92 KY. L.J. at 87.  
103 Id. at 89. 
104 Id. at 91. 
105 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 417.  




Kurland, Professor of Law at Howard University, a strong 
advocate for prosecution on a federal level, wrote that 
federal prosecution of state and local officials on the basis of 
congressional authority such as the Commerce Clause was 
dubious.106 Thus, Kurland looked elsewhere in the 
Constitution for congressional authority. His search led him 
to examine the Guarantee Clause. The Guarantee Clause 
states, “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government[.]”107 
Kurland believes: 
[T]he primary federal interest in combating 
local corruption . . . is based on the principle 
that the public is entitled to honest 
government at all levels. The faith that the 
citizenry places in all levels of government is 
the foundation of the republic. Thus, 
anything that erodes that foundation is of 
substantial federal interest. The citizens of 
the United States are therefore entitled to 
federal protection from abuses of power by 
those who govern.108 
Further, Kurland saw the Guarantee Clause as akin to the 
Fourteenth Amendment in that he views it as “a 
constitutional provision that necessarily intrudes on state 
sovereignty and alters the normal federal state balance.”109 
Additionally, Kurland believed the Guarantee Clause could 
                                                 
106 Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal 
Prosecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 486 
(1989).  
107 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.   
108 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 418 (citing Kurland, 62 S. CAL. 
L. REV. at 376-77).  
109 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 419 (citing Kurland, 62 S. CAL. 
L. REV. at 459). 
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be a source of congressional power to enact a generally 
applicable anti-corruption statute.110  
The immediate benefit of his thesis is that it is a plausible 
basis for “dealing directly with the problem of the 
prosecutions: validation under a general statute, of those 
prosecutions.”111 However, Congress has never taken such 
a broad view of its power.112 More importantly, recent 
Supreme Court discussion of the Guarantee Clause seems 
to view the clause more “as a source of state autonomy than 
a font of federal power.”113 Thus, New Federalism, 
discussed previously, blocks the Guarantee Clause from 
being a source a federal power, at least as it is currently 
viewed.  
V. OPERATION ROCKY TOP - AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE 
STUDY & RESTRICTING § 666’S SCOPE BY ADDING A 
JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT 
 
A. OPERATION ROCKY TOP 
 
By 1985, fearing circumvention of Tennessee’s strict 
gambling prohibitions, the Tennessee General Assembly 
began to heavily regulate charitable bingo operations, 
which were generating an estimated $31 million a year.114 
                                                 
110 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 420 (citing Kurland, 62 S. CAL. 
L. REV. at 452-53). 
111 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 420. 
112 Id. (citing Kurland, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. at 493).  
113 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 420 (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at  
918-9  (listing the Guarantee Clause among provisions that 
reflect the Constitution's commitment to state sovereignty)). 
114 Interview with Tennessee State Senator Randy McNally, 
Chairman of the Finance, Ways, & Means Committee, in Oak 
Ridge, TN. (Mar. 21, 2015); Ronald Smothers, Tennessee 
Republicans See an Election Weapon in State’s Bingo Scandal,  N.Y. 
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For instance, the legislature began limiting the times a 
person could play within a specified time period and the 
types of prizes which could be won.115 During this time, the 
Secretary of State’s office oversaw compliance with the 
relevant bingo law and regulations.116 
In the fall of 1985, then-state Representative James R. 
“Randy” McNally (“McNally”), who represented a portion 
of East Tennessee, received a call from a member of the local 
chapter of the Fraternal Order of Eagles (“Eagles”), an 
organization geared toward health-related charitable 
efforts,117 and the member told McNally of concerns he had 
with the bingo practices of a local branch of the Army & 
Navy Union (“Army-Navy”),118 an armed services veteran’s 
social organization. The Eagles member explained that 
Army-Navy was not adhering to Tennessee law in various 
ways.119 Consequentially, McNally began to investigate the 
law and Army-Navy.120  
Simultaneous to investigating the matter, McNally 
contacted Secretary of State’s office, and expressed his 
concerns about the practices of the Army-Navy branch, and 
he asked the office to look into Army-Navy’s practices.121 By 
February of 1986, McNally said he was frustrated because 
his efforts to prompt the Secretary of State to investigate 
                                                 
115 Interview with Tennessee State Senator McNally (Mar. 21, 
2015) (on file with author). 
116 Gentry Crowell, 57; Top Tennessee Aide, N.Y. TIMES, December 
22, 1989, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/22/obituaries/gentry-
crowell-57-top-tennessee-aide.html.  
117 Fraternal Order of Eagles, About, 
http://www.foe.com/About.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2015). 
118 Army and Navy Union, Home, 
http://www.armyandnavyunion.org/home/ (last visited Mar. 
22, 2015).  
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“were going nowhere.”122 At approximately the same time, 
McNally received a call from three fellow House members, 
and one in particular asked McNally to meet with a Bingo 
Association lobbyist. Initially, McNally was reluctant; 
however, as a courtesy, he consented.123  
At the end of the same legislative work week, McNally met 
with the lobbyist at the Hermitage for a luncheon to discuss 
bingo practices.124 McNally explained that “the meeting 
went normally until the [lobbyist] said some of the 
legislators that [the lobbyist] dealt with liked to get their 
money during campaign season, and others liked the 
money to be spread out over the year.”125 McNally found 
the statement deeply unsettling.126 What type of money was 
the lobbyist talking about-- campaign contributions or 
something else? Even if he were only referencing legal 
campaign contributions, why would the legislators prefer 
the funds be “spread out” over the year? 
He considered the statement over the weekend, and 
returned to Nashville the proceeding Monday but was 
unsure how to proceed.127 He worried about being framed 
as an “alarmist.”128 As a Rotary Club member, McNally 
attended a Rotary meeting that Monday, and the civic-
driven message conveyed by the meeting, pushed him to 
delve deeper into the lobbyist’s statement, regardless of the 
potential political and social ramifications.129 He called the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“F.B.I.”).130 
A call screener at the F.B.I.’s Nashville office answered the 
phone, obtained the necessary information, and told 







128 Id.  
129 Id.  
130 Id. 
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McNally he would be contacted soon.131 Within five 
minutes, they called back.132 F.B.I. agent, Richard Knudsen, 
expressed that the F.B.I. was interested in McNally’s 
information.133 Additionally, McNally learned that 
Knudsen had been working in conjunction with an agent of 
the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“T.B.I.”), Roger 
Farley, on this matter.134  
McNally was instructed not to initiate conversations with 
the Bingo Association’s lobbyist.135 McNally said, “if [he] 
called, I was supposed to tell them, ‘I was ok; I was satisfied’ 
with the legality of their operation.”136 Approximately two 
weeks after the Hermitage luncheon, another player 
revealed himself.137 
W.D. “Donnie” Walker (“Walker”), head of the Charitable 
Solicitations division of the Secretary of State’s office, 
contacted McNally, and ominously asked, “everything 
ok?”138 McNally gave an affirmative response, but the 
interested parties must not have been convinced because a 
week later, while McNally was on his way to a committee 
meeting in the General Assembly’s main office building, the 
War Memorial Building, the Bingo Association’s lobbyist 
handed McNally a white envelope, and said, “we 
appreciate you.”139 
As a result, he was immediately faced with a crucial 
decision: whether to risk raising alarm by skipping the 
committee meeting and reporting the event, or go to the 
meeting with an envelope filled with unknown content in 
his coat jacket’s side pocket.140 After a brief moment of 
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consideration, McNally called Agents Knudsen and 
Farley.141 The agents told McNally to leave the immense, yet 
crowded, office building without being seen, and they 
would pick him up immediately.142 
After stopping at nearby fast-food restaurant, the agents 
took the envelope from McNally, examined it, and 
preserved it as evidence.143 Upon opening the envelope, 
McNally found three hundred dollars.144 At the direction of 
the agents, McNally made a recorded phone call to the 
lobbyist.145 McNally thanked him for the money and 
expressly asked whether it should reported as a campaign 
contribution.146 The lobbyist said they did not intent to 
report it, and neither should he.147 
A lull in the relevant events occurred until June of 1986 
when the “drop dead” contribution reporting date 
approached.148 McNally was concerned about whether to 
report the three-hundred dollars because the Secretary of 
State oversaw the reporting and recording of 
contributions.149 The F.B.I. was proceeding with a particular 
degree of caution because Abscam, a corruption 
investigation ending with the overturning of several 
charges due to entrapment issues, was a not-so-distant 
memory.150 The F.B.I. and T.B.I. wanted more evidence, so 
when the lobbyist in question came calling, they sent 
McNally to meet with him in July of 1986.151 
Prior to the meeting, set to take place at the Regas in 
Knoxville, McNally was fitted with a wire and transmitting 
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device. He was “sweating bullets” during the dinner.152 The 
conversation centered around lobbying and the Army-
Navy matter.153 The lobbyist explained that he knew “how 
the [legislative] game was played.”154 With McNally (and 
investigating officials) listening, he proceeded to tell 
McNally that the game is best played when a lobbyist can 
get close to a legislator, obtain money for the legislator to 
vote a certain way on a hotly-contested bill, and the 
legislator and lobbyist split the corresponding illegal 
funds.155 To the investigators’ and McNally’s deeper 
surprise, the lobbyist cited specific votes and members the 
lobbyist had helped influence.156  
The dinner had gone on quite some time when suddenly 
McNally heard the previously set codeword over the 
Regas’s intercom system.157 He quickly excused himself, 
and met with agents in the men’s bathroom.158 Apparently, 
the tape recorder he was wearing was nearly out of 
recording capacity, and McNally was forced to end the 
dinner quickly without raising suspicion.159 McNally 
returned to the table, and the dinner ended anti-climatically 
with no further material facts developing, and to much 
disappointment, no money was exchanged.160 
Tapes in hand, the F.B.I. brought the case before 
Washington officials.161 After reviewing the tapes, the 
investigation received high priority, i.e., reinforcements 
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were deployed.162 Most notably, the F.B.I. sent an 
undercover agent to pose as a lobbyist.163 
In September of 1986, another major effort to gather 
evidence occurred.164 The lobbyist, Walker, and McNally 
met in the parking lot of an East Tennessee hospital.165 With 
the F.B.I. and T.B.I. watching, McNally received one-
thousand dollars after feigning dissatisfaction with the 
prior bribe.166 Serendipitously, reports of a peeping Tom 
had been made to the local police, and the entire 
surveillance of the event was almost exposed when a local 
police unit rolled by and saw the surveillance van.167  
Thinking the van may be connected to the peeping Tom 
reports, the local police officer got out, and began asking 
questions of the T.B.I. and F.B.I. agents within.168 Quickly, 
the agents identified themselves, and asked the officer to 
leave.169 Meanwhile, McNally calmed the lobbyist and 
Walker, who had seen the local police unit, by telling them 
to “just be cool.”170 When the officer left, the parties went 
their separate ways.171  
In November of 1986, McNally was elected to the Tennessee 
Senate.172 Nearly three years later, the investigation was 
publicly announced by the F.B.I. and T.B.I.173 Many and 
varying federal indictments were issued as result of the 
information gathered as a result of the information collected 
by F.B.I, the T.B.I., and McNally.174 Particularly, the lobbyist 
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and Walker were offered plea deals in return for 
cooperation.175 Both initially rejected.176 However, the ‘big 
break” in the case occurred when Walker became a witness 
for the prosecution.177 “Mr. Walker . . . pleaded guilty in a 
plea agreement and provided details of how he helped 
operators obtain fraudulent charters as charities so that they 
could legally organize bingo games.”178  
Walker detailed that he arranged “secret partnerships” in 
the operations for some current and former elected officials, 
and he helped organize the bingo operators into a group 
called ''the Association,'' whose goal was funneling money 
to legislators willing to become a part of a secret 
partnership.179 “Armed with Mr. Walker's testimony, grand 
juries began their indictments. Among those indicted were 
a former member of the Alcoholic Beverage Commission, a 
labor leader, a former legislator, and State Election 
Commissioner and an incumbent legislator[,]”180 as well as 
the previously discussed defendants. 
Operation Rocky Top reached its highest political actor with 
Secretary of State. After testifying before the federal grand 
jury, the Secretary was called another time.181 Knowing that 
the recall was likely to end in his indictment, he committed 
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suicide.182 In response to the revelations of the investigation, 
the Tennessee General Assembly established new, more 
rigid ethical boundaries: limits on campaign contributions 
and new lobbying restrictions.183 However, perhaps federal 
intervention was unnecessary.  
  
B. AN ADDITIONAL JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT 
 
The rationale used by the Court to support congressional 
authority to pass § 666 is arguably unconvincing. The highly 
policed Commerce Clause provided no basis; the Taxing 
and Spending rationale of Salinas and Sabri is wanting; 
Henning’s “Anti-Corruption Legacy” begged for serious 
inferences, and the Guarantee Clause provided no help in 
the face of the resurgence of Federalism principles, i.e., New 
Federalism.  
If, as a counterfactual, § 666 were found to have been 
without congressional authority and Senator McNally had 
accepted the bribes offered, the F.B.I.’s lack of power  to 
investigate the matter would not cause the sky to fall on the 
heads of the people of the State of Tennessee. The State, a 
quasi-sovereign federalism partner, would address the 
matter from an investigatory, prosecutorial, and 
adjudicative role. Specifically, the T.B.I.’s white collar 
division would investigate, seek to prosecute, and have the 
matter of public corruption adjudicated. 
At the heart of federal corruption statutes is the lack of trust 
the federal government has in states to discover, investigate, 
and fairly adjudicate a matter of corruption which involves 
the state’s local and/or state-level officials. The federal 
assumption essentially is that a state from which corruption 
spawns is thereby ill-equipped to help itself, to address the 
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matter. This assumption is a fallacy of the worst order. It is 
a generalization.  
All states in which corruption exists are not necessarily 
unable to address the matter merely because a corrupt act 
germinated within its boundaries. A determination as to 
whether the state is capable of addressing the matter must 
be made with regard to the nature and extent of the corrupt 
activities at issue. If the corrupt activities are so pervasive 
as to call reasonable doubt as to whether the state agency or 
branch of government in charge of investigating, 
prosecuting, or adjudicating the matter can fairly handle the 
matter then, perhaps, federal intervention is needed. 
Otherwise, the state should be allowed to address the 
matter with its agents and under its criminal law.  
To effectuate this policy, § 666’s jurisdictional hook need 
only be amended. The jurisdictional hook currently 
requires, an agent of a State, local government or agency to 
corruptly solicit or accept anything of value of $5,000 or 
more, and such organization of which that agent is a part 
receive $10,000 in federal benefits within a year’s time.184 It 
should be amended to additionally require that “there be 
reasonable belief that the state agency or agencies with 
jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute, or adjudicate the 
alleged corrupt matter will be unable to fairly decide 
whether to proceed with the matter due to potential bias, 
political or otherwise, created by the pervasive nature of the 
corruption scheme at issue.”  
This additional requirement would, in effect, remedy the 
generalization fallacy at the heart of § 666 as well as curb the 
nearly boundless scope of the statute. The concern 
regarding the lack of significant, traceable federal interest 
articulated by Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Sabri would 
also be quieted because the federal government could 
articulate reasonable doubt as to the ability of the state to 
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handle the state or local matter, and thereby gain an interest 
in legislating and enforcing § 666.  
Take Justice Thomas’s city meat inspector example. 
Recalling his concurrence in Sabri, Justice Thomas was 
unpersuaded by the argument that the fungible nature of 
money gave rise to a federal interest in prosecuting a bribe 
paid to a city's meat inspector in connection with a 
substantial transaction just because the city's parks 
department had received a federal grant of $10,000.185 The 
additional jurisdictional requirement as to the ability of the 
state to handle the matter of the unsavory meat inspector 
would add significant weight to the federal government’s 
interest that Justice Thomas felt unconvincingly light (or 
non-existent).  
To have palpable impact, the suggested additional 
jurisdictional requirement would necessarily have to be one 
which is proven to the jury at the time of trial. From an 
evidentiary perspective, for the federal government to able 
to proceed with the prosecution of the meat inspector, they 
would be required to produce evidence showing that the 
state would be unable to fairly decide whether to further 
investigate and potentially prosecute because, to extend 
facts of the example, the meat inspector’s unscrupulous 
behavior was merely a small tributary of a much larger, 
pervasive corruption scheme—a scheme which reasonably 
could leave a state-led investigation without the ability to 
fairly decide whether to proceed. 
Specifically, the federal government would be required to 
produce evidence showing that the local or state regulatory 
agency in charge of the meat inspector’s compliance with 
applicable law was tainted by the corruption scheme. 
Ideally, the federal government would produce evidence, 
such as video recordings, financial statements, or 
collaborative testimony, which demonstrates further bribes 
or a portion of the briberous scheme reached the highest 
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overseeing local and state actors as to render those actors 
without the ability, due to their involvement, to execute 
their investigative duties.  
In the context of Operation Rocky Top, if McNally had 
taken a $5000 bribe, § 666 would be applicable because the 
State of Tennessee receives far more than $10,000 in federal 
benefits in a year’s time, and the bribe would have been in 
connection with his capacity as a legislator. Should the 
additional jurisdictional element suggested have existed 
then, the federal prosecutor would have had to demonstrate 
to the jury that the T.B.I., the state prosecutorial authority, 
or state adjudicating body was unable to fairly decide 
whether to proceed with the matter due its bias, political or 
otherwise, created by the pervasive nature of the corruption 
scheme.  
Ideally, the prosecutor would present lawfully obtained 
testimony, recordings, or official or business records which 
would show that the bingo-related illegal funds or political 
influence spread from the legislature and into the relevant 
investigatory department of the T.B.I., the prosecuting 
official, or adjudicative body as to taint a link in the state’s 
criminal justice process.  
Specifically, the new element could have been satisfied by a 
prosecutorial showing of the scheme’s taint reaching the 
relevant, white-collar arm of the T.B.I. or the local judicial 
official who would likely hear the case if filed. Such a 
showing would demonstrate a reasonable belief that the 
pervasive nature of the corruption scheme at issue 
destroyed the objective stance of state agency tasked with 
the investigation, prosecution, or adjudication of the 
Association’s bingo-related practices. A taint of this nature 
would, in effect, render the state’s justice process unable to 
properly address the corruption matter. Upon that 
evidentiary showing, then federal interdiction into a state or 
local corruption matter would be proper. 
140                     4 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2016) 
 
 
However, the facts of investigation fell short of this 
jurisdictional requirement due to the fact that no evidence 
was presented that the corruption scheme reached into the 
T.B.I. or the state court system which would have 
adjudicated the matter. Had these been contemporary 
events and had the additional jurisdictional hook been in 
place, the State of Tennessee’s semi-autonomous nature 




Since Dixson, courts have seen the scope of § 201 become 
nearly boundless, and cases limiting its scope have had a 
nominal effect.186 By preemptively passing § 666, Congress 
further augmented the scope federal corruption crimes. 
After discussing various potential sources of congressional 
authority, the unconvincing Spending Clause rationale was 
revealed. Startlingly, the Court stated that the federal 
interest required for congressional authority to pass § 666 
stemmed from the fact that $10,000 in federal funds were 
merely in the vicinity of corruption. In the face of New 
Federalism, such logic, such a tenuous articulation of 
federal interest cannot stand. However, a solution was 
presented.  
The additional requirement to § 666’s jurisdictional hook, 
i.e., the federal government would be required to forbear 
intervention into what could largely be qualified as an intra-
state matter unless the federal government could 
demonstrate the state’s inability to help itself, would 
significantly lessen the tenuous nature of the federal interest 
as well as satisfy New Federalism principles, at least from a 
theoretical perspective. 
To demonstrate the jurisdictional requirement’s pragmatic 
efficacy, Operation Rocky Top, a Tennessee corruption 
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investigation, served as case study in which examples of 
how such a requirement could be met with a sufficient 
evidentiary showing. In short, the requirement would place 
a duly heavy burden on a federal prosecutor pursuing a § 
666 action against a state actor, but that is precisely the 
point. Such a heavy burden is necessary to give the federal 
government its required interest in the criminal matter and 
comport with New Federalism principles. The additional 
jurisdictional requirement reins federal authority, and by 
predicating federal authority on a respect for a state’s semi-
autonomous nature, the federal government is placed in an 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Libertarians may be unique in many regards, but 
their views on immigration do not qualify. They are as 
divided as is the rest of the population on this issue. Some 
favor open borders, and others oppose such a legal milieu. 
The present paper may be placed in the former category. It 
will outline both sides of this debate in sections II and III. 
Section IV is devoted to some additional arrows in the 
quiver of the closed border libertarians, and to a refutation 
of them. We conclude in section V.  
 
 
II. ANTI OPEN BORDERS 
The libertarian opposition to free immigration is 
straightforward and even elegant.1 It notes, first, a curious 
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bifurcation in international economic relations. In the case 
of both trade and investment, there must necessarily be 
two2 parties who agree to the commercial interaction. In the 
former case, there must be an importer and an exporter; 
both are necessary. Without the consent of both parties, the 
transaction cannot take place. A similar situation arises 
concerning foreign investment.  The entrepreneur who 
wishes to set up shop abroad must obtain the willing 
acquiescence of the domestic partner for the purchase of 
land and raw materials. And the same occurs with financial 
transactions that take place across national borders. Both 
lender and borrower must approve; otherwise, this 
interaction cannot possibly occur. 
Matters are entirely different regarding labor 
mobility. Here, in the absence of any immigration 
restrictions, the migrant, without anyone’s by-your-leave 
except his own, simply shows up on the territory of the 
receiving country. Nor is this only a mere failure to attain 
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symmetry. Something far more important, at least for this 
version of libertarianism, is involved. Without mutual 
consent, it is charged, such movement constitutes trespass. 
Or, in some versions of this argument, it is in effect forced 
integration.  Thus, from this quarter it is not at all clear that 
open immigration is the libertarian position. Indeed, the 
very opposite is true. Without limitations, restrictions, this 
is antithetical to libertarianism. In other words, private 
property rights are one of the two very bedrocks of this 
philosophy.3   Free and open immigration violates private 
property rights, and this is incompatible with freedom. Free 
immigration is an open sesame for trespass.4 
 
 
III. THE CASE FOR OPEN BORDERS 
Those libertarians in favor of free immigration5 are 
not without a defense of their position, even in the face of 
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ESSENTIAL ISSUES THAT AFFECT OUR FREEDOM, 150-159 (2011); 
Keith Preston, The Immigration Question: A Libertarian Middle 
Ground Between Rockwell and Carson, ATTACK THE SYSTEM (2015), 
https://attackthesystem.com/2015/11/13/the-immigration-
question-a-libertarian-middle-ground-between-rockwell-and-
carson (last visited Sept. 4, 2016); Michael Rozeff, Original 
Appropriation and Its Critics, LRC BLOG (2005), 
https://www.lewrockwell.com/2005/09/michael-s-
rozeff/original-appropriation-and-its-critics/ (last visited Sept. 
4, 2016). 




this seeming overwhelming case against it. The open 
borders libertarian asks, is immigration necessarily a 
violation of property rights? When put in this way, it is clear 
that it is not. For example, suppose an Asian, or an African, 
or a Mexican, or a Martian for that matter, were to catapult6 
into a completely unowned parcel of land that has never 
before been homesteaded.7  For example, consider some 
                                                 
6 Perhaps arriving by helicopter, or space ship in the case of the 
Martian.  
7 For the libertarian, homesteading is the sine qua non of private 
property rights. See Walter Block, Earning Happiness Through 
Homesteading Unowned Land: a comment on 'Buying Misery with 
Federal Land' by Richard Stroup, 15 J. OF SOC. POL. AND ECON. 
STUD. N.2,  237-254 (1990); Walter E. Block, Homesteading City 
Streets; An Exercise in Managerial Theory, Planning and Markets, 
Vol. 5, No. 1, 18-23, (2002),  http://www-
pam.usc.edu/volume5/v5i1a2s1.html; Walter E. Block, On 
Reparations to Blacks for Slavery, Human Rights Review, LRC BLOG 
(2002), https://www.lewrockwell.com/lrc-blog/reparations-
blacks-slavery/; Walter E. Block and Guillermo Yeatts, Economics 
and Ethics of Land Reform: A Critique of the Pontifical Council for 
Justice and Peace’s ‘Toward a Better Distribution of Land: The 
Challenge of Agrarian Reform, J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L., Vol. 
15, No. 1, 37-69 (1999-2000); Water E. Block and Michael R. 
Edelstein, Popsicle sticks and homesteading land for nature preserves, 
ROMANIAN ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AND BUSINESS REVIEW, Vol. 
7, No. 1, pp. 7-13 (2005), 
http://www.rebe.rau.ro/REBE%207%201.pdf; Per Bylund, Man 
and Matter: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Justification of 
Ownership in Land from the Basis of Self-Ownership, (June 2005) 
(master thesis on file with Lund University), 
http://www.lunduniversity.lu.se/o.o.i.s?id=24965&postid=1330
482;  Per Bylund, Man and Matter: how the former gains ownership 
of the latter, LIBERTARIAN PAPERS, Vol. 4, No. 1, (2012),  
http://libertarianpapers.org/articles/2012/lp-4-1-5.pdf; Hugo 
Grotius, Law of War and Peace (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, (1625); 
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private 
Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy, (1993); Hans-
Hermann Hoppe, Of Private, Common, and Public Property and the 
Rationale for Total Privatization, LIBERTARIAN PAPERS, Vol. 3, No. 1, 
1-13 (2011),  http://libertarianpapers.org/2011/1-hoppe-
private-common-and-public-property/; Stephan N. Kinsella, A 
libertarian theory of contract: title transfer, binding promises, and 
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territory in the midst of Alaska, or in some isolated part of 
the Wyoming Rocky Mountains. Our immigrant starts to 
mix his labor with this land that has never been touched by 
human beings.8  What law that a libertarian must respect 
has this Asian, African, Mexican, or Martian violated? It is 
not clear that he has acted unlawfully9 at all. Rather, the 
very opposite is the case. If the statists try to remove him 
from these immigrant land claims, it is they¸ not he who is 
the trespasser, the NAP violator, the disrespector of private 
property rights.  This is a clear case, as clear as can be. Such 
an immigrant homesteader acts entirely within the limits of 
libertarian law.10 A more debatable example concerns other 
                                                 
inalienability, 17 J. OF LIBERTARIAN STUD. 11 (2003), 
http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/17_2/17_2_2.pdf; Stephan 
N. Kinsella, How we come to own ourselves, MISES DAILY ARTICLES 
(Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.mises.org/story/2291; Stephan N. 
Kinsella, Homesteading, Abandonment, and Unowned Land in the 
Civil Law, MISES DAILY ARTICLES (May 22, 2009), 
http://blog.mises.org/10004/homesteading-abandonment-and-
unowned-land-in-the-civil-law/; John Locke, An Essay 
Concerning the True Origin, Extent and End of Civil Government, 17-
19 (1948); John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, Chap. 
5, (1955); Ellen Frankel Paul, Property Rights and Eminent Domain, 
(1987); Samuel Pufendorf, Natural Law and The Law Of Nations, 
(1673); Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian 
Manifesto, 32 (1973); Michael Rozeff, Communities, Immigration, 
and Decentralization, LRC BLOG (Dec. 14, 2005), 
http://www.lewrockwell.com/rozeff/rozeff51.html; Carl 
Watner, The Proprietary Theory of Justice in the Libertarian 
Tradition,  JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIES, Vol. 6, No. 3-4, 289-
316 (1982), http://mises.org/journals/jls/6_3/6_3_6.pdf. 
8 The Bureau of Land Management of the U.S. Government of 
course claims these parcels, but as they have not homesteaded 
them either, the libertarian need not support such land titles. 
9 At least not according to the libertarian NAP law. 
10 Bionic Mosquito appears to be ambivalent on this issue. On the 
one hand, he asserts: “I suppose, given my logic above, I could 
conclude that Block’ s immigrant squatter on the top of the 
Rocky Mountains now ‘ owns’  the land under his feet – at least 
until the owner (taxpayer, government – it really doesn’ t matter 
at the moment) defends it and removes him.  Which the state 
will, via the US military (or some similar agency).” Bionic 




property owned by the government that has not been totally 
empty of human habitation: parks, roads, forests. Suppose 
an immigrant were to set up shop in one of those places, in 
the face of a population that, through inaction, in effect 
acquiesces in continued state ownership. My own view is 
that anyone, citizen or outsider, who would do so would be 
in the right.11  However, I readily acknowledge, this is a far 
more complicated claim than the one concerning entirely 
virgin territory and one I shall not pursue in the present 
paper. 
Another weakness in the closed border libertarian 
position concerns internal immigration. If movement from 
Argentina to the U.S. is to be stemmed by regulations 
                                                 
Mosquito, Dances With Elephants, BIONIC MOSQUITO BLOG (Aug. 
12, 2015), http://bionicmosquito.blogspot.ca/2015/08/dances-
with-elephants.html. If I read this correctly, it means that in this 
author’s view the homesteader is not the legitimate owner of the 
land with which he has mixed his labor. On the other hand, this 
scholar also maintains: “Yet ‘own” means something– eventually 
they come into contact.  This leads me to consider the possibility: 
“own’ means what one can defend. I don’t say that this fits 
neatly in libertarian theory; I don’t say it is just...” Id. In my view, 
in contrast, licit ownership, at least for the libertarian 
perspective, has nothing whatsoever to do with whether or not 
the owner can successfully defend his property. When the bully 
exploits the 90 pound weakling, or the mugger robs a victim, or 
the conquistadores steal the land of the peasants, or the slave 
master despoils the slave of his labor, the latter is still in the 
right, even though he is unable to “defend” his rights, and the 
former is in the wrong. Might does not make right, at least not 
for the libertarian. 
11 See Joachim Hagopian, Deep State’s Draconian Measures To 
Criminalize Citizens, LRC BLOG (Jan. 2016) 
https://www.lewrockwell.com/2016/01/joachim-
hagopian/deep-states-vicious-measures; Ron Paul, Oregon 
Standoff: Isolated Event or Sign of Things to Come?, LRC BLOG (Jan. 
2016), https://www.lewrockwell.com/2016/01/ron-
paul/beginning-civil-unrest; Joel Skousen, Oregon Standoff: 
Federal Land Grab vs. the Sagebrush Rebellion, TEA PARTY 
ECONOMIST (Jan. 9 2016), 
http://www.garynorth.com/public/14709.cfm. 
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presumably emanating from private property rights 
considerations, what of a change of address from New York 
to Louisiana? It would appear that the same arguments that 
apply to the one case also do so for the other (Richman, 
2010). The criticism of the migrant to the U.S. from 
Argentina is that without some sort of controls, there is a 
violation of property rights. The immigrant arrives, as it 
were, without any permission from anyone else. However, 
that same situation holds true for interstate movements; for 
intrastate ones too. People continually travel, for instance 
between New Orleans and Baton Rouge, all on their own 
cognizance; with no permission from anyone else. The 
implication of the non-open borders position is that this, 
too, should be looked at askance. And, yet, this 
consideration would appear to be a reductio ad absurdum 
of that viewpoint.  
IV. OTHER ARGUMENTS 
A. ACTUAL IMMIGRANT PRACTICE 
It might be claimed that the typical immigrant does 
not hive off to the desolate woods where no man has ever 
trod before. Rather, he enters a city, typically where 
members of the donor country congregate, so that he can be 
amongst his own kind. Says Mosquito (2016D): “These 
refugees are not settling on the 3000-meter-plus peaks of the 
Swiss Alps, far removed from any otherwise improved 
land; they are not going north of the Arctic Circle.  They are 
coming to the developed – and even most developed – parts 
of Europe.  Even if I accept your theory, you cannot avoid 
this practice – today.” This cannot be denied.   
However, this is hardly even relevant to our 
discussion. We are now attempting to explore whether free 
immigration is per se a violation of the libertarian principles 
of private property rights. And, if a single, solitary counter 
example can be furnished, this proves there is no 
fundamental rights violation in this practice. 
 




B. CANNOT HIRE?  
In view of Hoppe (2004):  
It is incorrect to infer from the fact that an 
immigrant has found someone willing to 
employ him that his presence on a given 
territory must henceforth be considered 
‘invited.’ Strictly speaking, this conclusion is 
true only if the employer also assumes the 
full costs associated with the importation of 
his immigrant-employee. This is the case 
under the much-maligned arrangement of a 
‘factory town’ owned and operated by a 
proprietor. Here, the full cost of 
employment, the cost of housing, healthcare, 
and all other amenities associated with the 
immigrant's presence, is paid for by the 
proprietor. No one else's property is 
involved in the immigrant-worker 
settlement. Less perfectly (and increasingly 
less so), this full-cost-principle of 
immigration is realized in Swiss 
immigration policy. In Switzerland, 
immigration matters are decided on the local 
rather than federal government level, by the 
local owner-resident community in which 
the immigrant wants to reside. These owners 
are interested that the immigrant's presence 
in their community increase rather than 
decrease their property values. In places as 
attractive as Switzerland, this typically 
means that the immigrant (or his employer) 
is expected to buy his way into a community, 
which often requires multimillion-dollar 
donations. 
Unfortunately, welfare states are not 
operated like factory towns or even Swiss 
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communities. Under welfare-statist 
condition, the immigrant employer must pay 
only a small fraction of the full costs 
associated with the immigrant's presence. 
He is permitted to socialize (externalize) a 
substantial part of such costs onto other 
property owners. Equipped with a work 
permit, the immigrant is allowed to make 
free use of every public facility: roads, parks, 
hospitals, schools, and no landlord, 
businessman, or private association is 
permitted to discriminate against him as 
regards housing, employment, 
accommodation, and association. That is, the 
immigrant comes invited with a substantial 
fringe benefits package paid for not (or only 
partially) by the immigrant employer (who 
allegedly has extended the invitation), but by 
other domestic proprietors as taxpayers who 
had no say in the invitation whatsoever. This 
is not an ‘invitation,’ as commonly 
understood. This is an imposition. It is like 
inviting immigrant workers to renovate 
one's own house while feeding them from 
other people's refrigerators. Consequently, 
because the cost of importing immigrant 
workers is lowered, more employer-
sponsored immigrants will arrive than 
otherwise. Moreover, the character of the 
immigrant changes, too. While Swiss 
communities choose well-heeled, highly 
value-productive immigrants, whose 
presence enhances communal property 
values all-around, employers under 
democratic welfare State conditions are 
permitted by state law to externalize their 
employment costs on others and tend to 
import increasingly cheap, low-skilled and 
low value-productive immigrants, 




regardless of their effect on all-around 
communal property values.12 
There are several difficulties in this position. First, 
consider the claim that the employee immigrant is to be 
considered invited13 “only if the employer also assumes the 
full costs associated with the importation of his immigrant-
employee.” Consider the case of “immigrants” from an 
entirely different country, “Storkovia.”  Contrary to the 
views of some biologists, all babies come from that nation.14  
They are, not merely in effect, but, actually, immigrants. 
They come from a place completely outside of the recipient 
country, in some sense even further removed than adult or 
child migrants from elsewhere on the planet. Do the parents 
of these immigrants bear anything like the “full costs 
associated with the[ir] importation?” To ask this is to 
answer it: of course not. When these immigrants grow up 
and commit crimes, it is their responsibility, not that of their 
mothers and fathers. Why, then, impose “full costs” on 
employers, and not on parents? Wherein lies the 
justification for treating these importers of immigrants so 
differently?  
Second, consider “the cost of housing, healthcare, 
and all other amenities associated with the immigrant's 
presence” as well as the fact that the “immigrant is allowed 
to make free use of every public facility: roads, parks, 
hospitals, schools, and no landlord, businessman, or private 
association is permitted to discriminate against him as 
                                                 
12 Hans-Hermann Hoppe, In the Free Market, May a Businessman 




13 Block & Callahan, Is There a Right to Immigration? A Libertarian 
Perspective, supra note 5 (explaining that because of this, labor 
mobility, too, would garner agreement by two parties, as in the 
case of internationally traded goods or investments). 
14 Id. (explaining that the stork carries boy babies in blue cloth, 
and girl babies in pink). 
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regards housing, employment, accommodation, and 
association.”15   But whose fault is this? Is it the immigrants? 
Of course not. These policies were put in place long before 
he arrived on the shores of the recipient country. As well, 
the immigrants from Storkovia will also be able to access 
this “substantial fringe benefits package.” The logic of this 
argument implies, again, that babies should either be 
banned and/or their creation, in migration from Storkovia, 
should be strictly controlled; as strictly as migrants from 
any other “place.” No, of course, the libertarian answer, to 
which Hoppe would certainly agree is to get rid of the 
welfare state which offers these “fringe benefits” to all and 
sundry.16  
Third, Hoppe’s concern with declining “communal 
property values” is more than passing curious, given that 
under libertarianism, property, and only property, not its 
value, may properly be owned. This point is eloquently 
demonstrated by none other than this author himself.17 
C. COLOGNE, GERMANY; SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN, 
DENMARK  
A very powerful argument against open borders is 
based on what is actually occurring in late 2015 and early 
2016. Large numbers of immigrant men, mainly from Arab 
countries have been molesting women, raping them, in 
many of the European nations that have welcomed them.18  
                                                 
15 Id. (explaining how those consideration apply to voting, 
receiving welfare, etc., with a lag time of some 18-21 years). 
16 David D. Friedman, Welfare and Immigration—The Other Half of 
the Argument, DAVID D. FRIEDMAN’S HOME PAGE (April 1, 2006),  
http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Libertarian/Welfare_and_I
mmigration.html (making a valid point that immigration may 
well help reduce or eliminate these burdensome and illicit 
welfare programs).  
17 See Hans Hermann-Hoppe & Walter Block, On Property and 
Exploitation (2002). 
18 Martin Armstrong, Germany’s Refugee Crisis is Starting to 
Explode, LRC BLOG (Jan 11, 2016), 
https://www.lewrockwell.com/2016/01/martin-




This has been so serious a problem, and so widespread, that 
there is even a new language to describe these acts of biting 
the hand that feeds them: “rapefugees” and “Taharrush.”19  
This behavior is particularly despicable in that repays 
benevolence with viciousness. In the view of many, this is 
the Achilles Heel of libertarian open borders position.  It 
would be difficult to quarrel with this assessment, at least 
in the view of most exponents of this opinion. However, this 
                                                 
armstrong/germanys-rapefugee-crisis/; Janosch Deckler, 
‘Criminal’ migrants carried out Cologne assault Stolen mobile phones 
found at refugee centers, POLITICO (Jan. 11, 2016 1:35 PM), 
http://www.politico.eu/article/criminal-migrants-carried-out-
cologne-hauptbahnhof-sex-assault-refugees-asylium-migration; 
Michael B. Doughtery, The Morally Repugnant Response To The 
Cologne Sexual Assault Gang, THE WEEK (Jan.11 2016), 
http://theweek.com/articles/598070/morally-repugnant-
response-cologne-sexual-assault-gang; Tyler Durden, Massive 
Coverup Exposed In Sweden As Media, Cops Hid Migrant Sex 
Attacks, ZERO HEDGE  (Jan. 11, 2016), 
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-01-11/massive-
coverup-exposed-sweden-media-cops-hid-migrant-sex-attacks; 
Nick Hallett, ‘Taharrush’: Authorities Fear Repeat of Cologne as 




europe/; Rex Murphy, Every major authority in Cologne — police, 
officialdom, press — failed, NATIONAL POST (Jan. 9, 2016 4:49 PM),  
http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/rex-murphy-
every-major-authority-in-cologne-police-officialdom-press-




19   “Gang-rape,” or “collective harassment” in Arabic. See Corey 
Charlton, The Arabic gang-rape 'Taharrush' phenomenon which sees 
women surrounded by groups of men in crowds and sexually 
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is a small segment of scholars who have contributed to that 
literature whose perspectives are invulnerable to this 
critique. 
Before we make this defense, let us take a small 
detour and discuss the distinction put forth by Kant (1785, 
1930) between his categorical and hypothetical imperatives.  
The former is articulated in the form of a command: Do this! 
Don’t do that! Or, regarding our present concerns: Open the 
border! Do not open the border! The latter takes on an if-
then format: If you want this, do that. If you want that, do 
this. If you want to see large numbers of unskilled workers 
unemployed, implement the minimum wage law. If you do 
not want to see large numbers of unskilled workers 
unemployed, eliminate the minimum wage law.20  
Most libertarian advocates of open borders take on 
the categorical imperative: Open the borders! True, 
advocates state that the following reasons for their position: 
it is the moral policy to pursue, it does not harm domestic 
workers, and that it promotes specialization, etc. 
Nevertheless at the end of the day, their bottom line is a 
categorical one: do not prohibit open and free immigration. 
However, there are some libertarian advocates of free 
unimpeded immigration who adopt the hypothetical 
stance. This small subset of the open borders libertarians21 
do not say: open all borders, period. They assert, rather, 
open all borders or homestead all land, all standing room, 
all territory on which people might settle.22  To put this in 
                                                 
20 Note, a scenario in which the minimum wage increases 
employment and pay would be a logical contradiction; therefore, 
we do not ask about it. 
21 Block, Libertarian Case, supra note 5; Block, Immigration: A 
Critique, supra note 5; Block, Rejoinder to Hoppe, supra note 5; 
Block, Rejoinder to Todea, supra note 5; Block and Callahan, supra 
note 5; Gregory and Block, supra note 5. 
22 Walter Block & Peter Nelson, WATER CAPITALISM: THE CASE 
FOR PRIVATIZING OCEANS, RIVERS, LAKES, AND AQUIFERS,  
(Rowman & Littlefield eds., 2015) (including bodies of water 
internal to the country). 




other words: all borders should be open (a categorical); if, 
however, you are afraid of being inundated by people who 
will molest women and engage in other untoward acts, then 
privatize all land, every square inch of it. When you follow 
this policy, free immigration will be converted into trespass 
or forced integration, something that falls completely 
outside of the bounds of libertarian law. With full private 
property over every square inch of land, then and only then 
would open immigration constitute trespass or forced 
integration. 
I do not say that the open border libertarians who 
adopt the categorical imperative are refuted by the Cologne, 
Germany argument. I only maintain they are vulnerable to 
it. For example, they may assert that the obvious harms to 
allowing “rapefugees” into their country is more than offset 
by the positives; the humanitarian policy of rescuing 
innocent people in danger of their lives, etc. Whether this 
will suffice or not is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
The only point I wish to make now is that the open borders 
libertarians who adopt the Kantian hypothetical are 
invulnerable to the Cologne counterexample. They can 
properly defend their position by claiming that it is not their 
fault that the “rapefugees” were allowed into Germany. The 
government of Angela Merkel had a choice: either open the 
borders or privatize fully. Had they adopted the latter 
policy, there would not have been any “rapefugees” 
allowed into their territory. But, they chose differently. The 
responsibility thus lies with them, not with the open 
borders libertarians.23  
D. THICK LIBERTARIANISM 
In the view of some libertarian opponents of open 
borders, this policy will lead away from libertarianism, 
and/or make it more difficult to move in its direction in the 
                                                 
23 Not that the latter had any power to make any determination 
at all in these decisions. 
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first place. Mosquito (2016H) writes as follows on this 
matter:  
So what does culture have to do with 
maintaining a libertarian order?  This, 
to me, is quite simple: the less conflict, 
the less chance that some self-
proclaimed and self-pitying 
disadvantaged group will look to a 
savior to deliver them from their 
perceived suffering. The less conflict, 
the less chance that people will look for 
someone to do something about it.  The 
‘someone’ will ultimately be the 
monopoly provider of fixing all things 
for all people. And there goes the 
libertarian order – or even the 
possibility of moving closer to one. No 
matter the pleasant thoughts of open-
borders libertarians, in this world we 
have an open borders example turning 
into a call for more state action….Ask 
yourself: who is the ‘opposition’ in this 
drama?  Who is the ‘enemy’? Look in 
the mirror. This is the fruit of ‘open 
borders’ in this world. 24 
Note that this is a thick libertarian25 perspective. As 
such it is incompatible with what I am trying to do in the 
                                                 
24 Mosquito, supra note 10 (doubles down on this perspective 
with this statement: “I am not arguing libertarian theory; I am 
suggesting that Block’s suggested path from here to there will move 
society away from, and not toward, a libertarian world.”). 
25 For advocates of thick libertarianism, See Nick Gillespie, ET 
AL., The Declaration of Independents: How Libertarian Politics Can 
Fix What’s Wrong With America. (Public Affairs 2011); Charles 
Johnson, Libertarianism through Thick and Thin, RAD GEEK 
PEOPLE’S DAILY (OCT. 3, 2008), 
http://radgeek.com/gt/2008/10/03/libertarianism_through/; 




                                                 
Charles Johnson, Libertarianism through Thick and Thin, RAD GEEK 
PEOPLE’S DAILY (July 20, 2013), 
http://radgeek.com/gt/2008/10/03/libertarianism_through/; 
Roderick Long, The Plot Thickens,  
AUSTRO-ATHENIAN EMPIRE BLOG (Nov. 3, 2007), 
http://aaeblog.com/2007/11/03/the-plot-thickens/; Roderick 
Long, Thickness Unto Death, AUSTRO-ATHENIAN EMPIRE BLOG 
(July 10, 2008), http://aaeblog.com/2008/07/10/thickness-unto-
death/; Roderick Long, Monster Thickburger Libertarianism, 
AUSTRO-ATHENIAN EMPIRE BLOG (July 24, 2008), 
http://aaeblog.com/2008/07/24/monster-thickburger-
libertarianism/; Bionic Mosquito, The Real Action is in the 
Reaction of the Opposition, LRC BLOG (Jan. 11, 2016), 
https://www.lewrockwell.com/2016/01/bionic-
mosquito/open-borders-saul-alinsky/; Cathy Reisenwitz, Thick 
and thin libertarianism and Tom Woods, SEX & THE ST. (Dec. 23, 
2013), http://cathyreisenwitz.com/blog/2013/12/23/thick-and-
thin-libertarianism-and-tom-woods/; Sheldon Richman, TGIF: In 
Praise of ‘Thick’ Libertarianism, EXPLORE FREEDOM (Apr. 4, 2014), 
http://fff.org/explore-freedom/article/tgif-in-praise-of-thick-
libertarianism/; Sheldon Richman, Libertarianism is more than just 
rejecting force: the ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ of libertarian philosophy, HIT & 
RUN (Apr. 6, 2014), http://reason.com/archives/2014/04/06/a-
libertarian-opposition-to-racism; Sheldon Richman, TGIF: 
Libertarianism Rightly Conceived, EXPLORE FREEDOM (May 2, 2014), 
http://fff.org/explore-freedom/article/tgif-libertarianism-
rightly-conceived/; Sheldon Richman, What Social Animals Owe 
Each Other, EXPLORE FREEDOM (July 1, 2014), 
http://fff.org/explore-freedom/article/what-social-animals-
owe-each-other/; Jeffery Tucker, Against libertarian brutalism: 
Will libertarianism be brutalist or humanitarian? Everyone needs to 
decide, THE FREEMAN (March 12, 2014), 
http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/against-libertarian-
brutalism; Kevin Vallier, Political Libertarianism: Between Thick 
and Thin, BLEEDING HEART LIBERTARIANS (May 7, 2014) 
http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2014/05/political-
libertarianism-between-thick-and-thin; Kevin Vallier, Libertarian 
Social Morality: Progressive, Conservative or Liberal?, BLEEDING 
HEART LIBERTARIANS (February 22, 2013), 
http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2013/02/libertarian-
social-morality-progressive-conservative-or-liberal/; Matt 
Zwolinski, Libertarianism: Thick and Thin, BLEEDING HEART 
LIBERTARIANS (December 28, 2011), 
http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2011/12/libertarianism-
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thick-and-thin/#more-1697. In contract, advocates for thin 
libertarianism, See Logan Albright, What Libertarianism Is Not, 
MISES INSTITUTE CANADA BLOG (Apr. 26, 2014)  
http://mises.ca/posts/blog/what-libertarianism-is-not/; Walter 





=0_600843dec4-8cd483dafc-284768769; Walter Block, Was Murray 





28EconomicPolicyJournal.com%29; Walter Block, Was Murray 





H+%28EconomicPolicyJournal.com%29; Christopher Cantwell,  
Jeffrey Tucker Reduces Core Libertarian Ideals To ‘Brutalism,’ 
CHRISTOPHER CANTWELL: RADICAL AGENDA (March 12, 2014), 
http://www.christophercantwell.com/2014/03/12/jeffrey-
tuckers-case-libertarianism; David Gordon, What Is 
Libertarianism?, LRC BLOG (August 29, 2011), 
http://archive.lewrockwell.com/gordon/gordon90.1.html; 
Jacob Hornberger, The Virtues of Libertarianism, HORNBERGER’S 
BLOG (May 15, 2014),  
http://fff.org/explore-freedom/article/the-virtues-of-
libertarianism/; Stephan N. Kinsella, Homesteading, 
Abandonment, and Unowned Land in the Civil Law, MISES DAILY 
ARTICLES (May 22, 2009), 
http://blog.mises.org/10004/homesteading-abandonment-and-
unowned-land-in-the-civil-law/; Stephan N. Kinsella, What 
Libertarianism Is, MISES DAILY ARTICLES (Aug. 21, 2009), 
https://mises.org/library/what-libertarianism; Bionic 
Mosquito, Sheldon Richman Takes Down Walter Block & Lew 









present paper: discern what is the proper libertarian 
position on immigration. In very sharp contrast, this is not 
an objection on that ground. That is, whether a policy will 
promote liberty, somewhat shockingly, is entirely irrelevant 
to the question of what is the proper libertarian analysis of 
the issue. Instead, it raises an entirely different question: 
what view of libertarianism, correct or incorrect, will best 
promote libertarianism, a very distinct concern. To clarify 
                                                 
onomicPolicyJournal.com%29; Bionic Mosquito, On Thick, BIG 





%28EconomicPolicyJournal.com%29; Lew Rockwell, The Current 
Libertarian Infighting and the Future of Libertarianism, LRC BLOG 
(May 1, 2014), https://www.lewrockwell.com/2014/05/lew-
rockwell/the-future-of-libertarianism/; Dan Sanchez, Sophistry 
and the State: The Perils of Fuzzy (Thick) Thinking, LRC BLOG (May 
10, 2014), https://www.lewrockwell.com/2014/05/dan-
sanchez/the-perils-of-thick-thinking/; Neil J. Smith, Thick as a 
brick, BEFORE IT’S NEWS (May 2, 2014), 
http://beforeitsnews.com/alternative/2014/05/thick-as-a-
brick-2949630.html; Laurence M. Vance, I Am a Libertarian, LRC 
BLOG (May 6, 2014), 
https://www.lewrockwell.com/2014/05/laurence-m-vance/i-
am-a-libertarian/; Robert Wenzel,  A Note on the Difference 





8EconomicPolicyJournal.com%29; Robert Wenzel, It's Here: 





28EconomicPolicyJournal.com%29; Tom Woods, Thick and Thin 
Libertarianism, and Duck Dynasty, THE TOM WOODS SHOW 
(December 19, 2013), http://tomwoods.com/thick-and-thin-
libertarianism-and-duck-dynasty/. 
A RESPONSE TO THE LIBERTARIAN CRITICS OF OPEN-BORDERS LIBERTARIANISM          
 163 
 
this, consider some other cases. For example, the minimum 
wage law prohibits consenting adults from negotiating a 
wage contract below the level stipulated by this legislation. 
As such, this is a per se violation of liberty, and thus 
incompatible with libertarianism. But, suppose, just 
suppose, that the best way to promote economic freedom 
would be to support the minimum wage law. This might be 
true if this enactment creates so much unemployment for 
unskilled workers that a general revulsion leads to a 
jettisoning of all sorts of economic interventionistic policies. 
Then, by stipulation, the minimum wage law would 
encourage the free enterprise system, paradoxical though 
this might sound. A similar procedure is taking place in the 
present debate over free and open immigration. Mosquito 
is claiming that such a policy will lead to greater statism. It 
might well do so, as far as I know. However, my concern 
here is not with which is the most efficient efficacious way 
to achieve liberty, or maintain it. It is, rather, with what 
liberty consists of, an entirely different matter.  
Here is another example. It is a paradigm 
implication of libertarianism that all drugs should be 
legalized. But, posit, that if so, then some famous person 
will die from an overdose, and the electorate will become so 
revulsed by economic freedom, that democratic 
government will institute all sorts of horrid regulations. 
Still, drug legalization is the libertarian position, even 
though, under our present scenario, it will, paradoxically, 
lead to less liberty. 
We must stress that there is nothing at all wrong 
with enquiring which policies lead to and away from 
freedom. These are very valuable studies. One does not 
become enmeshed into the wilds of thick libertarianism 
until one conflates the two; equating policies the promote 
liberty with the libertarian position. For example, consider 
the totally made up scenario where murdering innocent 
people will somehow bring liberty closer. It is still 
incompatible with libertarianism, and punishable by 
libertarian law, to do so. (Block, 2004, 2006). 





Libertarian open borders opponents emphasize the 
importance of a shared culture (Mosquito, 2015E) in terms 
of reducing intra-national hostilities. They are undoubtedly 
correct; there is little doubt that homogeneous societies tend 
to be more peaceful than heterogeneous ones.26  This, of 
course, mitigates against the open border position. To be 
sure, some open border cases will fall victim to the Cologne, 
Germany objection based on rape. But not all, if the benefits 
of free immigration are ruled to outweigh this objection. 
And all of the free immigration perspectives based on the 
hypothetical imperative are immune to the charge that they 
promote rape. 
 
                                                 
26 Craig Calcaterra, Majority of Baseball Brawls are between Players 
of Different Ethnicities, NBC SPORTS (2015), 
http://mlb.nbcsports.com/2015/09/30/majority-of-baseball-
brawls-are-between-players-of-different-ethnicities/ (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2016) (offering an example of this that might well be 
unknown even to writers who maintain this stance in opposition 
to immigration). 
